Redman v. Lima City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 10 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 3:94CV7232.,3:94CV7232.
• Citation: 889 F. Supp. 288
• Parties: Ronda REDMAN, Plaintiff, v. LIMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia

889 F. Supp. 288

Ronda REDMAN, Plaintiff, v. LIMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:94CV7232.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division.

March 10, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Marc D. Mezibov, Sirkin, Pinales, Mezibov & Schwartz, Cincinnati, OH, for Ronda Redman.

Ronald S. Moening, Sr., Robison, Curphey & O'Connell, Toledo, OH, and Gregory B. Scott, and Julie C. Martin, Scott, Scriven & Wahoff, Columbus, OH, for Lima City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., Charles Buroker, and Tim Haller.

Bruce Comly French, Lima, OH, for Robert Hampshire.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CARR, District Judge.

This is a sexual harassment case in which the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff brings her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), O.R.C. § 4112.99, and Ohio common law. In her complaint, plaintiff names Robert Hampshire, the Lima City School District Board of Education (Board), Dr. Charles Buroker, and Timothy Haller as defendants. Defendants Buroker, Haller, and the Board oppose plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and move for summary judgment on all plaintiff's claims.¹ Defendant Hampshire has neither moved for summary judgment nor opposed plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment shall be denied as to all defendants but Hampshire, and defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against Hampshire shall be granted.

Plaintiff and Haller dated in 1993. At the suggestion of Haller, who was Superintendent of Custodians for the school district, plaintiff applied for a substitute custodian's job. Plaintiff was hired as a substitute custodian by the district. In September, 1993, plaintiff received a temporary appointment at Jefferson Elementary, where Hampshire was the principal. Plaintiff worked September 15 through September 17 before taking a leave for medical reason. During the three days, plaintiff alleges Hampshire approached her several times and invited her to get together after school and made other such comments to her. Plaintiff also alleges Hampshire rubbed his hand across plaintiff's back. During plaintiff's illness, Hampshire informed Haller that he would like plaintiff to return to his school. Haller acceded to Hampshire's request; on returning to work, plaintiff was again assigned to Jefferson.

On October 19, 1993, plaintiff's first day back to work, Hampshire followed her at work, complimented her on her appearance, and invited her to get together after work.

The following day plaintiff arrived at Jefferson at 6:30 a.m. to open the building and turn on the lights. Hampshire was already at the school. Hampshire invited plaintiff to join him in the boiler room. When plaintiff refused, Hampshire put his hand on the back of her neck and led her down the basement stairs. In the basement, Hampshire forced the plaintiff against the wall. Hampshire proceeded to fondle and rub against the plaintiff in a sexual manner. Plaintiff protested against Hampshire's actions. In response to Hampshire's unwelcome advance, plaintiff vomited. After plaintiff was sick, Hampshire released her and left the basement.

Early that afternoon, plaintiff spoke with Haller and told him of the incident. Haller told plaintiff that he would meet plaintiff at school when she reported to work the next morning so that she would not have to be alone with Hampshire. Haller met plaintiff the next two days. Later on those days, after Haller had left the school, Hampshire made sexually suggestive statements to the plaintiff.

On Sunday, Haller notified the assistant superintendent of plaintiff's allegations. The superintendent, Buroker, was notified, and the law firm of Squires, Sanders & Dempsey was retained to conduct an investigation. Patrice Baughman conducted the investigation and recommended that Hampshire be terminated from employment. A hearing was held following the investigation, and the referee recommended that Hampshire be dismissed. In response to the referee's finding, the Board fired Hampshire. He appealed his dismissal. The dismissal was upheld by the Allen County Court of Common Pleas.

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff asserts that this court is precluded from reinvestigating certain material facts because they are res judicata. This argument is premised on the fact that the referee's post-hearing findings were accepted by the Board and the Board's decision was upheld by the Allen County Court of Common Pleas.

The first issue is whether accepting the referee's findings as true has any effect on the outcome of the present litigation. According to his report (Doc. 37), the referee was concerned with only two issues:

1) Did Hampshire make unwelcome sexual comments and overtures to plaintiff between October 19-22, 1993?

2) If yes, should Hampshire's contract with the Lima City School District be terminated on the grounds of immorality and/or other good and just cause?

For purposes of their motions, defendants do not contest that Hampshire made such comments and overtures and that Hampshire should have been terminated; according to defendants, the facts underlying this litigation are undisputed. The referee, however, did not make any findings that Hampshire's actions created a hostile work environment or violated Title VII, leaving these issues of law unresolved. I agree with defendants that, even if the referee's findings of fact are res judicata, they are not determinative of defendants' liability under Title VII. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982) (determination of issue of fact or law is only conclusive when it is actually litigated, determined by a final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment).

Defendants Haller and Buroker claim that they cannot be individually liable under Title VII. The Sixth Circuit has not confronted this issue. Most recent circuit court decisions have concluded there is no individual liability. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.1993).; Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir.1993); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam); Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28 (5th Cir.1990). Some courts, however, hold to the contrary. See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir.1989); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 n. 1 (11th Cir.1989).

I agree with the courts denying individual liability. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Miller, the statutory scheme of Title VII indicates Congress did not intend to impose individual liability. Liability under Title VII is expressly limited to employers with fifteen or more employees because Congress "did not want to burden small entities with the costs associated with litigating discrimination claims." Miller, supra, 991 F.2d at 587. Given this protection for small employers, it is "inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil liability to run against individual employees." Id.

Additionally, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 places caps on the availability of compensatory and punitive damages based on the size of an employer's workforce. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A-D). In Miller, the Court found, "if Congress had envisioned individual liability under Title VII for compensatory and punitive damages, it would have included individual in this litany of limitation and would have discontinued the exemption for small employers." Miller, 991 F.2d at 588 n. 2. Because of the great weight of authority denying individual liability and the persuasiveness of its reasoning, I conclude there is no individual liability. Accordingly, summary judgment shall be granted as to plaintiff's Title VII claims against Haller and Buroker.

Both plaintiff and defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiff's quid pro quo claim of sexual harassment. To prevail on a quid pro quo claim of sexual harassment, plaintiff must assert and prove: 1) she was a member of a protected class; 2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; 3) the harassment was based on sex; 4) her submission to the unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits or refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment; and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l. Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir.1986).

It is undisputed that plaintiff has established the first three elements of a quid pro quo claim. As a female, plaintiff is a member of a protected class. She was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment by Hampshire, and the harassment was based on sex.

Plaintiff claims that Hampshire's refusal to allow her to work, because she complained to Haller of Hampshire's actions, was sufficient to satisfy the fourth element. Hampshire's action, however, was not in response to plaintiff's failure to submit to his advances but was instead in response to plaintiff's complaints of sexual harassment. Plaintiff's claim is not of quid pro quo sexual harassment but rather asserts a claim of retaliation. In some circumstances, retaliation can be a basis for a quid pro quo claim, however; the adverse action must be taken in retaliation against the plaintiff for her failure to submit to the defendant's advances.

Because plaintiff has failed to set forth facts supporting a prima facie quid pro quo claim, summary judgment must be granted to defendants.

Plaintiff and defendants also move for summary judgment on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim. For plaintiff to prevail on her claim of sexual harassment due to a hostile work environment she must prove:

1) the employee was a member of a protected class; 2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual

...