Redman v. Sentry Group, Inc.
| Decision Date | 29 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-0207-B.,91-0207-B. |
| Citation | 907 F. Supp. 180 |
| Parties | Michael REDMAN, Plaintiff, v. SENTRY GROUP, INCORPORATED, and Value-Tique, Incorporated, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
Terry Kilgore, Gate City, VA, for Plaintiff.
Laura E. Wilson, Abingdon, VA, for Defendants.
This action is before this court upon post-trial motion for judgment by Defendant, Sentry Group, Inc. ("Sentry"). Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). Previously, this court denied Sentry's motion for summary judgment as to the Plaintiff's claim alleging negligent design of a safe manufactured by Sentry. That issue was then presented to the jury at trial,1 and a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff was returned. The Defendant now brings a motion for judgment in which it is alleged: (1) that the Plaintiff failed to establish that the design of the safe breached industry standards; (2) that the safe at issue is not "unreasonably dangerous" as a "matter of law;" (3) that the Plaintiff failed to establish that his damages were proximately caused by the Defendant; and (4) that the Plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages for loss of his coins under Virginia's economic loss rule. Having considered the Defendant's motion and the evidence presented at trial, this court finds that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict and award of damages.
This case regards the purchase of a Sentry safe by the Plaintiff, Michael Redman. According to Mr. Redman, he ordered a Sentry safe after seeing an advertisement for a "Sentry Supreme" safe in a nationally distributed coin collector's magazine. The advertisement was placed in the magazine by Value-Tique, Incorporated. Mr. Redman ordered the safe through Value-Tique, which then forwarded his order to Sentry. Mr. Redman received his Sentry safe in February 1987.
According to the advertisement, Sentry safes are fire-resistant and burglary deterrent, and therefore, would provide excellent protection for valuable coin collections. Also, a warranty from Sentry, which was included with the safe upon delivery, stated that the safe would provide "a degree of protection against burglary." Based upon such evidence, Mr. Redman testified that he placed his coin collection into the safe, believing that it would provide safety from fire and theft. Upon returning from vacation in December 1989, Mr. Redman testified that he found that the safe had been burglarized. Based upon other testimony at trial, it appears that a small pry-bar was used to open the door of the safe. Also, Mr. Redman's coin collection, which he kept inside the safe, was stolen.
"To prevail in a products liability case under Virginia law, the plaintiff must prove that the product contained a defect which rendered it unreasonably dangerous for ordinary or foreseeable use." Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993 F.2d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1993). "In determining what constitutes an unreasonably dangerous defect, a court will consider safety standards promulgated by the government or the relevant industry, as well as the reasonable expectations of consumers." Id. (citation omitted). "Consumer expectations, which may differ from government or industry standards, can be established through `evidence of actual industry practices, ... published literature, and from direct evidence of what reasonable purchasers considered defective.'" Id. at 420-21 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Where there is no established industry norm, the court must rely on expert opinion in order to ascertain the applicable safety standard. Id. at 421 (citation omitted).
The Defendant, relying on Alevromagiros, contends that the Plaintiff's expert failed to establish that the safe fell below any industry standard. In Alevromagiros, the plaintiff was injured when a ladder on which he was standing fell. The plaintiff then brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of the ladder. At trial, the plaintiff's only expert testified to certain structural aspects of the ladder at issue. However, he admitted never having seen or tested a similar, undamaged ladder. He also testified to the absence of safety features found on other types of ladders. On cross examination, the plaintiff's expert noted the existence of advisory industry standards promulgated by two separate organizations: ANSI and UL. Although the plaintiff's expert admitted that the ladder complied with UL standards, he opined that the ladder failed to comply with the literal wording of the ANSI standard.
Upon motion by the defendant, the trial court granted a directed verdict and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit noted that the plaintiff's expert Id. at 421. Because the plaintiff's expert failed to identify anything other than his own subjective belief that the ladder was defective, the Alevromagiros court found his testimony to be insufficient.
The present case is distinguishable from the facts at issue in Alevromagiros. First, Mr. Redman's expert, Mr. Sahay, testified that he had identified certain industry standards regarding burglary deterrent safes from those within the safe industry. As Mr. Sahay testified:
Sahay Testimony at 16-17. Also, some of the most compelling evidence that the safe at issue fell below industry standards comes from the Defendant's expert, Mr. Beattie. According to Mr. Beattie's testimony:
Beattie Testimony at 80-81. Thus, testimony from both experts indicate that the safe at issue failed to meet industry standards2 regarding burglary deterrent/burglary resistant safes.
The Defendant also contends that the safe at issue is not "unreasonably dangerous" as a matter of law. As noted by the court in Alevromagiros, in determining what constitutes an unreasonably dangerous defect, a court is to consider government or industry standards as well as the reasonable expectations of consumers. Alevromagiros, 993 F.2d at 420. Consumer expectations, in turn, may be established from direct evidence of what reasonable purchasers considered defective. Id. In the present action, experts for both the Plaintiff and Defendant have stated that the safe fell below the industry standards regarding burglary deterrent/burglary resistant safes. Also, at trial the Plaintiff testified that it was his expectation that the safe would provide burglary protection due to the representation contained in the warranty. This court believes that a jury could find such an expectation to be reasonable and foreseeable where the manufacturer told purchasers of the safe that it would provide a degree of burglary protection. In sum, based upon the manner in which the term "unreasonably dangerous" has been defined by the Fourth Circuit, this court cannot say that as a matter of law the safe at issue could not be "unreasonably dangerous."
Next, the Defendant alleges that the Plaintiff failed to establish that any defect in the design of the safe was the proximate cause of the Plaintiff's loss. Proximate cause may be defined as that act or omission which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces that event, and without which that event would not have occurred. Huffman v. Sorenson, 194 Va. 932, 937, 76 S.E.2d 183 (1953). This test has been held to incorporate both a foreseeability and a factual causation analysis. See Banks v. Richmond, 232 Va. 130, 136, 348 S.E.2d 280 (1986). Based upon the language contained on the warranty which was sent with the Sentry safe, it would be foreseeable that Mr. Redman would place valuable items inside the safe in the belief that they would be protected from theft. Similarly, if that safe was not designed so as to be burglary deterrent/burglary resistant, a foreseeable consequence could be the loss of items within the safe due to theft. Thus, this court finds that a jury could find that the foreseeability prong of the proximate cause analysis was met.
Factual causation requires that the harm would not have occurred but for the Defendant's negligence. Etheridge v. Norfolk So. R.R. Co., ...
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