Redman v. Shaw

• Decision Date: 05 January 1942
• Docket Number: No. 52.,52.
• Citation: 300 Mich. 314,1 N.W.2d 555
• Parties: REDMAN et al. v. SHAW.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

300 Mich. 314

1 N.W.2d 555

REDMAN et al.

v.SHAW.

No. 52.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Jan. 5, 1942.

Suit to quiet title to oil leases by Clayton Redman, Clifford A. Perry, and Lucy Redman, copartners doing business under the name and style of Red-Man Oil Company, and others, against Josephine M. Shaw. From an adverse decree, the defendant appeals.

Decree affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Allegan County, in Chancery; Fred T. miles, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Arthur F. Shaw, of Grand Rapids, for appellant.

Butterfield, Keeney & Amberg, Harry Shulsky, and Richard L. Lindland, all of Grand Rapids, for appellees.

CHANDLER, Chief Justice.

This is a bill to quiet title of plaintiffs as lessees of two oil leases covering a certain piece or parcel of land situate in the County of Allegan, particularly described as follows: The Southest one-quarter (SE 1/4) of the Southeast one-quarter (SE 1/4) of Section 2, Township 4 North, Range 13 West.

These leases were assigned to plaintiffs by Arthur F. Shaw, husband of appellant, in pursuance of the decree affirmed by us with a minor modification, not relevant here, in Redman Oil Co. v. Shaw, 291 Mich. 8, 288 N.W. 318. The decree in the Circuit Court for the County of Allegan did not award any damages to the plaintiff but instead determined, and we quote from that decree: ‘8. That Josephine Shaw, the wife of said defendant, has no dower interest, inchoate or otherwise, or other right or title in and to any of said leases hereby decreed to be assigned and transfered by said defendant to said plaintiff.'

As Josephine M. Shaw was not a party to the proceedings, the decree was not binding on her. She has written a letter to the buyer of the oil produced by plaintiffs from said leases that she was asserting a dower interest in all oil produced from said leases and directing the purchaser to pay a dower interest to her. Because of the letter, the buyer has withheld from plaintiffs' portion of the moneys owing by it for oil produced from said leased land, and the plaintiffs bring this bill to clear the above cloud on their title to the two leases. Both leases contain a clause limiting their life to five years, ‘* * * and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from said land by the lessee.'

The sole issue is whether the wife of the lessee has a dower interest in the above oil and gas leases. The statute, 3 C.L.1929, sec. 13072 (Stat.Ann. 26.221) provides: ‘The widow of every deceased person shall be entitled to dower, or the use during her natural life, of one-third (1/3) part of all the lands whereof her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance, at any time during the marriage, unless she is lawfully barred thereof.'

Defendant's right of dower depends solely upon whether defendant's husband ‘was seized of an estate of inheritance’ by being lessee on the two oil and gas leases. The terms ‘dower,’ ‘seized’ and ‘estate of inheritance’ are not defined by statute, but this statute is, in substance, the common-law rule of dower, Cummings v. Schreur, 239 Mich. 178, 214 N.W. 199,May v. Rumney, 1 Mich. 1, and we must look to the common-law definitions.

The first requirement is there must be seisen of the husband during coverture. Sagendorph v. Lutz, 286 Mich. 103, 281 N.W. 553; Flynn v. Flynn, 171 Mass. 312, 50 N.E. 650,42 L.R.A. 98, 68 Am.St.Rep. 427. ‘Seisen ’ has been defined by Black in his Law Dictionary wherein he quotes Brown, ‘The word (seisen) still retains its original signification, being applied exclusively to the possession of land of a freehold tenure, it being inaccurate to use the word as expressive of the possession of leaseholds or terms of years, or even of copyholds.'

Also see 1 Tiffany, 2d Ed., sec. 74, citing Litt. 324, Litt. 200b, 201a; Challis, Real Prop. 47, wherein it is stated: ‘* * * (Seisen) * * * came finally to be used only in reference to possession claiming a freehold estate; he being said to be ‘seised’, while a tenant for years or at will was said to be merely possessed.'

The remaining requirement is that the estate be one of inheritance. Of this 1 Tiffany on Real Property, 2d Ed., sec. 213, citing Littleton sec. 36 and 2 Blackstone's Commentaries 131, says:

‘Since the estate of dower is derived out of the estate of the husband, his estate must, in order that the wife be endowed, be one of inheritance * * * that is, either a fee simple or a fee tail * * *

‘There is no right of dower at common law if the husband had merely a chattel interest in the land, such as a term for years, however long it may have to run, or even though it be renewable forever, nor can there be dower in an estate at will.'

Now, was appellant's husband seised of a fee-simple estate or an estate of inheritance? Appellant contends that the interest of her...