Redman v. Stedman Manufacturing Company
| Decision Date | 19 February 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. C-846-G.,C-846-G. |
| Citation | 181 F. Supp. 5 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Frank R. REDMAN and Redman Process American Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. STEDMAN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant. |
McLendon, Brim, Holderness & Brooks, Greensboro, N. C., and Taylor, Scoll & Simon, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Welch Jordan, Greensboro, N. C., and Pennie, Edmonds, Morton, Barrows & Taylor, New York City, for defendant.
Herbert S. Falk, Greensboro, N. C., and Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn, New York City, for Tubular Textile Machinery Corp., Eugene Cohn and Joseph Cohn.
This matter is before the court (1) on the petition of the plaintiffs, Frank R. Redman and Redman Process American Corporation (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Redman"), for an order to show cause why the Tubular Textile Machinery Corporation (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Tubular"), and its officers, Eugene Cohn and Joseph Cohn, should not be adjudged in civil contempt and punished for violation of a writ of injunction addressed to Tubular, and (2) on a motion by Tubular, Eugene Cohn and Joseph Cohn for an order (a) vacating this court's judgment of September 23, 1957, insofar as that judgment names and enjoins Tubular as a defendant, (b) similarly vacating this court's decree on mandate, dated March 13, 1959, and writs of injunction issued against Tubular on March 16, 1959, and (c) quashing the show cause order for adjudication of civil contempt.
On April 17, 1954, Redman, the owner of patents covering a device and method of preventing shrinkage in tubular knit fabrics, commenced this infringement action against Stedman Manufacturing Company (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Stedman"). It was alleged that Stedman was using an infringing device known as a "tensionless calender," which had been manufactured and leased to it by Tubular.
Pursuant to its lease agreement with Stedman, Tubular openly assumed the complete defense of the action, both monetarily and by the selection of Stedman's attorneys. Tubular's defense of the action was open and avowed, and was known to Redman from the inception of the trial. Tubular was not served with process, and has never been made a "formal" party to the action. However, at the commencement of the trial, Stedman's attorneys, who had been selected and paid by Tubular, characterized Tubular as being the real party in interest.
The plaintiff, Redman Process American Corporation, is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York City. The plaintiff, Frank R. Redman, is a resident of Pennsylvania, but in his capacity as a director of the Redman Process American Corporation maintains an office in New York City. The defendant, Stedman Manufacturing Company, is a North Carolina corporation, and maintains its principal place of business within the jurisdiction of this court. Tubular Textile Machinery Corporation is a New York corporation and maintains its principal office in that state. Eugene Cohn is Tubular's vice-president and general manager, and Joseph Cohn is Tubular's secretary-treasurer. Both individuals live in New York City.
On September 23, 1957, this court found Redman's patents valid and infringed by Stedman's use of Tubular's tensionless calender. Redman v. Stedman Manufacturing Co., D.C.M.D.N.C. 1957, 154 F.Supp. 378. In his opinion, Judge Hayes observed that while Stedman was the named defendant and user of the accused device, Tubular was the manufacturer and owner and lessor and in charge of and conducted the defense and would be referred to in the opinion as the defendant. The judgment entered on September 23, 1957, provides, in pertinent parts, the following:
On May 20, 1957, Redman's attorneys sent to Stedman's attorneys (employed by Tubular) a copy of a proposed judgment embodying the substance of the above-quoted Paragraph 10 of the judgment later signed by the Court. Defense attorneys had opportunity to object to this provision from the date it was submitted to them until the entry of the judgment on September 23, 1957. No objection was made in the name of Stedman, nor did Tubular appear in its own name to contest the validity of this portion of the judgment. During this same period, and prior to the entry of the judgment, the defense attorneys submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which requested the court to find:
After entry of the judgment, no application was made by defense counsel, either in the name of Stedman or in the name of Tubular, to amend the judgment by the elimination of Paragraph 10 thereof. Stedman appealed to the Court of Appeals from the judgment of this court, but no appeal was taken in the name of Tubular. In its brief before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the appellant raised no question concerning the validity of Paragraph 10 of the judgment, nor was any question raised on oral arguments before that court. The judgment of this court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on July 17, 1958. Stedman Manufacturing Co. v. Redman, 4 Cir., 1958, 257 F.2d 867. Stedman, in its petition for rehearing before the Court of Appeals, for the first time raised a question concerning the validity of Paragraph 10 of the judgment. On September 17, 1958, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for rehearing.
Thereafter, Stedman filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. One of the principal contentions made in the petition was the invalidity of the portion of the judgment naming and enjoining Tubular as a defendant. The petition was denied on January 12, 1959. Stedman Manufacturing Co. v. Redman, 1958, 358 U.S. 928, 79 S.Ct. 314, 3 L.Ed. 2d 302. Upon the remand after affirmance, this court, on March 13, 1959, entered its decree on mandate, Paragraph 10 of which, like Paragraph 10 of the original judgment, enjoins Tubular as a defendant. On March 11, 1959, attorneys for Redman served upon the defense attorneys a copy of the proposed decree on mandate, and stated that the proposed decree would be submitted to the court for execution. No objection was made by defense attorneys to the provisions of the decree on mandate enjoining Tubular.
On March 16, 1959, this court issued writs of injunction directed against Tubular, embodying the injunction against said corporation as set forth in the judgment and decree on mandate. Said writs of injunction were duly served upon Tubular on March 19, 1959, by the United States Marshal for the Eastern District of New York.
On April 10, 1959, Tubular instituted a declaratory judgment action against Redman in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and moved for a preliminary injunction restraining and enjoining Redman from attempting to enforce or otherwise take action upon the judgment, decree and injunctive writs issued by this court. Eugene Cohn and Joseph Cohn subsequently intervened as plaintiffs in said action and motion. The motion for preliminary injunction was denied on May 21, 1959. Tubular Textile Machinery Corp. v. Redman, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1959, 173 F.Supp. 269. Following an expedited appeal from that order, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on June 22, 1959, affirmed the opinion of the district court. Tubular Textile Machinery Corp. v. Redman, 2 Cir., 1959, 267 F.2d 784.
In its complaint in the New York action, Tubular alleged that it then had leased 150 tensionless calenders to 79 customers in 19 states. The fact that some or all of the tensionless calenders then leased by Tubular actually infringes upon Redman's patent is not controverted.
On April 20, 1959, this court, upon petition of Redman, directed an order to Tubular and Eugene Cohn and Joseph Cohn to appear before this court on May 22, 1959, and show cause why said corporation and individuals should not be adjudged in civil contempt of this court by reason of their violations of the writs of injunction addressed to and served upon them. Said respondents were further ordered to make answer to the allegations set forth in the petition and supporting affidavits not later than May 15, 1959. Redman's petition and affidavit, and the show cause order, were duly served upon Tubular and Eugene Cohn on April 22, 1959, and upon Joseph Cohn on April 23, 1959.
Neither Tubular nor Eugene Cohn nor Joseph Cohn have answered the allegations set forth in the petition for order to show cause, and the supporting affidavits, either on or before May 15, 1959, as required by the order of this court, or at any other time. Further, neither of said respondents have filed any response whatever to said petition and order, as required by the rules of this court, and neither have, by motion, pleading, or in any other way, denied any of the allegations of...
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