Redmond v. Fulwood

Decision Date09 June 2017
Docket NumberNo. 15-5145,15-5145
Citation859 F.3d 11
Parties Jesse R. REDMOND, Jr., Appellant v. Isaac FULWOOD, Jr., Former Chairman, United States Parole Commission, Appellee
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

David C. Wolff, appointed by the court, argued the cause as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on the briefs was Kathryn L. Clune, Washington, DC.

Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: Rogers, Brown and Millett, Circuit Judges.

Millett, Circuit Judge:

Jesse Redmond, Jr. was convicted of sexual assault under District of Columbia law. He was twice denied parole by the United States Parole Commission. Alleging that his denials of parole were infected by unconstitutional decisionmaking, Redmond filed suit against the then-Chair of the Commission, Isaac Fulwood, Jr., in his personal capacity. The district court dismissed the case sua sponte , concluding that parole commissioners are entitled to absolute immunity from such lawsuits. We affirm, albeit on the ground that Fulwood is entitled to qualified immunity. We leave for another day the question of whether parole commissioners merit absolute immunity as a matter of law.

I

Jesse R. Redmond, Jr. was convicted in the District of Columbia in 1996 of one count of first-degree sexual assault, and acquitted of one count of oral sodomy and one count of anal sodomy. He was sentenced to serve fifteen years to life in prison. Fifteen years after his conviction, in 2011, Redmond became eligible for parole. He was denied parole both at his 2010 pre-eligibility hearing and in a subsequent hearing held in 2011. The 2011 denial occurred despite the Hearing Examiner's finding that Redmond should be paroled under the applicable parole guidelines.

Dissatisfied with his parole denials and without any option to appeal, Redmond brought suit against the then-Chairman of the United States Parole Commission, Isaac Fulwood, Jr., in his personal capacity, pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).1 The district court sua sponte dismissed Redmond's complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), 1915A(b)(2), holding that Fulwood is absolutely immune from suit for acts taken in the course of his duties as Chairman of the United States Parole Commission.

Redmond appealed to this court, and we now affirm. We do so, however, because Fulwood is entitled to qualified immunity for each of the claims in Redmond's complaint. Accordingly, we need not and do not reach the question of whether Fulwood is entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken during his tenure as Chairman of the United States Parole Commission. See Taylor v. Reilly , 685 F.3d 1110, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("Because we conclude that the [Parole Commission] defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we do not address the issue of absolute immunity."); see also Radtke v. Caschetta , 822 F.3d 571, 573 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ("[W]e are free to affirm the lower court on alternative grounds.") (citing RSM Prod. Corp. v. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer U.S. LLP , 682 F.3d 1043, 1045 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ).

II

Courts are required to dismiss complaints in civil actions "in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity," and the complaint "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A ; see also id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Accordingly, a prisoner's civil complaint is properly dismissed sua sponte if the person the prisoner seeks to sue is protected by either qualified or absolute immunity. See, e.g. , Reynolds v. Morrison , 672 Fed.Appx. 20, 20 (D.C. Cir.2016) (affirming dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) because defendants were entitled to judicial immunity); cf. Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Admin. , 492 F.3d 428, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that qualified immunity is a basis for dismissal of prisoner complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A ).

Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from suits for money damages unless a plaintiff shows both that (i) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (ii) that right was "clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Taylor , 685 F.3d at 1113 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ). We can begin—and often end—our qualified immunity analysis with either prong of the test. Taylor , 685 F.3d at 1113.

Because Redmond has proceeded pro se , we construe the allegations of his complaint liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ("A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ ") (citations omitted). However, because Redmond brought suit against Fulwood only in his personal capacity, Redmond's suit must be limited to actions taken specifically by Fulwood or by the Commission with Fulwood's involvement. That is to say, Fulwood cannot be held personally responsible for all of the Commission's actions, in particular those decisions in which he did not take part. Accordingly, because the only decision with respect to Redmond that Fulwood participated in was the 2011 decision denying Redmond's request for reconsideration of the adverse parole determination, our review is limited to that decision.

Liberally read, Redmond's complaint alleges five claims against Fulwood. The first four claims are allegations that Fulwood violated Redmond's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by: (i) failing to consider that Redmond was acquitted of sodomy charges at trial; (ii) denying parole because Redmond had not completed certain rehabilitative courses, even though those courses were not offered at the facility in which Redmond was incarcerated; (iii) failing to correct errors in Redmond's parole guideline scores; and (iv) exhibiting bias against Redmond due to the nature of his offense.2 The fifth claim is an allegation that Fulwood violated Redmond's First and Fifth Amendment rights by grounding the denial of parole in part on Redmond's continued profession of innocence.

As a matter of law, Fulwood enjoys qualified immunity for each of those claims.

First, with respect to the alleged failure to consider that Redmond was acquitted of the sodomy charges at trial, Redmond does not plausibly allege any constitutional violation because Fulwood expressly acknowledged that acquittal in the decision. See Appellee's Br. Add. 2 n.1 ("Redmond was convicted of sexual assault (vaginal intercourse), but acquitted of oral and anal sodomy as was pointed out in a memo addressing counsel's request to schedule Redmond's rehearing earlier than ordered.").

Second, regarding the importance attached by the Commission to parole applicants' participation in rehabilitative programs, Fulwood did not leave Redmond in the impossible position of having to take unavailable courses, as he alleges. Instead, Redmond was advised to "volunteer for the comprehensive residential sex offender treatment program so that he could be transferred to a facility that conducts the program" or "to participate in other comprehensive programs that will reduce his risk level." Appellee's Br. Add. 3. There is nothing plausibly unconstitutional about advising Redmond to participate in certain programs that would best prepare him for paroled release into society.

Third, with respect to the Commission's improper reliance on an erroneous salient factor score under the parole guidelines, Fulwood candidly acknowledged that error in his reconsideration...

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5 cases
  • Small v. Brock
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • June 26, 2020
    ...barred by qualified immunity, such a rule has yet to be adopted in this circuit.2 See Dissenting Op. at 545 (citing Redmond v. Fulwood , 859 F.3d 11, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ; Martin v. Duffy , 858 F.3d 239, 250–51 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2017) ; Story v. Foote , 782 F.3d 968, 969–70 (8th Cir. 2015) ; ......
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    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • June 9, 2017
  • Niskey v. McAleenan
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • October 28, 2019
  • Scott v. United States, Civil Action No. 16-694 (RDM)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • August 29, 2017
    ...complaint if the complaint "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Id. § 1915A(b)(1); see Redmond v. Fulwood, 859 F.3d 11, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that § 1915A instructs courts to dismiss complaints sua sponte). On its face, Scott's complaint asserts claims under 42 U......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Qualified Immunity and Federalism
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 109-2, December 2020
    • December 1, 2020
    ...1915A(b)(2) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2) (2018). This language appears to contemplate qualif‌ied immunity. See Redmond v. Fulwood, 859 F.3d 11, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (explaining that “a prisoner’s civil complaint is properly dismissed sua sponte if the person the prisoner seeks to sue is p......

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