Redmond v. Sanders
| Decision Date | 13 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10–12695. |
| Parties | Javaughn M. REDMOND, Plaintiff, v. David SANDERS, Ian Severy, Antjuan Spigner, and City of Detroit, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Noah S. Hurwitz, Joel Sklar Law Office, Joel B. Sklar, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.
Jerry L. Ashford, John A. Schapka, Detroit City Law Department, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Javaughn M. Redmond commenced this action in this Court on July 8, 2010, asserting federal constitutional and state-law claims arising from his June 24, 2009 arrest by the three Defendant City of Detroit police officers, the attendant search of his vehicle, and his subsequent criminal prosecution on state-law charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm and carrying a concealed weapon. This Court's subject matter jurisdiction rests upon Plaintiff's assertion of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his rights under the U.S. Constitution. See28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Through the present motion filed on April 30, 2011, the Defendant police officers and the City of Detroit seek an award of summary judgment in their favor on the federal § 1983 claims asserted in Plaintiff's complaint. 1 In support of this motion, Defendants principally argue that Plaintiff's claims are defeated by the doctrine of collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion), in light of a state court determination at a preliminary hearing that there was probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest and prosecution on weapons charges. Defendants further contend that the inventory search of Plaintiff's vehicle following his arrest—during which the Defendant police officers found a loaded handgun that gave rise to the weapons charges brought against Plaintiff—was lawful, or that, at a minimum, it was objectively reasonable for the Defendant officers to conduct this search.
Defendants' motion has been fully briefed by the parties. Having reviewed Defendants' motion, Plaintiff's response, and the accompanying exhibits submitted by the parties, the Court finds that the relevant allegations, facts, and legal issues are adequately presented in these written materials, and that oral argument would not aid the decisional process. Accordingly, the Court will decide Defendants' motion “on the briefs.” See Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan. This opinion and order sets forth the Court's rulings on this motion.
At around 1:50 a.m. on June 24, 2009, the Defendant City of Detroit police officers—David Sanders, Ian Severy, and Antjuan Spigner—were on routine patrol in a marked scout car when they observed a gold Chevrolet Impala that appeared to have an excessively tinted front driver's side window. The officers activated the overhead lights and siren on their scout car and stopped the Impala, which was being operated by Plaintiff Javaughn M. Redmond. According to Plaintiff, this traffic stop occurred at or near the location of Plaintiff's business, a barbershop.
After the stop, all three Defendant officers exited their scout car and approached Plaintiff's vehicle, with Officer Severy directing Plaintiff to place his hands in the air. According to the officers, Plaintiff initially complied, but then was observed reaching down toward the middle of the front seat of his car. At that point, Officer Severy instructed Plaintiff to exit his vehicle, conducted a “cursory pat down for weapons,” and placed Plaintiff in handcuffs. (Defendants' Motion, Ex. 2, Severy Police Report.)
As Plaintiff remained handcuffed and outside his car, Officer Severy asked him where he kept the vehicle's registration and proof of insurance, and Plaintiff responded that these documents could be found in the car's glovebox. Upon checking the glovebox, Officer Sanders found no vehicle registration, and an insurance binderin the glovebox revealed that Plaintiff's car insurance had lapsed.2 Accordingly, Plaintiff was issued traffic citations for unlawfully tinted windows and for operating a motor vehicle without insurance,3 and the Defendant officers decided to impound Plaintiff's car because it had been illegally operated on the roadway without insurance.
In light of the decision to impound Plaintiff's vehicle, Officer Sanders performed an inventory search of the car. He found nothing in the passenger compartment of the car, but upon opening the trunk, Officer Sanders discovered a loaded handgun. Plaintiff acknowledged to the Defendant officers that he did not have a permit to carry a concealed weapon, and the officers placed him under arrest. Plaintiff subsequently was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, carrying a concealed weapon, and an additional weapons offense based on his status as a repeat offender.
On August 20, 2009, a preliminary examination was held before a state district court judge, with the prosecution calling Officer Sanders as a witness and Plaintiff presenting the testimony of his wife, Tonie Shepherd. During cross-examination by Plaintiff's counsel, Officer Sanders was shown photographs of a Chevrolet Impala, and he acknowledged that the vehicle shown in the pictures appeared to have “no tint on the window.” (Plaintiff's Response, Ex. C, Preliminary Exam. Tr. at 11.) Nonetheless, Officer Sanders was unable to say whether the car depicted in the photographs was the same vehicle he and his fellow officers had stopped on June 24, 2009, ( see id. at 10, 15–16), and he testified repeatedly that the car pulled over that night had excessively tinted windows, ( see id. at 5–7, 9–11). For her part, Ms. Shepherd testified that the car depicted in the photographs was, in fact, Plaintiff's vehicle, and that this car had no tint on its front windows during the time Plaintiff owned it. ( See id. at 18–19.) Upon hearing the testimony of Officer Sanders and Ms. Shepherd and the arguments of counsel, the state district court found that the testimony gave rise to “question[s] of fact for the trier of fact,” and concluded that there was probable cause to prosecute Plaintiff for the three charged weapon offenses. ( Id. at 23.)
Before the case proceeded to trial, however, Plaintiff and his counsel moved to suppress the handgun that was found in Plaintiff's vehicle on the night of his arrest, arguing that this discovery was the product of an illegal inventory search. In an opinion issued on October 30, 2009, a state circuit court judge granted Plaintiff's motion, finding (i) that “the Detroit Police Department policy directive on the impounding of vehicles is unconstitutionally vague,” and (ii) that the decision of the Defendant officers to impound Plaintiff's vehicle was “unreasonable and arbitrary,” in light of the officers' evident lack of knowledge of a provision in the policy directive that granted them the discretion not to impound the vehicle, but to instead ask Plaintiff whether his car should be left parked at the roadside. (Plaintiff's Response, Ex. F, State Circuit Court Op. at 4–5.)
Following this state court ruling, the charges against Plaintiff were dismissed. This suit followed on July 8, 2010, with Plaintiff asserting federal constitutional and state-law challenges to the Defendant officers' June 24, 2009 stop and search of his vehicle, his ensuing arrest and imprisonment, and his criminal prosecution on weapons charges.4
Through the present motion, the three Defendant police officers and their municipal employer, the Defendant City of Detroit, seek an award of summary judgment in their favor on Plaintiff's federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as (perhaps) some of Plaintiff's state-law claims.5 Under the pertinent Federal Rule, “[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought,” and “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). As the Supreme Court has explained, “the plain language of Rule 56[ ] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
In deciding a motion brought under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813 (6th Cir.2006). Yet, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials, but instead must support a claim of disputed facts by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). Moreover, any supporting or opposing affidavits “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). Finally, “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence that supports the nonmoving party's claims is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Pack, 434 F.3d at 814 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
In seeking summary judgment in their favor on Plaintiff's federal § 1983 claim...
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