Redmond v. Socha

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Garman
• Citation: Redmond v. Socha, 837 N.E.2d 883, 216 Ill.2d 622, 297 Ill.Dec. 432 (Ill. 2005)
• Decision Date: 06 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 99625.,99625.
• Parties: Tommie REDMOND, Appellee, v. Elaine SOCHA, Appellant.

Page 883

837 N.E.2d 883

216 Ill.2d 622

Tommie REDMOND, Appellee, v. Elaine SOCHA, Appellant.

No. 99625.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 6, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael Resis, of O'Hagan, Smith & Amundsen, L.L.C., Chicago, for appellant.

Robert E. Tracy, of Kroll & Rubin, Ltd., Chicago, for appellee.

Matthew D. Ports, of Pfaff & Gill, Ltd., Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.

Justice GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

On July 4, 2001, near the corner of Ogden Avenue and California in Chicago, the car driven by defendant/cross-plaintiff Socha collided with the rear of a motorcycle driven by plaintiff/cross-defendant Redmond, injuring Redmond and damaging Socha's car. In the litigation that followed, no evidence was presented by either party of any cause or contributing factor other than the alleged negligence of the other party. The weather was good; the pavement was dry and clean; no other vehicles were involved; and no mechanical failure caused either vehicle to malfunction. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Socha on Redmond's complaint and in favor of Redmond on Socha's counterclaim. The trial court entered judgment on the verdicts. Following a hearing on Redmond's posttrial motion, the trial court found that the verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was no evidence of any intervening cause of the accident and, thus, it was "not logically possible to find that an accident occurred without [its] being anyone's fault."

The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the verdicts were "irreconcilably inconsistent." 352 Ill.App.3d 1049, 1055, 288 Ill.Dec. 398, 817 N.E.2d 1048. The appellate court rejected the approach taken by the Fourth District in a factually similar case, Barrick v. Grimes, 308 Ill.App.3d 306, 241 Ill.Dec. 825, 720 N.E.2d 280 (1999). Thus, there is an apparent split of opinion among the appellate districts. We granted leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill.2d R. 315) to determine whether, in such a case, a new trial must be granted because the verdicts are legally inconsistent. We have permitted the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to file a brief amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiff. 155 Ill.2d R. 345.

BACKGROUND

Both vehicles were traveling in the same direction when they collided. According to Redmond, he was changing lanes from the right lane to the left lane when Socha's car, which had been traveling in the right lane behind two other motorcycles, "shot" from behind the other cycles and came up behind him in the left lane. According to Socha, she was already in the left lane when Redmond swerved in front of her. In either event, she was unable to stop in time to avoid hitting him. The right front fender of her car hit the left rear of his motorcycle.

Each party alleged that the negligence of the other was the proximate cause of the accident. As noted, neither party introduced evidence of any factor that might be seen as an intervening cause. Both parties introduced evidence of damages. Redmond claimed medical expenses in excess of $25,000. Socha's claimed automobile repair costs were in excess of $7,000. Both parties raised the defense of comparative negligence.

The trial court instructed the jury according to Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction No. B21.04 (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. B21.04 (1995)) (hereinafter IPI Civil (1995)) that, because the case involved both a claim and a counterclaim, there were four possible outcomes. The jury could find: for the plaintiff and against the defendant (IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04(3)), for the defendant and against the plaintiff (IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04(4)), against both (IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04(5)), or for both (IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04(6)). The jury was further instructed that to prevail on his or her claim, each party had the burden of proving three propositions: an act or failure to act that constituted negligence, injury, and proximate cause. IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.02. In addition, the term "burden of proof" was defined for the jury in accordance with Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction No. 21.01: "When I say that a party has the burden of proof on any proposition, or use the expression `if you find,' or `if you decide,' I mean you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which he has the burden of proof is more probably true than not true." IPI Civil (1995) No. 21.01. Finally, in the event that both parties were found negligent, the jury was instructed to apportion fault between them. IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04(22).

The jury returned verdicts under the third option-against Redmond on his claim and against Socha on her counterclaim. Following the trial court's entry of judgment, Redmond filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in which he argued, inter alia, that the verdicts indicated that the "jury clearly feels that both the parties were equally at fault." The jury, according to Redmond, mistakenly utilized verdict forms C and F (finding neither party negligent) rather than verdict forms B and E (finding both parties negligent). Redmond argued that the verdicts were "clearly inconsistent" because they failed to apportion 100% of the fault between the parties. The motion was accompanied by an affidavit from Redmond's attorney in which he stated that he was "advised by the jurors" that they used verdict forms C and F because they "thought both parties were at [sic] equally at fault, and therefore, entitled to money." Redmond's motion sought entry of judgment in favor of both parties on the question of liability, with a new trial on the issue of damages. Alternatively, he requested that the verdicts be set aside and a new trial be held on all issues.

Socha's answer to the posttrial motion included a statement that her counsel "was present with" Redmond's attorney "when at least three of the jurors explained that it was felt that neither party sustained their burden of proofs and this is the reason they decided the case as they did." Socha argued that the totality of the evidence at trial did not so overwhelmingly favor Redmond that the jury verdicts should be set aside.

Redmond filed a response to the answer accompanied by an additional affidavit. His attorney stated in the second affidavit that the three jurors who spoke in the presence of both attorneys actually stated that the "reason for the verdict is because the jurors could not agree as to whom [to] award damages."

At the hearing on the motion, the trial court indicated its understanding that the pending motion was a motion for a new trial and/or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Redmond's attorney then argued that because the verdict forms required an apportionment of liability totaling 100%, it was "clear that the jury either didn't want to . . . decide the case or were lazy or just didn't get it." He also argued that "the only logical interpretation" of the verdicts was that the jury found the parties equally at fault and used the incorrect verdict forms, perhaps because "they didn't care." He asked the trial court to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict apportioning fault 50% to each party, with a new trial on damages only, or, in the alternative, to grant a new trial. Socha's attorney argued that the verdicts stood for the simple proposition that the jury found that neither party had satisfied his or her burden of proof on all of the elements of the negligence claim.

The trial court denied Redmond's motion for judgment n.o.v., finding that all of the evidence, when viewed most favorably to Socha, the nonmoving party, did not so overwhelmingly favor Redmond that a verdict in Socha's favor could never stand.

As for the motion for a new trial, the trial court stated that "events don't happen without being caused by some act or omission." Because there was no evidence presented of any intervening cause, the "only two possible causes of this accident" were the acts or omissions of Redmond and Socha. Because "[s]omebody has to be at fault," the court was "unable to see how a rational trier of fact could come up with nobody's entitled to anything." The court explained further that "in this closed universe of facts . . . there has to be a logical result," and "the jury has to make a choice." In the end, the trial court granted the motion for a new trial, stating that "[s]omebody has to be at fault. Somebody is entitled to damages in some amount."

On appeal, Socha argued that the two verdicts were neither against the manifest weight of the evidence nor inconsistent. Her position was that the jury could have found that each party failed to meet its burden of proof. 352 Ill.App.3d at 1053, 288 Ill.Dec. 398, 817 N.E.2d 1048. The appellate court concluded, however, that "in the context of the facts of this case such a hypothesis is unreasonable," because, "[i]n the absence of any evidence of an intervening cause of the collision, one or both of the parties must necessarily have been negligent." 352 Ill.App.3d at 1054, 288 Ill.Dec. 398, 817 N.E.2d 1048.

In reaching this result, the appellate court rejected the reasoning employed in Barrick, a case in which the parties were the drivers of a car and a truck that collided in an intersection. The evidence was conflicting as to which driver violated a red light. Barrick, 308 Ill.App.3d at 307, 241 Ill.Dec. 825, 720 N.E.2d 280. The jury reached verdicts against both claimants and the trial court denied a posttrial motion based on inconsistent verdicts. Barrick, 308 Ill.App.3d at 309, 241 Ill.Dec. 825, 720 N.E.2d 280. The appellate court found that the verdicts were not legally inconsistent because the jury could have found that neither party met its burden of proof on the issues of negligence or proximate cause. Barrick, 308 Ill.App.3d at 310, 241 Ill.Dec. 825, 720 N.E.2d 280. In addition, the Barrick court...