Redpath, Noland v. MO Hwy & Transp. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 09 November 1999
• Citation: Redpath, Noland v. MO Hwy & Transp. Comm'n, 14 S.W.3d 34 (Mo. App. 1999)
• Parties: (Mo.App. W.D. 1999) James M. Redpath, Mayo H. Redpath, Jill Lynn Noland, Pamela Jane Metzger, Marilyn Helen Redpath, and James Todd Redpath, Respondents, v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, Appellant. WD56224
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

14 S.W.3d 34 (Mo.App. W.D. 1999)

James M. Redpath, Mayo H. Redpath, Jill Lynn Noland, Pamela Jane Metzger, Marilyn Helen Redpath, and James Todd Redpath, Respondents, v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, Appellant.

WD56224

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

11/09/99

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Cole County, Hon. Byron L. Kinder

Counsel for Appellant: Bryce D. Gamblin

Counsel for Respondent: Steven E. Mauer

Opinion Summary: The Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission appeals summary judgment in favor of James M. Redpath, Mayo H. Redpath, Jill Lynn Noland, Pamela Jane Metzger, Marilyn Helen Redpath, and James Todd Redpath on their petition for judicial review of the Commission's denial of their billboard permit application. The court found that the state regulation relied on by the Commission to deny the application, 7 C.S.R. 10-6.040(2)(A), was illegal and void and that the Commission arbitrarily denied the application because it did not consider the public benefit of the billboard.

Division Four holds: (1) Under the state Billboard Act, the Commission is limited to making rules and regulations of minimal necessity to effect federal restrictions on interstate highways, to preclude loss of federal highway funds. Neither federal or state highway beautification acts recognize an area that has been spot zoned for outdoor advertising as a zoned commercial or industrial area, and neither contemplate a determination of "why" a billboard is being erected or that spot zoning may be permissible if done for a good reason. Therefore, the laws are not inconsistent. The Commission did not generate a rule that was beyond what was minimally necessary to secure receipt of federal highway funds in contradiction of section 226.530, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1998. The trial court's finding that 7 C.S.R. 10-6.040(2)(A) was illegal and void was a misstatement of the law and was erroneous.

(2) The Missouri General Assembly and Commission clearly intended that the general common law definition of "spot zoning," used to determine if a zoning ordinance is valid, does not apply for purposes of regulating outdoor advertising. The Commission defined spot zoning consistent with federal law as the General Assembly required and consistent with the state law's purpose. The Commission was not required to consider the public benefit of the zoning. The trial court misapplied the law in finding that the Commission was required to consider the public benefit of the zoning of Redpath et al.'s property in denying their application for a billboard permit.

(3) The Missouri regulation excludes from zoned commercial or industrial areas, for purposes of outdoor advertising, an area that has been zoned for outdoor advertising purposes and that is out of harmony with the zoning classification or uses of surrounding land. Redpath et al.'s property was zoned commercial for the sole purpose of allowing the erection of a billboard. Such zoning was out of harmony with the surrounding land uses. Thus, the property did not, under 7 C.S.R. 10-6.040(2)(A), constitute a zoned commercial or industrial area for the purpose of outdoor advertising. The Commission properly denied the application for a billboard permit. The summary judgment in favor of Redpath et al. is, therefore, reversed, and summary judgment is granted in favor of the Commission.

Breckenridge, C.J., P.J., and Howard, J., concur.

Robert G. Ulrich, J.

The Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission (Commission) appeals the summary judgment ¹ entered by the trial court in favor of James M. Redpath, Mayo H. Redpath, Jill Lynn Noland, Pamela Jane Metzger, Marilyn Helen Redpath, and James Todd Redpath (Respondents) on Respondents' petition for judicial review of the Commission's denial of their billboard permit application. The court found that the state regulation relied on by the Commission to deny the application, 7 C.S.R. 10-6.040(2)(A), was illegal and void and that the Commission arbitrarily denied the application because it did not consider the public benefit of the billboard. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and summary judgment is granted in favor of the Commission.

Facts

Respondents own a one-acre parcel of land immediately south of I-70 between Spruce and Kensington Avenues in Kansas City. The property is vacant and surrounded by single family dwellings. Over the years, the property has not been maintained and has become a site for illegal dumping. Respondents and a city councilman developed a plan to construct and maintain a community park on the property, which would be funded by a portion of the advertising revenues of a billboard located on the site and visible from I-70.

In the spring of 1996, Respondents applied to the City of Kansas City to rezone the property from residential (R2b--Two-Family Dwellings) to commercial (C2p--Local Retail Business-Limited) to allow for erection of the billboard. The City Planning and Development Department issued a report on June 18, 1996, recommending approval of Respondents' application. The City Council passed Ordinance No. 960583 rezoning the property to C2p on June 27, 1996.

In May 1997, Respondents applied to the Commission for an outdoor advertising permit to erect a billboard on the property. The Commission denied Respondents' request for a permit on July 10, 1997, stating, "According to the State's Statutes governing outdoor advertising, spot zoning is prohibited for the sole purpose of accommodating a billboard."

As a result, Respondents filed a petition in the circuit court on August 6, 1997, seeking judicial review under section 536.150, RSMo 1994, of the Commission's denial of their application for permit. In the petition, Respondents alleged that 7 C.S.R. 10-6.040(2)(A), which excludes from the definition of commercially and industrial zoned areas any area that has been spot zoned for outdoor advertising, thereby precluding such area from qualification for outdoor advertising, was contrary to sections 226.500 and 226.540, RSMo 1994, and, therefore, illegal and void. Respondents also alleged that the Commission's denial of their application was arbitrary, capricious, and against the weight of the evidence because the rezoning of the property was not spot zoning and was not done solely for the purpose of allowing outdoor advertising.

The Commission filed a motion for summary judgment on February 25, 1998. Respondents filed a cross motion for summary judgment on April 3, 1998. On July 16, 1998, the trial court granted Respondents' motion for summary judgment. The court found that 7 C.S.R. 10-6.040(2)(A) was contrary to section 226.530, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1998, which requires the Commission to promulgate only those rules minimally necessary to secure the State of Missouri federal highway aid, and, therefore, was illegal, void, and of no effect. The court also found that the Commission failed to consider the public benefit of the rezoning in this case, and, thus, its denial of Respondents' permit application was arbitrary, capricious, and against the weight of the evidence. This appeal by the Commission followed.

Points Relied On

On appeal, the Commission claims that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and in granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents because (1) 7 C.S.R. 10-6.040(2)(A) complies with section 226.530, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1998, (2) neither federal nor state law requires the Commission to consider public welfare, and (3) the relief ordered was beyond the scope of Respondents' petition. ² The Commission also claims that the court erred in ordering it to pay court costs asserting that the court did not comply with specific requisite statutory procedure in making the order.

Standard of Review

On appeal of an administrative decision in a noncontested case, the appellate court reviews the decision of the trial court, rather than the decision of the agency. State ex rel. Donelon v. Division of Employment Sec., 971 S.W.2d 869, 873 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998). In cases seeking judicial review under section 536.150, RSMo 1994, of noncontested administrative decisions, the trial court conducts a de novo review in which it hears evidence on the merits of the case, makes a record, determines the facts, and, considering those facts, decides whether the agency's decision was unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise involved an abuse of discretion. Id. at 873-874. The appellate court will sustain the judgment of the circuit court unless no substantial evidence supports it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id. at 874.

The Relationship of 23 U.S.C. section 131, section 226.500 et seq., and

7 C.S.R. 10-6.040(2)(A)

The Commission first claims that the trial court erred in declaring its regulation, 7 C.S.R. 10-6.040(2)(A), illegal and void. The Commission relied on the regulation, which excludes any area that has been spot zoned for outdoor advertising from commercially zoned areas where outdoor advertising is permissible, in denying Respondents' application. The court found that the regulation was contrary to section 226.530, RSMo 1994.

The Federal Highway Beautification Act provides for control of the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising signs in areas adjacent to the interstate and primary highway systems. 23 U.S.C. section 131 (1990). The purposes of the Act are to protect the public investment in such highways, to promote the safety and recreational value of public travel, and to preserve natural beauty. 23 U.S.C. section 131(a). To further its objectives, the Act requires states receiving federal highway funds to establish provisions for the effective control of billboards or risk jeopardizing ten percent of those funds. 23 U.S.C. section 131(b). The Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate rules establishing the national standards for...