Reece v. Carey (In re Carey)

Decision Date23 May 2022
Docket NumberA. P. 16-3074,16-31579
PartiesIn re: WILLIAM A. CAREY and RUBY L. CAREY Debtors v. WILLIAM A. CAREY Defendant JOSH REECE Plaintiff
CourtU.S. Bankruptcy Court — Western District of Kentucky

In re: WILLIAM A. CAREY and RUBY L. CAREY Debtors

JOSH REECE Plaintiff
v.

WILLIAM A. CAREY Defendant

A. P. NO. 16-3074

No. 16-31579

United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky

May 23, 2022


MEMORANDUM

Alan C. Stout, United States Bankruptcy Judge

This adversary proceeding comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Plaintiff, Josh Reece ("Reece"). At issue is whether the debt owed to Reece is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Upon review of the motion, the supporting documents, and the response filed by the Defendant, William A. Carey ("Carey"), the Court concludes that the Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.

JURISDICTION

Determinations of dischargeability are core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). The Court has jurisdiction over core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a).

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts in this dispute were summarized in the Memorandum Opinion & Order ("Memorandum") entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky ("Eastern District") (Case No. 3:16-cv-00069-GFVT).

The Plaintiff, Joshua Reece, brought this action alleging that he was

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beaten by ten to twelve inmates on the instruction of Defendant Carey, a jailer at the Shelby County Detention Center, while jailed for stealing a two-dollar food item. He brought claims against many Defendants for excessive force deliberate indifference to his medical needs, negligence intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy

See Eastern District [DN 294].

Reece filed a complaint against Carey, and others, in the Eastern District. Prior to trial, Plaintiff's remaining claims against Carey were: (1) a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); (2) negligence and gross negligence claims (Count II); (3) an intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") claim (Count III); and (4) a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count IV). [DN 1 at ¶¶ 34, 48, 52, 55].

On May 19, 2020, Reece filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all of his remaining claims against Carey. The District Court granted in part and denied in part the Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, the Motion for Summary Judgment was granted with regard to Count I, excessive force in violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights, but denied with respect to Reece's remaining claims.

At the final pre-trial conference, Carey informed the District Court that he planned to stipulate liability on Plaintiff's remaining claims and proceed to trial solely on the issue of damages. Reece did not object to this stipulation. At trial, the jury was asked to determine an amount of damages recoverable by Reece for the injuries he sustained as a result of Carey's actions.

The following stipulation ("Stipulation") was provided to the jury as part of the Jury Instructions:

"Now we will move to the issues in this case that have been determined. This case stems from events that occurred at the Shelby County Detention Center on November 18, 2015. Plaintiff Joshua
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Reece was the subject of a physical assault by other inmates. The assault was orchestrated by a deputy jailer, Defendant William Carey, who directed inmate Corey Hopper to assault Plaintiff later in the evening. Defendant Carey never returned to the cell and did not attempt to intervene in the assault.
Defendant Carey was charged and pled guilty in state court to Official Misconduct and Complicity to Fourth-Degree Assault. He was also charged and pled guilty in federal court to a federal civil rights violation. In Defendant's federal guilty plea, he admitted that "[he] directed Inmate [Corey Hopper] to assault [Plaintiff], purposefully setting into motion an assault that resulted in serious bodily injury.' And [he] admitted that, in doing so, he willfully deprived [Plaintiff] of his constitutional right 'to be free from the use of unreasonable force by or at the direction of a deputy jailer." He further admitted to knowing Plaintiff would be assaulted, but yet, never returned to the cell during his shift to check on Plaintiff's wellbeing.
Defendant's stipulation means that you must accept as true that Defendant, while acting under color of state law and in the course and scope of his employment, deprived Plaintiff of his Fourteenth Amendment right by directing inmates to use excessive force against Plaintiff as well as failed to intervene and stop the inmates from using excessive force--one of his job duties as a deputy jailer even though he had the opportunity and means to prevent the assault. You must also accept as true that Defendant had a duty to ensure that Plaintiff received necessary medical attention after the assault, Defendant breached that duty by failing to check on Plaintiff's wellbeing, and as a result Plaintiff was injured.
In other words, in this case, you will not decide whether Defendant is legally responsible for any injury Plaintiff may have suffered as a result of the incident in question. Defendant has admitted he is legally liable. The only issue remaining for you to determine is the measure of damages, recoverable by the Plaintiff, caused by Defendant's conduct toward Plaintiff. The fact that legal liability has already been admitted to by Defendant should not unfairly bias you in favor of either party, unduly prejudice you against either party, or improperly influence you in any way in determining the specific issues submitted to you for decision. You must accept this stipulation as true and independently make your decisions about damages. In this case, Plaintiff is seeking damages for claimed physical injuries, pain and suffering, and impairment of his ability to earn money. Plaintiff
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is also seeking punitive damages."

On July 9, 2021, the jury returned a Jury Verdict Form ("Verdict"). In the Verdict, the jury awarded Reece $400, 604.50 for loss of earning capacity, $83, 666.79 for medical expenses, $1, 300, 000.00 for pain, suffering, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life. The jury also awarded punitive damages in the amount of $400, 000. See Eastern District [DN 285].

On May 18, 2016, Carey filed a Chapter 7 petition in this Court. On October 18, 2016, Reece timely filed this adversary proceeding asking that the debt be excepted from discharge. The complaint included three separate counts. The complaint provided as follows:

A. Count I
Carey's conduct was intentional, reckless, deliberate, wanton and/or malicious, and was indicative of his total, deliberate and reckless disregard of and indifference to Mr. Reece's health, well-being, as well as his rights and the risk of harm to his health occasioned by such conduct. Carey is directly responsible for the assault and battery and deliberate lack of medical care while Reece was in Carey's care.
As a result of the foregoing, Mr. Reece, through Carey's deliberate indifference and grossly negligent -- if not reckless, intentional and/or malicious -- conduct, was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment without due process of law in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Count II
Carey's treatment of Mr. Reece was so beyond the bounds of human decency that it exemplifies the tort of outrage.
C. Count III
Mr. Reece suffered several fractures in his head and face because of the direct actions of Carey to have him seriously harmed while incarcerated in the Shelby County Jail. Carey is responsible for aiding and abetting the assault and battery of Reece's person. Defendant Carey was prosecuted criminally and pled guilty which
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should have a preclusive effect on his defense in this matter.

AP No. 16-3074 [DN1 at ¶¶ 25, 26, 28, and 30].

The prayer asked for a money judgment. It further requested that this Court find that Carey's indebtedness to Reece constitutes a nondischargeable debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). He also requests costs and attorney's fees.

In light of the pending action in the Eastern District of Kentucky, this Court held the adversary proceeding in abeyance pending an outcome in the Eastern District litigation. As stated above, the jury rendered its Verdict on July 9, 2021.

On September 21, 2021, the District Court from the Eastern District entered a Judgment ("Judgment") in favor of Reece and against Carey based upon the unanimous Verdict. The Judgment further declared Reece the "prevailing party," which entitled him to request attorney's fees and costs. See Eastern District [DN 293].

Several months later, on February 7, 2022, and upon motion by Reece, the District Court entered the Memorandum. In that decision, the District Court ordered Reece to pay Carey a total of $254, 221 in attorneys' fees, $6, 875 to compensate the Reece for the time spent preparing the Motion for Attorneys' Fees, and $8, 028.54 for litigation costs. These awards total approximately $269, 124.54. See Eastern District [DN 294].

As stated above, Reece has now moved for summary judgment in this action. In support of his motion, Reece attached a copy of the Jury Instructions, which included the Stipulation, and the Verdict. Carey has filed a response in opposition to the summary judgment motion. Carey attached a copy of the Verdict in support of his response.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

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Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056 (incorporating by reference Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). The movant bears the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute, and...

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