Reed-Jennings v. Baseball Club of Seattle, L.P.

Citation188 Wash.App. 320,351 P.3d 887
Decision Date26 May 2015
Docket NumberNo. 71545–3–I.,71545–3–I.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
PartiesTeresa REED–JENNINGS and Cliff Jennings, wife and husband and their marital community, Appellants, v. The BASEBALL CLUB OF SEATTLE, L.P., a Washington corporation, d/b/a The Seattle Mariners, Washington State Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District, a municipal corporation; Defendants John Doe I–X, Respondents.

Thomas Moulton Geisness, Peter Thomas Geisness, Max James Pangborn, Geisness Law Firm, Seattle, WA, for Appellants.

Thomas Charles Stratton, Rockey Stratton PS, Seattle, WA, for Respondents.

Opinion

VERELLEN, A.C.J.

¶ 1 During batting practice before a Seattle Mariners baseball game, a batter hit a foul ball into the stands along the right field foul line, seriously injuring Teresa Reed–Jennings. The trial court properly dismissed the Jennings' negligence claim against the Mariners because the Mariners did not breach its limited duty of care, and, alternatively, assumption of risk bars any recovery. We affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 The material facts are undisputed. The Jennings attended a Mariners game at Safeco Field on May 4, 2009, and arrived more than an hour before the game to watch batting practice.1 They sat along the right field foul line, two rows up from the field in section 116.

¶ 3 The Jennings' ticket included a warning that explained the dangers of balls and bats entering the stands. Cliff Jennings, Teresa's husband, read the warning, but Teresa did not. On the concourse above section 116, several support posts for the lower level warned spectators about bats and balls leaving the playing field. Near the Jennings' seats on the wall separating the seats from the field, additional warnings cautioned spectators about bats or balls leaving the field. The back of each seat in section 116 warned spectators about “bats and balls leaving the field.”2 Teresa maintains she did not see any of these warnings but “knew that balls could come into the stands” during batting practice.3

¶ 4 Safeco Field has a permanent 26–foot safety screen behind home plate. For batting practice, the Mariners place a batting cage above and around three sides of home plate and temporary safety screens at first base, second base, center field, and the pitcher's mound. Since 2002, the Mariners have placed 8–by 10–foot temporary safety screens along the left field and right field foul lines. Major League Baseball (MLB) did not require teams to have temporary safety screens along the foul lines until 2012.

¶ 5 From 2005 to May 2009, over 10,000,000 spectators attended a Mariners baseball game. Of those 10,000,000, 300 spectators have been hit by either fair or foul balls. Of those 300, only 5 spectators were injured while sitting in section 116.

¶ 6 Batting practice affords spectators more protection because the Mariners remove the batting cage and other temporary safety screens once the game starts. Teresa was aware that a safety screen did not extend all the way down the first base line to protect her from all foul balls.

¶ 7 The visiting team performs batting practice after the Mariners. The pitcher “typically hold[s] three balls in his non-pitching hand and one ball in his pitching hand” to reduce “delay between pitches.”4 The pitcher “must throw in a rhythm during batting practice so that players and coaches can get the maximum work done and are not unduly exposed to danger.”5 Batting practice runs rapidly and consists of “many activities occurring at the same time.”6 Pitchers do not wait long between pitches, so batters can get the proper number of swings. Every other MLB team conducts batting practice in a similar fashion. Before May 4, 2009, Teresa had never attended or seen batting practice.

¶ 8 The Jennings previously attended several baseball games at Safeco Field and, on those occasions, sat near or in section 116. The Jennings recalled seeing foul balls land in the stands on previous occasions. The Jennings knew foul balls could reach their area. But Teresa did not know “multiple balls could be batted into the air simultaneously during batting practice.”7

¶ 9 On May 4, 2009, Teresa saw a foul ball land near her seat during batting practice. Shortly after, a batter hit a ball into center field, and Teresa attempted to track the ball's flight. Before that ball was caught, Teresa heard another ball being hit. When she turned her head, the second ball hit her in the face. Teresa sustained serious injuries to her left eye. She twice tweeted several days after the game: “A foul ball landed in the seats in front of us and the young man next to Cliff scampered over the seats and grabbed it,”8 and “I said, well, that really should have been my ball. I just wasn't fast enough. I said I wanted another one to land right there. It'[ll] be mine.”9

¶ 10 The Jennings sued the Mariners, alleging negligence.

¶ 11 The Mariners moved for summary judgment, arguing it satisfied its limited duty to protect spectators from foul balls by placing several temporary safety screens on the field and a permanent 26–foot safety screen behind home plate. The Mariners also argued Teresa assumed the risk of her injury because she knew batting practice was ongoing” and “a foul ball had landed in her seating area earlier.”10

¶ 12 The Jennings argued the adoption of comparative fault statutes abrogated the limited duty rule. They also argued the implied primary assumption of risk doctrine does not bar their recovery because the Mariners breached its duty to exercise reasonable care under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965).

¶ 13 The trial court granted the Mariners summary judgment. The trial court determined the Mariners did not breach a duty owed to the Jennings, and, even if the Mariners did breach a duty, the Jennings assumed the risk of injury.

¶ 14 The Jennings appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶ 15 The Jennings challenge the trial court's summary judgment dismissing their negligence claim. They specifically argue genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the Mariners breached its duty of care and whether Teresa assumed the risk posed by multiple batted balls being simultaneously in play during batting practice.

¶ 16 We review a summary judgment order de novo, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.11 Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issues of material fact exist and “reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion.”12 “A material fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation.”13

Limited Duty Rule

¶ 17 Contrary to the Jennings' contention, Washington follows the limited duty rule. For many decades throughout the United States, the majority of jurisdictions have applied the limited duty rule to define the duty a baseball stadium operator owes to its patrons injured from foul balls before or during a game.14 The limited duty rule requires baseball stadium operators “to screen some seats ... to provide protection to spectators who choose it.”15 This rule imposes two requirements on baseball stadium operators. First, baseball stadium operators must provide a sufficient number of protected seating for those spectators ‘who may be reasonably anticipated to desire protected seats on an ordinary occasion.’16 Second, baseball stadium operators must “provide protection for all spectators located in the most dangerous parts of the stadium, that is, those areas that pose an unduly high risk of injury from foul balls (such as directly behind home plate).”17

¶ 18 Washington courts have long imposed a limited duty on baseball stadium operators to screen some seats, generally those behind home plate.18

¶ 19 The Mariners clearly satisfied its limited duty to screen a reasonable number of seats. Safeco Field has a permanent 26–foot safety screen behind home plate. The Mariners' head groundskeeper Bob Christofferson testified that he and his crew place temporary safety screens on the field during batting practice, including a batting cage above and around three sides of home plate and temporary safety screens at first base, second base, center field, and the pitcher's mound. As previously noted, since 2002, the Mariners have placed 8– by 10–foot temporary safety screens along the left field and right field foul lines. MLB did not require teams to have temporary safety screens along the foul lines until 2012. Christofferson placed the temporary safety screens along the foul lines “to reduce the number of line drive foul balls reaching the spectator seats.”19 No evidence in the record suggests the Mariners' screening of certain sections of the stadium deviated from the screening customarily employed at other MLB stadiums.

¶ 20 The record reveals a very low risk of injury in section 116 from foul balls. For example, the Mariners' Vice President of Ballpark Operations Scott Jenkins testified that from 2005 to May 2009, over 10,000,000 patrons attended a Mariners game at Safeco Field. During that period, for both games and batting practice, “300 people had some form of injury or contact with a ball that left the playing field.”20 Of those 300 incidents, only 5 occurred in section 116 where Teresa was injured. Nothing in the record indicates “foul balls of this kind cause serious injuries with sufficient frequency to be considered an unreasonable risk.”21 Similar to throwing balls pregame (“long toss”) in Taylor v. Baseball Club of Seattle, L.P., batting practice is a normal part of pregame warm-ups.22 No evidence suggests the batting practice here did not conform to MLB custom.

¶ 21 The Jennings cite Leek v. Tacoma Baseball Club for the proposition that Washington applies Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 to define a baseball stadium operator's duty of care.23 But Leek only discussed the restatement in pronouncing its holding that the limited duty rule applies. No Washington courts have cited § 343 in the baseball context since Leek. And no Washington courts,...

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3 cases
  • O'Neill v. City of Port Orchard
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • June 28, 2016
    ...of what the plaintiff knows, understands, and is willing to accept.’ ” Reed – Jennings v. Baseball Club of Seattle, L . P . , 188 Wash.App. 320, 331, 351 P.3d 887, review denied , 184 Wash.2d 1024, 361 P.3d 747 (2015) (quoting Restatement Second of Torts § 496C cmt. e. (1965)). There are fo......
  • Walter v. Spee W. Constr. Co.
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • February 28, 2022
    ...assumption of the risk instruction.¶17 Spee West disagrees and contends that this case is analogous to Reed-Jennings v. Baseball Club of Seattle, 188 Wash. App. 320, 351 P.3d 887 (2015). In that case, Reed-Jennings was hit by a foul ball during batting practice before a Seattle Mariners bas......
  • Wright v. 3M Co.
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • December 13, 2021
    .... . . in the plaintiff's shoes would want to know and consider.'" Reed-Jennings v. Baseball Club of Seattle, LP, 188 Wn.App. 320, 333, 351 P.3d 887 (2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Home v. N. Kitsap Sch. Dist., 92 Wn.App. 709, 720, 965 P.2d 1112 (1998)). Knowledge requires more tha......

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