Reed Lumber Co. v. Lewis

• Citation: 10 So. 333,94 Ala. 626
• Parties: REED LUMBER CO. ET AL. v. LEWIS.
• Decision Date: 18 December 1891
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

10 So. 333

94 Ala. 626

REED LUMBER CO. ET AL. v. LEWIS.

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 18, 1891

Appeal from city court of Anniston; B. F. CASSADY, Judge.

Action by E. M. Lewis against the Reed Lumber Company as a firm, and its individual members. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

The action was brought on three notes, in which were waived all homestead exemptions. In addition to the plea of the general issue filed by the defendants, they also filed a special plea of recoupment in which all of the defendants joined except Emily Farrar, the wife of W. T. Farrar. The plaintiff demurred to this plea of recoupment on the ground, among others, that the damages claimed by way of recoupment were too remote. The court overruled this ground of demurrer. The defendant Emily Farrar, after the ruling upon the other defendants' pleas, offered to file her plea of coverture but the court refused to allow it done. Upon the hearing of the evidence the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and in said judgment declared that the defendants were entitled to no exemptions of personal property.

Gordon McDonald and Caldwell & Johnston for appellants.

Matthews & Whiteside, for appellee.

MCCLELLAN J.

This action is on promissory notes executed by the Reed Lumber Company, which is alleged to be a partnership composed of W. T. Farrar, Emily Farrar, the wife of W. T. Farrar, and C. W. Burrows. The suit is against the company and the individuals composing it. The company, W. T. Farrar, and Burrows pleaded in recoupment that the notes were given for the price of certain machinery to be presently delivered; that it was not delivered for two months afterwards; that the machinery was a part of a saw-mill, without which the mill could not be run; that plaintiff knew the uses to which it was to be applied, and that the mill was stopped in consequence of its non-delivery; and that as a result of this enforced idleness of the mill defendants were unable to fill certain contracts for lumber which they had with various parties, and lost the profits they would have made had they been able to supply the lumber, and that these profits amounted to $500. There is no averment that plaintiff contracted to deliver the machinery in contemplation of these contracts on the part of defendants to supply lumber to others, or that he knew of their existence.

The plea is bad upon two grounds, if not more. The plaintiff was not liable for the profits defendants would have made out of these contracts unless such damages, manifestly not being the natural consequences of plaintiff's mere failure to deliver the machinery, but depending on the contractual relations between defendants and others, could be said to have been in the contemplation of the parties without knowledge on the part of plaintiff of those relations, and hence, without his engagement, having any reference to them. Devlin v. Mayor, etc., 63 N.Y. 26; Daughtery v Telegraph Co., 75 Ala. 168; Telegraph Co. v. Way, 83 Ala....