Reed v. Bliss & Van Auken Lumber Co.
Decision Date | 19 December 1923 |
Docket Number | No. 25.,25. |
Citation | 196 N.W. 420,225 Mich. 164 |
Parties | REED v. BLISS & VAN AUKEN LUMBER CO. et al. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Certiorari to Department of Labor and Industry.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Comp. Laws, §§ 5423-5495), by Ella Reed, to obtain compensation for the death of Richard Reed, her husband, opposed by the Bliss & Van Auken Lumber Company, employer, and the Michigan Mutual Liability Company, insurance carrier. Compensation was denied, and applicant brings certiorari. Affirmed.
Argued before WIEST, C. J., and FELLOWS, McDONALD, CLARK, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ.Purcell & Picard, of Saginaw, for appellant.
Beaumont, Smith & Harris, of Detroit (Albert E. Meder, of Detroit, of counsel), for appellees.
Defendant lumber company operates a lumber yard in Saginaw consisting of 20 acres. The generally used method of ingress and egress to and from the plant is through a gate opening onto Niagara street, a north and south street, 66 feet in width. While a few employés go across the river in boats and some of them go through the fence at other points, most of them use this entrance. It is also used by the company's customers and for general purposes, and the fire department uses it to get to the dock at the river. The fence at this point is of wire, and we do not understand that the gate is kept closed during operating hours. The Michigan Central Railroad runs on Niagara street; its main track being slightly east of the center of the street, a spur track running to the property of the Saginaw Manufacturing Company being east of the main track. There is a spur track running into the lumber company's property, but this is above the entrance and is not important here. Richard Reed, plaintiff's husband, was in the employ of the lumber company, as a lumber inspector. September 16, 1922, was a Saturday. The plant did not operate on Saturday afternoons. After Mr. Reed had completed his forenoon's work, he went to the office and got his pay check and that of a fellow workman named Moore, who was ill at home. While the parties are not agreed as to the exact distance from the office to the street, it is upwards of 200 feet. On coming out of the office Mr. Reed got into an automobile owned by Mr. Moore, and that day driven by his wife. He had for some few weeks come to his work and returned home in the Moore automobile, and there is some testimony tending to show that he paid Mr. Moore a stated sum weekly for such transportation. Mrs. Moore drove the automobile out through the gate into Niagara street, and when on the main track of the railroad they were struck by a fast train. Mrs. Moore was seriously injured, and Mr. Reed was killed. Plaintiff as sole dependent made claim against the lumber company for compensation, which claim was denied by the department of labor and industry. She here reviews such action, claiming that the department of labor and industry erroneously held that the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment.
An examination to the authorities is convincing that it is a general rule that an accident does not arise out of and in the course of the employment, when it occurs while the employé is on his way to work, before he has reached the premises of the employer, or when he is on his way home and has left the employer's premises. Mr. Bradbury, with the citation of numerous authorities (Bradbury on Workmen's Compensation [3d Ed.] p. 468), thus states the rule:
‘Ordinarily, when an employé is injured while traveling to or from his place of work on his employer's premises, and the employé is not paid for the time consumed in going and coming, the means of conveyance is not furnished by the employer, and the employé has departed from or has not yet reached the employer's premises, the injury does not arise out of the employment.’
And in Ruegg on Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation, 377, it is said:
‘In one sense, it may be said to be a part of his duty to get to such place, but if his method of traveling is not controlled by the employer, if he is a free agent, it is thought this qualified duty is not sufficient to raise, at the time, the relation of employer and workman.
‘The same may be said with respect to the time occupied in returning home from work, and of intervals allowed for meals when spent off the employer's premises.’
In Caton v. Summerlee & Mossend Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., 39 Scot. L. R. 762, in denying liability, it was said by the Lord Justice-Clerk:
And in Bell v. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., Ltd., 12 B. W. C. C. 138, it was said by the master of the rolls:
In DeVoe v. N. Y. State Rys., 218 N. Y. 318, 113 N. E. 256, L. R. A. 1917A, 250, it was said:
This court has recognized this general rule. Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N. W. 243;Guastelo v. Michigan Central R. Co., 194 Mich. 382, 160 N. W. 484, L. R. A. 1917D, 69;Lipinski v. Sutton Sales Co., 220 Mich. 647, 190 N. W. 705. But like most general rules this one has its exceptions which was noted in the Hills Case, where it was said:
‘In applying the general rule that the period of going to and returning from work is not covered by the act, it is held that the employment is not limited by the exact time when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins time, space, and opportunity before and sonable time, space, and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of employment.’
It is insisted by plaintiff's counsel that the case falls within the exception rather than the rule, while defendant's counsel insist that it falls within the rule. Defendant's counsel also insists that, if it is within the exception, the commission has by its...
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Barker, Matter of
...What did the Court actually say in Eriksen? A later case than Croxen, it cites Croxen for this: [110 Idaho 876] Bliss & Van Auken Lumber Co., 225 Mich. 164, 196 N.W. 420 (1923). As a general rule an accident does not arise out of and in the course of employment within the meaning of the Wor......
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...N.W.2d 776; Stocker v. Southfield Co., 244 Mich. 13, 221 N.W. 175; Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N.W. 243; Reed v. Bliss & Van Auken Lumber Co., 225 Mich. 164, 196 N.W. 420; Pearce v. Michigan Home and Training School, 231 Mich. 536, 204 N.W. 699; Otto v. Chapin, 243 Mich. 256, 220 N.W.......
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