Reed v. Central Soya Co. Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 27S05-9309-CV-1020,27S05-9309-CV-1020
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,114 Michael E. REED and Beth E. Reed, Appellants (Plaintiffs below), v. CENTRAL SOYA COMPANY, INC., National By-Products, Inc., and Boyce Turner d/b/a Boyce Turner d/b/a Turner & Sons Ag Service, Appellees (Defendants below).

Page 84

644 N.E.2d 84

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,114

Michael E. REED and Beth E. Reed, Appellants (Plaintiffs below), v. CENTRAL SOYA COMPANY, INC., National By-Products, Inc., and Boyce Turner d/b/a Boyce Turner d/b/a Turner &amp Sons Ag Service, Appellees (Defendants below).

No. 27S05-9309-CV-1020.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Dec. 7, 1994.

Mary A. Findling, Price & Barker, Indianapolis, Frank E. Gilkison, Beasley Gilkison Retherford Buckles & Clark, Muncie, for appellants Michael Reed and Beth Reed.

John R. Burns, III, Jeffrey A. Townsend, Baker & Daniels, Fort Wayne, for Central Soya Company, Inc.

John F. Prescott, Jr. Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, S.P. DeVolder, Gamble & Davis, P.C., Des Moines, IA, for National By-Products, Inc.

DICKSON, Justice.

In this case, a strict liability in tort action, plaintiffs-appellants Michael E. and Beth E. Reed seek rehearing following our decision in Reed v. Central Soya Co., Inc. (1993), Ind., 621 N.E.2d 1069. There, in part, we affirmed the trial court entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, a producer and a distributor of animal feed. The Reeds challenge the majority holding that defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the nature of the damages, various physical disorders in the Reeds' dairy herd allegedly resulting from the ingestion of contaminated feed, was not "sudden, major damage to property." ¹

The Reeds contend that because they observed adverse symptoms in the herd within twenty-four hours after the initial ingestion of the feed, the resultant immediate reduction in the fair market value of the affected cows established sudden, major damage. The Reeds further assert that even though their initial awareness of other bovine disorders did not occur until weeks after ingestion, this does not alter the fact that this damage likewise was sustained upon the first ingestion of the tainted feed. In their petition for rehearing, the Reeds argue that (a) the dissent is correct in concluding that the determination of whether property damage is sudden and major is a question of fact, and (b) even if it were a question of law, genuine issues of material fact exist here which preclude granting summary judgment.

Defendants respond that the majority correctly determined that because "the question of whether the damage suffered by a plaintiff is sudden, major damage is a question of law," Reed, 621 N.E.2d at 1076, summary judgment was properly granted. Defendants claim that the facts suggest that the Reeds' alleged losses occurred gradually and are yet evolving and that such losses do not constitute the statutorily requisite "sudden, major damage."

While the issue of whether property damage is sudden and major can be disposed of as a matter of law in some situations, this is not always the case. At the pleading stage, the court may be able to dispose of the issue as a matter of law, either for the plaintiff or for the defendant, depending on the pleadings and related matters presented. Conversely, at the summary judgment stage, the court may be faced with a genuine issue of material fact which must necessarily be decided by the fact finder.

However, when the underlying facts of the case--when the damage first manifested itself, how extensive the damage was, and how long the damage continued--are not in serious dispute, the issue is who should decide whether the damage is sudden and major, judge or jury? It is on facts such as these that the positions of the majority and dissent diverged in our initial opinion, the majority concluding that the issue is always one of law, and the dissent arguing that it is one of fact.

The legislature's directions are clear: the property damage must be sudden; it must be major; it may not include damages or resulting economic losses that are gradually evolving. Yet, courts must infuse these directions with legal meaning, and the facts of a particular case, when evaluated accordingly, may be sufficient to decide the case as a matter of law. Nevertheless, even when the statutory terms have been infused with meaning, there may be cases in which some weighing, balancing, or qualitative assessment of the underlying facts will be necessary to determine whether the facts meet those statutory standards. Such assessments should be left for the finder of fact. If the facts enable the court to unequivocally determine whether damage is sudden and major, then the issue is one of law. However, if weighing, balancing, and assessing must take place, the realm of the fact finder has been invaded and summary judgment is inappropriate. See generally Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 723, 730-31 (1...