Reed v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 18 February 2016
• Docket Number: Nos. 1–13–0681,1–13–2138.,s. 1–13–0681
• Parties: Mark REED, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, TH Ryan Cartage Company and L & D Drivers Services, Inc., Defendants–Appellees. Mark Reed, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. The Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission, TH Ryan Cartage Company and L & D Drivers Services, Inc., Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

49 N.E.3d 930

Mark REED, Plaintiff–Appellant
v.
The ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, TH Ryan Cartage Company and L & D Drivers Services, Inc., Defendants–Appellees.

Mark Reed, Plaintiff–Appellee
v.
The Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission, TH Ryan Cartage Company and L & D Drivers Services, Inc., Defendants–Appellants.

Nos. 1–13–0681
1–13–2138.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Feb. 18, 2016.

49 N.E.3d 931

Paul A. Coghlan & Associates, P.C., Hinsdale, for Mark Reed.

Law Offices of Meachum, Stark, Boyle & Trafman, Chicago, for TH Ryan Cartage Company and L&D Drivers Services, Inc.

OPINION

Justice COBBS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Pursuant to section 19(g) of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) ( 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2012)), plaintiff, Mark Reed, applied for a judgment on a portion of a workers' compensation award. Defendants, TH Ryan Cartage Company and L & D Drivers Services, Inc., moved to dismiss the section 19(g) application. The circuit court of Cook County concluded that the Act did not permit enforcement because a portion of the award was on judicial review before the circuit court. Consequently, the court dismissed the section 19(g) application as premature. Defendants thereafter filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), which the circuit court denied.

¶ 2 Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of his section 19(g) application. Defendants appeal from the denial of their motion for sanctions.

¶ 3 We affirm both orders of the circuit court.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On August 12, 2004, plaintiff suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident while working as a truck driver for defendants. As a result, he pursued a workers' compensation claim against defendants. On January 18, 2012, an arbitrator with the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) issued a decision in favor

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of plaintiff. The arbitrator's decision included an award of medical expenses, and an award of temporary total disability (TTD) benefits based on his calculation of plaintiff's wages. Defendants filed a petition for review before the Commission (see 820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2012)), which affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision on October 15, 2012.

¶ 6 Defendants thereafter informed plaintiff that they planned to petition the circuit court for judicial review of the Commission's determination of plaintiff's wages, but did not plan to contest its determination of plaintiff's medical expenses. On November 15, 2012, defendants filed their petition for judicial review in the circuit court. See 820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2012).

¶ 7 On December 10, 2012, plaintiff filed a section 19(g) complaint in the circuit court, in which he applied for judgment on the medical expense portion of the workers' compensation award. See 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2012). On January 23, 2013, defendants filed a motion to dismiss under both section 2–615 and section 2–619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–615, 2–619 (West 2012)). In the motion, defendants argued, inter alia, that section 19(g) of the Act did not allow enforcement proceedings because judicial review was pending and, alternatively, that the complaint violated a circuit court local rule.¹

¶ 8 On March 6, 2013, following a hearing, the circuit court granted defendants' section 2–619 motion to dismiss, without prejudice. The court concluded that section 19(g) of the Act does not provide for enforcement while any proceedings for review are pending. The court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. On March 7, 2013, plaintiff filed his notice of appeal. On April 5, 2013, defendants filed a motion for sanctions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 4, 2013), which the court denied. On June 25, 2013, plaintiff filed an amended notice of appeal. On July 1, 2013, defendants filed notice of their separate appeal.² Additional pertinent background will be discussed in the context of our analysis.

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Before this court, plaintiff assigns error to the circuit court's dismissal of his section 19(g) application. Also, defendants assign error to the circuit court's denial of their motion for sanctions under Rule 137.

¶ 11 Enforcement Under Section 19(g) of the Act

¶ 12 The circuit court dismissed plaintiff's section 19(g) application because the Act, according to the court, does not provide for enforcement of a workers' compensation award while proceedings for review are pending. Section 2–619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–619 (West 2012) ) provides for the involuntary dismissal of a cause of action based on certain defects or defenses. One of the enumerated grounds for a section 2–619 dismissal is that the claim is barred by affirmative matter which avoids the legal effect of or defeats the claim. 735 ILCS 5/2619(a)(9) (West

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2012). A section 2–619 dismissal is similar to the grant of a motion for summary judgment. Thus, the reviewing court considers whether the existence of a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded the dismissal, or absent such a factual issue, whether dismissal is proper as a matter of law. Chandler v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 207 Ill.2d 331, 340–41, 278 Ill.Dec. 340, 798 N.E.2d 724 (2003). The terms of section 19(g) of the Act are properly considered “affirmative matter” that could negate completely the asserted claim. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill.2d 469, 487, 203 Ill.Dec. 463, 639 N.E.2d 1282 (1994).

¶ 13 We review de novo a circuit court's dismissal of a complaint under section 2–619. Skaperdas v. Country Casualty Insurance Co., 2015 IL 117021, ¶ 14, 390 Ill.Dec. 94, 28 N.E.3d 747 ; Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 209 Ill.2d 376, 383, 283 Ill.Dec. 669, 808 N.E.2d 957 (2004). Specifically, the material facts being undisputed, the circuit court dismissed plaintiff's section 19(g) application based on the court's construction of the Act. The construction of a statute presents a question of law that is also reviewed de novo. Skaperdas, 2015 IL 117021, ¶ 15, 390 Ill.Dec. 94, 28 N.E.3d 747 ; Cassens Transport Co. v. Illinois Industrial Comm'n, 218 Ill.2d 519, 524, 300 Ill.Dec. 416, 844 N.E.2d 414 (2006).

¶ 14 Our guiding principles are familiar. The primary goal in construing a statute, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill.2d 225, 232, 258 Ill.Dec. 548, 756 N.E.2d 822 (2001). We look to the statutory language, which given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indication of legislative intent. Beelman Trucking v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 233 Ill.2d 364, 370, 330 Ill.Dec. 796, 909 N.E.2d 818 (2009). We read the statute as a whole and consider all relevant parts. We must construe the statute so that each word, clause, and sentence is given a reasonable meaning, and avoiding an interpretation which would render any portion of the statute superfluous, meaningless, or void. Cassens Transport, 218 Ill.2d at 524, 300 Ill.Dec. 416, 844 N.E.2d 414. In addition to the statutory language, we also consider the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects and purposes sought. Beelman Trucking, 233 Ill.2d at 371, 330 Ill.Dec. 796, 909 N.E.2d 818. Also, we presume that the legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Sylvester, 197 Ill.2d at 232, 258 Ill.Dec. 548, 756 N.E.2d 822.

¶ 15 Likewise familiar is the purpose of the Act, which:

“substitutes an entirely new system of rights, remedies, and procedure for all previously existing common law rights and liabilities between employers and employees subject to the Act for accidental injuries or death of employees arising out of and in the course of the employment. [Citation.] Pursuant to the statutory scheme implemented by the Act, the employee gave up his common law rights to sue his employer in tort, but recovery for injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment became automatic without regard to any fault on his part. The employer, who gave up the right to plead the numerous common law defenses, was compelled to pay, but his liability became fixed under a strict and comprehensive statutory scheme * * *. [Citation.] This trade-off between employer and employee promoted the fundamental purpose of the Act, which was to afford protection to employees by providing them with prompt and equitable compensation for

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their injuries.” Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 180–81, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).

Courts liberally construe the Act to effectuate its remedial purpose. Beelman Trucking, 233 Ill.2d at 371, 330 Ill.Dec. 796, 909 N.E.2d 818 ; Cassens Transport, 218 Ill.2d at 524, 300 Ill.Dec. 416, 844 N.E.2d 414.

¶ 16 Section 19(g) provides, in relevant part:

“Except in the case of a claim against the State of Illinois, either party may present a certified copy of the award of the Arbitrator, or a certified copy of the decision of the

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