Reed v. Illinois
| Decision Date | 10 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12-cv-7274 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | LINDA REED, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS; THE HONORABLE SIDNEY A. JONES III, in his official capacity as Circuit Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court; THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. EVANS, in his official capacity as Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court; and MELISSA PACELLI, in her Official capacity as Court Disability Coordinator for the Circuit Court of Cook County, Defendants. |
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Plaintiff Linda Reed brings this action against the State of Illinois, the Circuit Court of Cook County and the Honorable Sidney A. Jones III, the Honorable Timothy C. Evans, and Melissa Paccelli, in their official capacities, for violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Reed claims that Defendants failed to accommodate her disabilities in previous state-court proceedings and prevented her from effectively presenting her pro se personal injury action to a jury. (See R. 41, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-33.) Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), respectively. (R. 56, Mot. to Dismiss.) For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss forlack of subject matter jurisdiction and grants Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Reed alleges the following facts in the First Amended Complaint, which the Court assumes as true for purposes of Defendants' motion to dismiss. In 2009, Reed, a resident of Wisconsin, brought a personal injury action in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Reed v. Moore, Case No. 09 M1 301249. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) Reed represented herself pro se in that action. (Id. ¶¶ 15-33.) In April 2011, about a month before trial began, Reed was diagnosed with tardive dyskinesia, an untreatable neurological condition characterized by involuntary movements, including tongue thrusting, pursing of the lips, choking, and side-to-side chewing of the jaw. (Id. ¶ 9.) Reed also experiences involuntary movements in her body and limbs: she appears jerky, her head moves, and her fingers tap. (Id.) Stress worsens Reed's conditions, causing her to become mute, scream, or make non-verbal sounds. (Id. ¶ 10.) Reed also suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder, which can cause severe anxiety, especially under stress. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Trial in Reed's personal injury action began on May 24, 2011. (Id. ¶ 16.) Beginning on May 17, Reed made several requests for accommodations during trial to the Court Disability Coordinator for the Circuit Court of Cook County. (Id.) Reed requested a note-taker, a podium, the ability to seek recesses as needed, an interpreter to speak for her when she could not speak for herself, a microphone, and an explanation to the jury about her disability. (Id.) The court agreed to make the first three requested accommodations, allowing Reed to use a note-taker and a podium and to seek recesses as needed. (Id. ¶ 18.) The court, however, denied her requests fora microphone, an interpreter, and an explanation of her disability to the jury.1 (Id.) Reed alleges that the failure to make these accommodations "rendered her communications less effective than her defense attorney counterpart, who [did] not have the same impairments." (Id. ¶ 20.)
Additionally, Reed claims that Judge Jones, who presided over her state-court action, "exacerbated" her conditions and created a hostile environment for Reed through his "constant expressions of exasperation and impatience before the jury." (Id. ¶ 21.) According to Reed, although Judge Jones knew about her disability, he made remarks about the uncontrollable pauses her condition caused, telling her to "hurry up," and he "glared at Reed, hit his bench, leaned forward at [Reed] and otherwise expressed annoyance with Reed in a way clearly visible to the jury." (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) Furthermore, Reed alleges that because she did not receive adequate accommodations, she had to resort to hand signals, grunts, and other non-verbal signals that are difficult to transcribe to communicate at trial. (Id. ¶ 25.) Reed alleges that, as a result, "she had no opportunity to create an accurate and complete trial transcript." (Id.)
The jury in the state-court proceedings returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. (Id. ¶ 26.) Following the verdict, Reed filed a motion for a new trial arguing, among other things, that the court had erred in denying her requests for reasonable accommodations. (See R. 61-1, Pl. Mot. for New Trial at 15-16.) Reed made additional requests for accommodations to argue her post-trial motions. (Am. Compl. ¶ 27.) By that point, Reed's condition has worsened, and she could not travel from Milwaukee to argue the post-trial motions. (Id.) Because Reed could not use a telephone without assistive technology, she requested that the court allow her use text communications to argue her motions. (Id.) The court denied Reed's requests for a teletypewriter and to allow argument by email. (Id.) The court offered Reed the option ofparticipating in oral argument using instant messaging. (See R. 61-4, Aug. 2, 2011 Order ¶ 4.) Reed, however, declined the court's offer because of her lack of knowledge regarding instant messaging. (Id.) Judge Jones ultimately decided not to entertain oral argument from either side due to Reed's difficulty speaking. (Id.)
On September 28, 2011, Judge Jones denied Reed's motion for a new trial, rejecting her argument that the court had failed to provide reasonable accommodations to allow Reed to represent herself effectively at trial. (See R. 61-2, Sept. 28, 2011 Memorandum Op. and Order at 5-6.) Reed appealed the judgment against her to the Illinois Appellate Court in October 2011. (See 61-6, Pl. Appellant Br.) The appellate court affirmed the judgment against Reed on November 13, 2012 (see 61-5, Nov. 13, 2012 Ill. App. Ct. Order), and the Illinois Supreme Court denied Reed's petition for leave to appeal on March 27, 2013. (See R. 61-7 at 2.)
On September 11, 2012, while her state court appeal was pending, Reed filed suit against Defendants in this Court asserting claims for violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-37.) Reed alleges that Defendants failed to take adequate measures to accommodate her disability, failed to notify her in a meaningful way of her right to accommodations, and failed to provide sufficient training to judicial officers on their duty to accommodate pro se litigants with neurological and mental disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 18-25, 27, 29, 31-32.) According to Reed, Defendants' failures denied her a fair trial at a cost of thousands of dollars and caused her emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses. (Id. ¶ 33.)
The standard the Court applies to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction depends on the purpose of the motion. See Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443-44 (7th Cir. 2009); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012). If a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the allegations regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Apex Digital, 572 F.3d at 443-44; United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 946. If, however, the defendant denies or controverts the truth of the jurisdictional allegations, the Court may look beyond the pleadings and view any evidence submitted to determine if subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Apex Digital, 572 F.3d at 443-44; United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 946. "Where jurisdiction is in question, the party asserting a right to a federal forum has the burden of proof, regardless of who raised the jurisdictional challenge." Craig v. Ontario Corp., 543 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2008).
"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted." Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted).
Under the federal notice pleading standards, a plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. Put differently, a complaint must contain sufficient factual content "to allow the court 'to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Charleston v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. at Chicago, 741 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). "In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, [courts] accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true." Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013). Additionally, although a plaintiff need not plead facts in the complaint to defeat potential affirmative defenses, where "the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy [an] affirmative defense," ...
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