Reed v. PNC Mortg.
Decision Date | 02 July 2013 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. AW-13-1536 |
Parties | DENNIS JAMES REED, Plaintiff, v. PNC MORTGAGE, a division of PNC BANK, N.A. f/k/a NATIONAL CITY MORTGAGE, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Dennis Reed's Complaint for failure to state a claim. Doc. No. 9. The Court has reviewed the record and concludes that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.1
On or about March 29, 2013, Plaintiff filed this action in the Circuit Court of Prince George's County against Defendant National City Mortgage to quiet title to his Upper Marlboro, Maryland property. PNC Mortgage, which is successor in interest to National City Mortgage as a result of the merger between PNC Bank, N.A. and National City Bank, removed the action to this Court on May 28, 2013. Doc. No. 1.
Plaintiff claims title to the Upper Marlboro property based on a deed dated December 31, 2008 and recorded the same day in the land records for Prince George's County. Doc. No. 2 ¶ 2. In or about February 2009, Plaintiff obtained a refinancing loan from National City Mortgage inthe amount of $362,207.00, which was secured by a deed of trust to National City. Id. ¶ 5; Doc. No. 2-1. The deed of trust named Lawyers Title Services, Inc. as the trustee. Id. The deed of trust was recorded in the land records for Prince George's County on February 4, 2009. Doc. No. 2 ¶ 5.
Plaintiff asserts that the deed of trust is "invalid and unenforceable" for the following reasons:
Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff seeks a declaration from this Court that the deed of trust is null and void and seeks to quiet title to the property from any claims by Defendant. Id. at 4.
Defendant filed the pending Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim on June 4, 2013. Doc. No. 9. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for the Court's consideration.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is "to test the sufficiency of [the] complaint." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). Except in certain specified cases, the complaint need only satisfy Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure, which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court should proceed in two steps. First, the Court should determine which allegations in the Complaint are factual allegations entitled to deference, and which are mere legal conclusions that receive no deference. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Second, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679.
In its determination, the Court must "accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true," Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and "must construe factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999). The Court should not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), "legal conclusion[s] couched as . . . factual allegation[s]," Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are "to be liberally construed . . . and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted)(internal quotations omitted). However, "even a pro se complaint must meet a minimum threshold of plausibility." Hawkins v. Hairston, No. 12-cv-1366-JKB, 2012 WL 5503839, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2012).
Plaintiff first alleges that the deed of trust is invalid and unenforceable because the original lender and trustee—National City Mortgage and Lawyers Title Services, Inc., respectively—are no longer in good standing to do business in Maryland. Doc. No. 2 ¶ 6(a). Exhibits attached to Plaintiff's Complaint demonstrate that National City Mortgage has been dissolved and Lawyers Title Services is in forfeiture. Doc. No. 2-1 at 1-2. Plaintiff cites no authority, and the Court is aware of none, which would render the deed of trust invalid and unenforceable on these grounds. PNC Mortgage, as successor in interest to National City Mortgage, has the same right to benefit from the deed of trust as the original lender.2 And even assuming that the deed of trust was defective for naming a forfeited entity as trustee, it would not be invalid or unenforceable. "An error or omission in a mortgage or deed of trust concerning the designation of the trustee or the individual authorized to exercise a power of sale does not invalidate the instrument or the ability of the mortgagee or beneficiary of the deed of trust to appoint an individual to exercise the power of sale." Md. Code, Real Prop. § 7-105(b)(4). The deed of trust in this case expressly grants the lender and beneficiary the power to remove a trustee and appoint a successor trustee. Doc. No. 2-1 ¶ 24. Accordingly, Plaintiff's argument that the deed of trust is invalid or unenforceable based on the status of National City Mortgage or Lawyers Title Services is without merit.
Plaintiff's arguments that the deed of trust is invalid and unenforceable because it has been "separated" from the underlying note are similarly without merit. See Doc. No. 2 ¶¶ 6(b),6(d). Courts in this district have rejected similar claims based on the alleged separation of a note from the deed of trust. See, e.g., Parker v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. WMN-12-3358, 2013 WL 1390004, at *2-3 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2013). Although Plaintiff presents no facts indicating that his loan was securitized, he appears to object to securitization in general. See Doc. No. 2 ¶ 6(d). Even assuming that his loan was securitized, Plaintiff has presented no basis for the Court to declare the deed of trust invalid or unenforceable. See, e.g., Edokobi v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, No. JFM-13-288, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45782, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 29, 2013) (); Suss v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. WMN-09-1627, 2010 WL 2733097, at *5 (D. Md. July 9, 2010) ().3 Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief based on the alleged separation of the note from the deed of trust or the securitization of his loan.
Finally, Plaintiff appears to object to the fact that there is no valid assignment of the deed of trust recorded in the land records of Prince George's County. Plaintiff's argument is without merit for multiple reasons. First, no assignment from National City Mortgage to PNC Mortgage was necessary because PNC is the successor in interest to the rights of National City Mortgage. See Md. Code, Corps. & Ass'ns § 3-114(e)(1) ( ). Second, under Maryland law, "[a] deed of trust securing a negotiable promissory note cannot be transferred like a mortgage; rather, the corresponding note may be transferred, and carries with it the security provided by the deed of trust." Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v.Brock, 63 A.3d 40, 48 (Md. 2013). Accordingly, there is no legal requirement that an assignment of a deed of trust must be recorded in Maryland. See also In re Williams, 277 B.R. 78, 81-82 (Bankr. D. Md. 2002) (). For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and his Complaint must be dismissed.
Plaintiff makes a variety of...
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