Reed v. Reed

Decision Date19 November 1908
Citation62 S.E. 792,108 Va. 790
PartiesREED et al. v. REED et al.
CourtVirginia Supreme Court
1. Contracts (§ 92*)Parties—Mental Capacity—Sufficiency.

One who had been discharged from an insane asylum as "improved, " and who thereafter between insane intervals, lasting from two days to two weeks, was quiet and inoffensive, and worked with efficiency, read, voted, and was regarded as having sufficient mental capacity to deed, had sufficient capacity during a lucid interval to contract with his sister to give her his property in consideration of care for him.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 413; Dec. Dig. § 92.*]

2. Frauds, Statute of (§ 125*) — Parol Agreement to Convey—Certainty.

An agreement by decedent that he would give his sister all his property, excepting certain bonds, if she would provide him a home for life and care for him, and if he should not be returned to an insane asylum, was sufficiently definite, within the rule that parol agreements to sell land and can only be enforced when definite.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Frauds, Statute of, Cent. Dig. § 276; Dec. Dig. § 125.*]

3. Frauds, Statute of (§ 129*) — Parol Agreement to Convey—Evidence—Sufficiency.

Evidence held to show that defendant's acts in caring for decedent were done pursuant to decedent's parol agreement to give her his prop erty, within the rule governing enforcement of parol agreements to sell land.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Frauds, Statute of, Cent. Dig. §§ 287, 289; Dec. Dig. § 129.*]

4. Frauds, Statute of (§ 129*) — Parol Agreement to Convey—Equities.

Evidence held to show that decedent's parol agreement to give his property to his sister in consideration of his care had been so far executed by her that a refusal of full execution would operate a fraud upon her.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Frauds Statute of, Cent. Dig. §§ 287, 289; Dec. Dig. § 129.*]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Rockbridge County.

Bill by J. H. Reed and others against Indiana Reed and another. From a decree for defendant Indiana Reed on her cross-bill, complainants appeal. Affirmed.

Timberlake & Nelson, for appellants.

Moore & Moore and Greenlee D. Letcher, for appellees.

KEITH, P. J. H. Reed and others, claiming to be heirs at law of Alexander Reed, deceased, filed their bill in the circuit court of Rockbridge county, in which they state that Alexander Reed died seised and possessed of sundry personal and real estate. The real estate consisted of an undivided five-eighths interest In a tract of land containing about 85 acres, the other three-eighths interest being owned by his sister, Indiana Reed, and the personal estate amounted to $373.29. The object of the bill was to have a partition of the real estate and a distribution of the personal estate among those entitled thereto. Indiana Reed, a sister of Alexander Reed, and Thomas A. Sterrett, his administrator, were made parties defendant.

Indiana Reed filed an answer and crossbill, in which she states that her brother, Alexander, was in April, 1885, adjudged a lunatic and admitted to the lunatic asylum at Staunton, Va.; that he soon recovered his mind, and wrote to her most earnest letters, and made urgent appeals to her and to his brothers to get him released, that he was in a most distressed condition by reason of his surroundings; that respondent went to see him, and he renewed his appeals in person, and agreed that if she would get him out of the asylum, take him home with her, furnish him a living the rest of his life, and take care of him, he would give her all of his property, real and personal; that she finally agreed to accept his offer, and in company with her brother Hezekiah went to Staunton, and brought her brother Alexander home with her; that upon his return he was overjoyed, saying that he believed he would have died, had he remained longer at the asylum, and repeated the bargain which he had theretofore made, and she agreed with him that she would never let him be taken back, andwould take care of him the remainder of his life; that she would not have made this agreement under any circumstances with a stranger, as she did not consider all the property he had, real and personal, in any way equivalent in value to the trouble and care that his condition promised to impose upon her, but as a sister she with pleasure agreed to and accepted the proposition made by her brother, and from that day to the day of his death she faithfully carried out the same, giving him every attention and furnishing him every comfort that her humble means and the property received from him permitted. The answer further avers that, after she had acquired title to the real and personal property of Alexander Reed, she fully carried out and performed said agreement on her part, and held full, entire, and exclusive possession of the property, real and personal, in all respects as her own, and the same was thereafter regarded as hers by Alexander Reed and all cognizant of the facts; that, being hers, she repaired the house and the outhouses, barn, and stable, and made various new and permanent improvements, both to the buildings, fences, and the land, and did and caused to be done a great amount of advantageously directed and beneficial labor thereon, in which improvements the little work done by Alexander Reed was not effective and contributed little, if anything.

The cross-bill avers that the contract was made between respondent and her brother when he was clothed in his right reason and in law able and competent to contract, and when he thoroughly understood the nature of the contract and its effect. The cross-bill then goes on to detail with much particularity the services rendered by respondent to her brother, his frequent attacks of insanity, when he would have to be chained to the floor to prevent his doing injury to himself and others; the watchful care with which she soothed him during the night, going scores of times to talk with him, adjust his bedclothing, and render to him the unremitting attention which would be required by a child. These attacks would last sometimes for days, weeks, and even months, after which he would recover his mind, and for intervals of longer or shorter duration be perfectly sane.

The plaintiffs answered this cross-bill, and by their answer put all of its material allegations in issue. The case was referred to a commissioner, to ascertain what personal property Alexander Reed died possessed of and its value; what real estate he died possessed of and its value; what contract was made between Alexander Reed and Indiana Reed, and whether the same was legal and enforceable, and the value of her services; and a statement of the property taken by Thos. A. Sterrett, administrator, and the proceeds therefrom, to whom it belonged and the proper distribution of said proceeds and the costs.

In answer to these interrogatories, the commissioner made an excellent report, in which the facts are stated so clearly that we cannot do better than to reproduce it in substance.

Dealing first with the mental capacity of Alexander Reed to make the contract, the report states that Alexander Reed had been dangerously insane when committed to the asylum in April, 1885; that he was discharged as "improved" in December of that year and that during all the rest of his life he was subject to frequent epileptic fits of more or less severity; that these attacks would last from two or three days to sometimes as long as two weeks. He seemed during the intervals between the insane spells to have...

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18 cases
  • Waddy v. Grimes
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 23, 1930
    ...6, 1926, devising this property to Annie Waddy have been a good devise, but this deed would constitute a valid conveyance. Reed Reed, 108 Va. 790, 62 S.E. 792; Weeks Reliance Fertilizer Co., 20 Ga.App. 498, 93 S.E. 152; Fay Burditt, 81 Ind. 433, 42 Am.Rep. 142; Mileham Montague, 148 Iowa 47......
  • Waddy v. Grimes
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 23, 1930
    ...March 6, 1926, devising this property to Annie Waddy have been a good devise, tout this deed would constitute a valid conveyance. Reed v. Reed, 108 Va. 790, 02 S. E. 792; Weeks v. Reliance Fertilizer Co., 20 Ga. App. 498, 93 S. E. 152; Fay v. Burditt, 81 Ind. 433, 42 Am. Rep. 142; Mileham v......
  • Gilmer v. Brown
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • September 3, 1947
    ...of such person to execute a deed (Waddy v. Crimes, 154 Va. 615, 153 S.E. 807); nor is a commitment to the insane asylum (Reed v. Reed, 108 Va. 790, 62 S.E. 792; Rust v. Reid, 124 Va. 1, 97 S.E. 324). In each of these cases the deed or will was executed some time after the date of the adjudi......
  • Gilmer v. Brown
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • September 3, 1947
    ...capacity of such person to execute a deed (Waddy Grimes, 154 Va. 615, 153 S.E. 807); nor is a commitment to the insane asylum (Reed Reed, 108 Va. 790, 62 S.E. 792; Rust Reid, 124 Va. 1, 97 S.E. 324). In each of these cases the deed or will was executed some time after the date of the adjudi......
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