Reed v. Reed
Decision Date | 05 April 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 9384,9384 |
Citation | 304 P.2d 590,130 Mont. 409 |
Parties | Julia REED, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Fred C. REED, Defendant and Respondent. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Horace J. Dwyer, Anaconda, Ralph J. Anderson, Helena, for appellant.
Ralph J. Anderson, Helena, argued orally for appellant.
J. B. C. Knight, Wade J. Dahood, Anaconda, Joseph J. McCaffery, Jr., Butte, for respondent.
Wade J. Dahood and J. B. C. Knight, Anaconda, argued orally for respondent.
The plaintiff and defendant to this action obtained divorces from their immediate former respective spouses and on April 17, 1948, at Las Vegas, Nevada, entered into marriage.
After what could be described as a truly stormy marital relationship, the plaintiff Julia Reed brought this action against the defendant Fred C. Reed and it was alleged that she had been a resident of Montana for more than one year immediately preceding the commencement of this action, and that the defendant disregarding his duties as a husband, for more than one year last past, has done all sorts of things contrary to that expected in a marital relationship.
In all respects plaintiff's complaint was broad enough under the statute to grant an absolute divorce provided of course that proof followed. However the complaint contained only prayers for permanent alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month, attorney's fees, injunctive relief and security that she may live separate and apart from the defendant and for such further relief as to the court may seem just and equitable and no specific prayer was made for an absolute divorce.
Defendant's answer to the complaint admitted the marriage, the residence, and then cross-complained whereby he sought an absolute divorce from the plaintiff.
After a lengthy hearing the district judge below entered a decree granting to the plaintiff an absolute divorce along with certain allowances to be paid monthly by the defendant for approximately five years and certain other relief was granted which is of no importance to this appeal. From the judgment and decree the plaintiff appeals. The questions raised by her appeal are as follows:
1. Does the court as a matter of law have the right to grant an absolute divorce in a suit wherein the plaintiff sought separate maintenance only?
2. What is the propriety of a monthly award for approximately five years for the support and maintenance of plaintiff?
3. The propriety of the court in permitting over objections testimony concerning the relationship between the parties hereto prior to their marriage.
There are no minor children, nor any children, involved in the questioned marital status. Thus there is but the disposition to be made of the marital status between the litigants themselves. A study of the evidence produced at the trial proves the seriousness and finality of the marital repture. A reconciliation would be, as the evidence shows, impossible.
Michigan and Tennessee have by statute granted to the court authority to use its sound discretion where a divorce from bed and board is prayed; the appellate courts in those states have sustained rulings by the lower court wherein absolute divorce was granted when the complaint asked for a divorce from bed and board. Lingner v. Lingner, 165 Tenn. 525, 56 S.W.2d 749, and Plantt v. Plantt, 28 Tenn.App. 79, 186 S.W.2d 338; Ratcliffe v. Ratcliffe, 308 Mich. 488, 14 N.W.2d 127. No such discretion is allowed by the Montana statutes.
However as is stated in 3 Nelson on Divorce, 2nd Ed., Sec. 32.39, pp. 409, 410: 'Contrary to the rule governing divorce actions in some jurisdictions, that absolute divorce may be decreed though the plaintiff ask only for a divorce from bed and board, if a wife, not desiring a divorce, proceeds for separate maintenance the court may not decree a divorce, but is bound to decree separate maintenance only * * *'.
It would be difficult indeed to find better language contained in any of the cases which would be more apropos to the circumstances as they were presented to us in the instant appeal than in the case of Cawley v. Cawley, 59 Utah 80, 202 P. 10, 11, where it is said:
The plaintiff's action here was for separate maintenance and not divorce as is evidenced by her complaint and in her testimony she indicated definitely that she did not desire a divorce and the lower court was in error in forcing the plaintiff to accept a form of relief which she did not seek and which she did not desire.
Section 21-136, R.C.M.1947, reads as follows: 'Though judgment of divorce is denied, the court may, in its discretion, in an action for divorce, provide for the maintenance of the wife and her children, or any of them, by the husband.' This statute seems definitely to point out the scope of the courts' authority and nowhere in the Montana Civil Code can there be found any authority wherein the courts are permitted, by statute, to grant a divorce where only separate maintenance is sought. The general rule of statutory construction is applicable, it being that where there is an express mention of certain authority, the mentioning of it implies the exclusion of any other. Compare Stephens v. City of Great Falls, 119 Mont. 368, 175 P.2d 408; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, Sec. 333, pp. 666 to 670; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Secs. 244, 245, 246, pp. 238 to 241.
An examination of section 21-103, R.C.M.1947, discloses that absolute divorces, or separations from bed and board or decrees for separate maintenance, may be granted for certain reasons, but there is nothing in that section which suggests the court may grant any relief beyond that which is sought for by the prevailing party.
Respondent contends that the cases of Weil v. Weil, 37 Cal.2d 770, 236 P.2d 159, and Greenwood v. Greenwood, 101 Cal.App. 736, 282 P. 433, are persuasive in support of the legal premises that he advances. However in both of those cases the wife consented to amend the prayer of her complaint and thereby consented to a decree being entered for absolute divorce.
Consistent with the overwhelming weight of authority we hold that the district court has no power to grant relief in an action wherein separate maintenance is sought by granting an absolute divorce.
The apparent policy of the legislature in adopting R.C.M.1947, Sec. 21-136, was to discourage the incautious granting of divorces and in doubtful cases to give the court the authority to grant a separation rather than to destroy the vinculum of the marriage, the reason for this being that a reconciliation of the parties may be accomplished by legally separating them for a time thus permitting their passions and prejudices to subside and for the further and more important reason that the children, if any, resulting from the marriage must come foremost in the court's consideration.
The legislature has imposed the methods recognized under which the bonds of matrimony are consummated and at the same time it has imposed the methods under which those bonds may be terminated. For us to read into the statute something that is not there would be in effect a judicial amendment thereto. Such authority has not been committed to us.
A suit for separate maintenance is one of ancient origin but unless we can find statutory authority, and we find none, which gives to the courts the power to use their discretion in their disposition of domestic relations, then we must follow the general rules as have been laid down by our predecessors.
Quoting again from Nelson on Divorce, supra, Sec. 32.04, p. 368: ...
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