Reed v. Rhodes
| Decision Date | 15 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. C73-1300.,C73-1300. |
| Citation | 472 F. Supp. 612 |
| Parties | Robert Anthony REED et al., Plaintiffs, v. James A. RHODES et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
James L. Hardiman, Theresa Demchak, Cleveland, Ohio, Nathaniel R. Jones, New York City, Thomas I. Atkins, Roxbury, Mass., for plaintiffs.
Jeremiah Glassman, Michael Sussman, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae, United States of America.
Mark O'Neill, Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, George I. Meisel, James P. Murphy, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, John H. Bustamante, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants.
The Court has become painfully aware that the local defendants' planning activities have not been effective. Last fall, this Court noted, but overlooked, the scattered and inconsistent planning, which resulted in presenting a plan to the Court which was hurriedly revoked as the school term approached. The Court, at that time, was forced into the position of having to accept a hastily drawn school closing plan which, if the defendants had allowed sufficient time, the Court may have rejected. However, the Court was engineered into a position of either approving their ill-prepared school closing plan or ordering the schools to remain closed until proper planning had been undertaken. The Court was disappointed at the procedures and tactics employed by the local defendants, but did not want to disrupt the expectations of the parents and children that school would open on a timely basis after the teachers' strike.
The local defendants' failure to plan properly was again evident this February. On January 24, 1979, the Cleveland School Board approved various plans which they later disapproved on February 8, 1979. Their planning was so deficient that the Deputy Superintendent for Desegregation Implementation had not considered either the legality of their plans1 or their cost.2 Therefore, after filing their plans with the Court, they partially rescinded their plans even though it was within a few short weeks of the opening of school. Dr. Fleming has acknowledged that the vacillation of the Board's planning has "discouraged" many parents.3 Dr. Fleming has also acknowledged that the local defendants' failure to prepare expeditiously and thoughtfully for desegregation has limited their ability to do as much desegregation as perhaps they could.4
The local defendants' inability to carry out desegregation pervades the school system. School principals and administrators are not properly prepared for desegregation.5 The school system's records on student, faculty, staff and inventory are incomplete and provide an obstacle to effective desegregation. In all, the local defendants' meager attempt at desegregation in February, 1979 was so disruptive that this Court has serious doubt whether the ultimate implementation, which is of much greater magnitude, can be carried out smoothly and effectively.
The local defendants have also shown a complete inability to regard the various aspects of desegregation planning as interrelated components. The February 6, 1978 order could be strengthened and requires further planning. This Court has instructed the parties on several occasions, including in the February 6, 1978 order itself, to suggest a creative modification of the remedial plan which best incorporates the Kennedy and Marshall school areas, which fully takes into account all schools projected for closing in the next few years,6 and which contains a variety of magnet programs. Each of these items separately affects the distribution and assignment of students. If considered separately, a change in any one item will affect the February 6 plan as well as the other items. Therefore, they cannot be treated separately but must be carefully and prospectively incorporated into an overall plan for the Cleveland public schools. To plan in a piecemeal fashion is absurd and will continue to disrupt the expectations of parents who want to know where their child will be taught the following semester. This Court wants to minimize as much as possible the dislocations attendant to any desegregation effort. Therefore, foresighted and comprehensive planning is required.7
The local defendants have failed to heed the recommendations of this Court that the local school administration needs the guidance of outside expertise to formulate a workable plan. In fact, they have ignored a direct order of this Court that "the defendants shall consult with experts drawn from outside the Cleveland school system, such consultants to be selected with the approval of the Court." February 6, 1978 order, p. 79. The local defendants' floundering efforts this 1978-79 school year has shown that such outside expertise is desperately needed.
As a result of this Court's analysis of the management capability of the local defendants (see pp. 95-98 of February 6, 1978 order), a deputy superintendent for desegregation implementation was hired. An individual who had considerable experience in other school systems undergoing desegregation was chosen. Regrettably, this individual decided to leave the Cleveland system.
Upon Dr. Leftwich's departure, this Court made clear its belief that desegregation is a difficult and complex task and that it would take an outside expert to replace the departing deputy superintendent. Despite these admonitions, the local defendants selected Margaret Fleming, an insider who admitted to having no previous desegregation experience except for the few tasks performed for the nascent effort in Cleveland.
The local defendants' failure to hire the appropriate experts has delayed effective planning long enough and can no longer persist. Desegregation implementation in September, 1979, or even February, 1980 will stand little chance of success unless experts are brought into the system.
The case law firmly supports the authority of a district court to hire consultants or experts to create a workable plan for desegregation implementation. See, e. g., Swann, v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 306 F.Supp. 1291, 1313 (W.D. N.C.1969); Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 380 F.Supp. 673, 684 (D.Colo.1974); Hart v. Community School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F.Supp. 699, 758-769 (E.D.N.Y.1974); Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F.Supp. 1096, 1104 (E.D.Mich.1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. 216, 227 (D.Mass.1975); Armstrong v. O'Connell, 416 F.Supp. 1325, 1336 (E.D.Wis.1976); ...
To continue reading
Request your trial