Reed v. Saul

Decision Date14 March 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 20-331-JWD-SDJ
PartiesJOHN ATHON REED v. ANDREW M. SAUL COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana
NOTICE

Please take note that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation has been filed with the Clerk of the U.S District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have 14 days from receipt of this Notice to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Magistrate Judge's Report. A failure to object will constitute a waiver of your right to attack the factual findings on appeal.

ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SCOTT D. JOHNSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Plaintiff Johnathan Reed, seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), denying Plaintiff's application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II and supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 11). The Commissioner filed an Opposition (R. Doc. 13). Plaintiff filed a Reply (R. Doc. 14). Having found all the procedural prerequisites met, the Court has properly reviewed Plaintiff's appeal. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (“The Appeals Council's decision, or the decision of the administrative law judge if the request for review is denied, is binding unless you … file an action in a Federal district court …”). For the reasons assigned below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the decision of the Commissioner be REVERSED and that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 11) be GRANTED to the extent it seeks remand of this matter for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed an application for benefits, alleging a disability onset date of March 28, 2017. (Tr. 197-200).[1] The claim initially was denied on May 10, 2018. (Tr. 134-36). Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing, which was held on June 10, 2019, at which Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified. (Tr. 35-86, 143-44). A vocational expert, Thomas Bott, also testified at the hearing. (Tr. 71-83).

An unfavorable decision was rendered by the Administrative Law Judge on August 2, 2019 (Tr. 10-24), finding that Plaintiff was not disabled during the period of disability asserted. Plaintiff's request for review was denied by the Appeals Counsel on April 2, 2020. (Tr. 1-5). The ALJ's decision rested as the Commissioner's final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. The ALJ's final decision is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to two inquiries: (1) whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commissioner and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence has been defined as less than a preponderance but “more than a scintilla.” Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d at 1022. The Fifth Circuit has further held that substantial evidence “must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established, but no substantial evidence will be found only where there is a conspicuous absence of credible choices or no contrary medical evidence.” Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotations omitted). Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner “and not the courts to resolve.” Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990). The Court may not reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, even if it finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Bowling, 36 F.3d at 434 (“This is so because ‘substantial evidence' is less than a preponderance but more than a scintilla.”); Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988) (we must carefully scrutinize the record to determine if, in fact, such evidence is present; at the same time, however, we may neither reweigh the evidence in the record nor substitute our judgment for the Secretary's”); Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).

If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, then it is conclusive and must be upheld. Estate of Morris v. Shalala, 207 F.3d 744, 745 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g)). If, on the other hand, the Commissioner fails to apply the correct legal standards or fails to provide a reviewing court with a sufficient basis to determine that the correct legal principles were followed, it is grounds for reversal. See Bradley v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir. 1987).

III. ALJ'S DETERMINATION

To qualify for benefits, the claimant must establish that he is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (“SSA”). Herron v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1127, 1131 (5th Cir.1986) (internal citations omitted). The SSA defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Selders, 914 F.2d at 618.

The Commissioner, through an ALJ, applies a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). First, the claimant must prove he or she is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must prove his or her impairment is “severe” in that it “significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities … ” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). At step three, the ALJ must conclude the claimant is disabled if he or she proves that his or her impairments meet or are medically equivalent to one of the impairments contained in the Listing of Impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) (step three of sequential process); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (Listing of Impairments). Fourth, the claimant bears the burden of proving he or she is incapable of meeting the physical and mental demands of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).

If the claimant is successful at all four of the preceding steps, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove, considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience, that he or she is capable of performing other work. 20 C.F.R § 404.1520(g)(1). If the Commissioner proves other work exists which the claimant can perform, the claimant is given the chance to prove that he or she cannot, in fact, perform that work. Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1991).

In her decision, before discussing whether Plaintiff met his burden at each of the steps, the ALJ granted Plaintiff's request to assert a closed period of disability from December 12, 2017, through February 11, 2019. (Tr. 10). The ALJ then found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the SSA and that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity from March 28, 2017, through February 12, 2019.[2] (Tr. 12). At the second step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: multi-compartmental osteoarthritis of the bilateral knees, HIV, reactive airway disease, sciatica, obesity, anxiety, and depression. (Tr. 13). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments, considering the impairments listed in 20 CFR Part 404, subpt. P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926). (Tr. 13-16). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functioning capacity to perform sedentary work, except that he can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, and stoop; and can never kneel, crouch, or crawl. (Tr. 16-22). The ALJ further determined that, while Plaintiff can relate to supervisors and peers on a superficial, occasional, work basis, he cannot have contact with the general public. (Tr. 16-22). At the fourth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. (Tr. 22). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined by the SSA, from March 28, 2017, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 24).

IV. DISCUSSION

In support of his request to reverse the ALJ's decision, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ applied an improper legal standard by failing to make adequate findings at Step 3 with respect to whether Plaintiff either met or equaled § 1.02(A) of the Listing of Impairments. (R. Doc. 11-2 at 6).

A. Whether Plaintiff Meets the Requirements of Listing 1.02(A)

At step three, the ALJ considers the severity of the claimant's impairments without regard to vocational factors. The ALJ applies the Social Security Administration's Listing of Impairments, which “describes for each of the major body systems impairments that [the SSA] consider[s] to be severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any...

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