Reed v. St. Charles General Hosp.
| Decision Date | 06 May 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008-C-0570.,No. 2008-CA-0431.,No. 2008-C-0571.,No. 2008-CA-0430.,No. 2008-C-0573.,No. 2008-C-0572.,2008-CA-0430.,2008-CA-0431.,2008-C-0570.,2008-C-0571.,2008-C-0572.,2008-C-0573. |
| Citation | 11 So.3d 1138 |
| Parties | Joe REED, Husband of and Dorothy Reed v. ST. CHARLES GENERAL HOSPITAL. Dorothy Reed v. St. Charles General Hospital. Dorothy Reed v. St. Charles General Hospital. Dorothy Reed v. St. Charles General Hospital. Dorothy Reed v. St. Charles General Hospital. Dorothy Reed v. St. Charles General Hospital. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Russ M. Herman, James C. Klick, Herman, Herman, Katz & Cotlar, LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Eugene Reed, Frank Day, Sunny Day Collins, and Clyde Donald Day, Individually and as Legally Designated Heirs of and on Behalf of the Estates of Joseph and Dorothy Reed.
Guy C. Curry, Suzanne Ford LaNasa, Curry & Friend, PLC, New Orleans, LA, for Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund/Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight Board.
Stephen M. Pizzo, Craig R. Watson, Blue Williams, L.L.P., Metairie, LA, for St. Charles General Hospital.
(Court composed of Chief Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge PAUL A. BONIN).
Mr. Joe Reed entered St. Charles General in 1985 and received a transfusion of blood contaminated with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The virus did not manifest itself for several years during which time Mr. Reed, unknowingly but tragically, communicated the virus to his wife, Dorothy Reed.
On November 12, 1988 Mr. Reed died of AIDS, acquired immune deficiency syndrome. His wife's death from AIDS followed on May 1, 1995.
Mr. and Mrs. Reed instituted these legal proceedings for compensation against the hospital and others. After their deaths, their children continued their parents' litigation and sought compensation for the deaths of their parents. After almost 20 years of litigation, the children asked the district court to approve their petitions to settle their claims against the hospital so that they could obtain payments from the Patient's Compensation Fund. The district judge approved the petitions. The PCF objects.
For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the claim of Joe Reed to the district court for trial of damages in excess of the $100,000 settlement, pursuant to La. R.S. 40:1299.44(C)(5)(a).
The Reeds jointly and simultaneously instituted suit against St. Charles General Hospital in the Civil District Court and filed a medical malpractice claim with the PCF on September 14, 1988. At that time, the PCF1 advised that St. Charles General Hospital ("St. Charles General") was a qualified healthcare provider under the Medical Malpractice Act. During the course of the pending lawsuit, the Reeds urged several theories of liability against St. Charles General, and also challenged the constitutionality of the Medical Malpractice Act ("Med Mal Act") and related statutory provisions. After the deaths of the Reeds, their children were substituted as the parties plaintiff and by the tenth amending and supplemental petition sought recovery for the wrongful deaths of their parents against St. Charles General. St. Charles General was acquired by Tenet HealthSystems Hospitals, Inc., which was substituted as the party defendant.2
This is the third time our court has visited this case. We review the two earlier visits in some detail as they bear upon and guide our decision.
The first occasion was on direct appeal. Reed v. St. Charles General Hosp., 602 So.2d 784 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992). We refer to this matter as Reed I. Among several other issues this court addressed in Reed I was a lower court judgment that had granted the exception of prescription filed by St. Charles General. In reversing the judgment, our court noted that the trial court had erred in two respects: first it had failed to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their petition to plead facts "relating to the third category of contra non valentem, as well as to add additional parties or cause of action"; and, second, it had failed "to hold the requisite evidentiary hearing (requested by Mrs. Reed) under Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 477 So.2d 1094, 1104 (La.1985)." Reed, 602 So.2d at 786. The case was then remanded to the district court.
The second occasion, almost ten years later, came to this court on an application for supervisory relief. Reed v. St. Charles General Hosp., 01-1148 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/27/02), 815 So.2d 319. Reed II, as we refer to the second visit, treated the trial court's denial of St. Charles General's reurged exception of prescription. Our court then decided the prescription issues pertaining to Joe Reed's claim separately from Dorothy Reed's claim.3
This court decided in Joe Reed's case that the applicable prescriptive period for his claim, a Reed p. 4, 815 So.2d at 321. However, because of the language of the version of La. R.S. 9:2797 which applied to Joe Reed's case, it was necessary for the trier of fact to determine "whether as of the date of Mr. Reed's transfusion, HIV could be detected by appropriate medical or scientific laboratory tests before a determination could be made with respect to prescription of Mr. Reed's claim." Id. (emphasis supplied). This court then remanded the exception of prescription as to Joe Reed's claim to the trial court.
As to the trial court's denial of the exception of prescription as to Dorothy Reed's claim, this court determined that because she had not been St. Charles General's "patient", as defined by La. R.S. 40:1299.41(A)(3), she was definitionally excluded from the applicability of the Medical Malpractice Act and, therefore, the general prescriptive period for delictual actions was applied to Dorothy Reed's claim. Our court further found that her lawsuit was timely filed. Reed, p. 5, 815 So.2d at 322.
Reed II also noted that despite the passage of ten years since the remand in Reed I directing a Sibley hearing on the constitutionality issues "the Reeds had not pursued their claim".
This third visit to our court has its beginnings in two distinct petitions for settlement approval filed by the Reeds' heirs in late 2007 to settle the wrongful death and survival action claims regarding each parent against St. Charles General. St. Charles General answered the petition pertaining to Joe Reed unqualifiedly and agreed with the petitioners that the Med Mal Act applied. However, St. Charles General, while not objecting to the petition for settlement pertaining to Dorothy Reed, did not agree that the Med Mal Act applied in her case.
The PCF responded by filing a petition to intervene, an exception of prematurity, an exception of prescription, a request for subpoena duces tecum, and a motion to continue hearing in the Joe Reed matter. The PCF responded by filing near identical pleadings mutatis mutandis as well as an exception of no cause or no right of action in the Dorothy Reed matter.
The trial court denied the petitions to intervene,4 overruled the exceptions of prematurity5 and of prescription,6 quashed the subpoena duces tecum, denied the motions to continue conditionally, and overruled the exception of no cause or no right of action as to Dorothy Reed's claim.7 Over the objections of the PCF, the trial court approved both settlement petitions.
The PCF filed four separate applications for supervisory relief and also filed motions for devolutive appeal from all of the signed judgments.8 The PCF has assigned twenty-six errors by the trial court for our consideration. The four writ applications and the two appeals have been consolidated.
Before specifically addressing the assignments of error filed by the PCF, we first determine its standing to object to the petitions for settlement. The PCF is a creature of the Legislature. La. R.S. 40:1299.41(A)(5), (19), and (20), (I) and (J); La. R.S. 40:1299.42; La. R.S. 1299.43(A)(4), (C) through (J), and La. R.S. 40:1299.44.
In Williams v. Kushner, 549 So.2d 294, 296 (La.1989) the Louisiana Supreme Court noted:
The legislature had the power to establish the fund and provide a supplemental recovery for those more seriously injured by medical malpractice.... The fund is not a negligent party and does not have the status of an Article 2315 defendant.
This determination by the Supreme Court is instructive and dispositive in the resolution of the issues presented by the objections of the PCF. The Med Mal Act, La. R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq., in which the duties and obligations of the PCF are treated, provides in Subsection (I) in pertinent part that
Nothing in this Part shall be construed to make the patient's compensation fund liable for any sums except those arising from medical malpractice....
The Med Mal Act has provisions, on the other hand, which prevent the PCF from challenging certain aspects of settlements entered into between the patient and the health care provider. For example, La. R.S. 40:1299.44(C)(5)(e) provides:
In approving a settlement or determining the amount, if any, to be paid from the patient's compensation fund, the trier of fact shall consider the liability of the health care provider as admitted and established where the insurer has paid its policy limits of one hundred thousand dollars, or where the self-insured health care provider has paid one hundred thousand dollars.
Another pertinent example of a critical restriction on the PCF is set forth in La. R.S. 40:1299.44(C)(6):
Any settlement approved by the court shall not be appealed. Any judgment of the court fixing damages recoverable in any such contested proceeding shall be appealable pursuant...
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