Reed v. State

• Court: Nevada Supreme Court
• Docket Number: 87042
• Decision Date: 14 January 2026
• Citation: Reed v. State, 87042 (Nev. Jan 14, 2026)
• Parties: DAVID LEVOYD REED, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

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DAVID LEVOYD REED, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

No. 87042

Supreme Court of Nevada

January 14, 2026

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of two counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, first-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon of a victim 60 years of age or older, battery with the intent to commit a crime, conspiracy to commit robbery robbery with the use of a deadly weapon of a victim 60 years of age or older, burglary while in the possession of a deadly weapon, assault with the use of a deadly weapon, possession of a stolen vehicle, and stop required on the signal of a police officer. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County Monica Trujillo, Judge.

Appellant David L. Reed attacked seventy-two-year-old Barbara Sgrillo in her garage in September 2017. Reed and another assailant moved her into her master bedroom where they ordered her to tell them where her money was. Sgrillo saw her assailants in the mirror, one of whom she later identified as Reed. Once Reed had taken her cash, he shoved her into the master bathroom and told her not to come out for two minutes. When she was sure they had left, Sgrillo called the police, who gathered DNA evidence at the scene. Two days later, officers caught and arrested Reed fleeing from a stolen vehicle.

Reed was indicted in February 2018 and later tried on various charges related to this and other robberies. The district court conducted a Faretta canvass, and Reed elected to proceed pro se starting in March 2019. Reed's trial was continued several times., often at Reed's request, and due to the COVID-19 shutdowns. On the first day of trial. Reed's standby counsel was sick with COVID-19. Rather than have the trial continued once more, Reed waived standby counsel and proceeded to trial on his own. Reed decided not to testify in his defense after the district court indicated that it would limit the scope of his testimony. During closing arguments Reed continually argued facts not in evidence despite the district court's repeated admonitions. The district court ended up removing Reed from the courtroom during his closing argument due to his disruptive behavior.

A jury convicted Reed on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 12 to 35 years. On appeal, Reed argues that: (1) the district court acted improperly in removing him from the courtroom during his closing argument and allowing the State to deliver its rebuttal in his absence; (2) the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense by limiting his proffered testimony; (3) the court abused its discretion in not issuing an adverse inference instruction based on the State's destruction of evidence; (4) the five-year delay between indictment and trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; (5) the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his first-degree kidnapping conviction; (6) the court abused its discretion in not proactively revoking Reed's pro se status; and (7) the court erroneously rejected his motion for a new trial as untimely.

The district court did not err by removing Reed from the courtroom

Reed argues that the district court violated various of his constitutional rights by removing him from the courtroom during closing arguments and allowing the State to give its rebuttal without him present.

He further argues that the district court failed to follow the proper steps in doing so and that his behavior was not disruptive enough to warrant removal.

Under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, a criminal defendant has the "right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970). The defendant may lose this right, however, when he or she engages in disruptive conduct justifying removal from the courtroom. Id. at 345-46. A trial court may then conduct the trial in the defendant's absence, subject to some safeguards. See id. at 345-47 (describing some appropriate safeguards). "A district court's decision to remove a defendant from the courtroom for disruptive behavior is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard." Collins v. State, 133 Nev. 717, 719, 405 P.3d 657, 661 (2017). We have previously laid out suggested steps for district courts to follow when faced with a disruptive defendant:

(1) advise the defendant that his or her conduct is not acceptable; (2) warn the defendant that persisting in the disruptive conduct will lead to removal; (3) if the conduct persists, determine whether it warrants the defendant's removal or a lesser measure will suffice; and (4) bring the defendant back to court periodically to advise that he or she may return if the defendant credibly promises to desist from the disruptive conduct.

Id. at 720, 405 P.3d at 661; see also NRS 175.387(1) (detailing district court's options when faced with a disruptive defendant).

Contrary to Reed's assertion, the district court did follow each of these steps when removing him. The district court repeatedly advised Reed during his closing argument not to reference facts that were not introduced into evidence and dismissed the jury three separate times in order to advise Reed of the limits on closing arguments and address his disruptive and improper behavior. During the second break, the court warned Reed that he could forfeit his right to closing argument and to be present in the courtroom by failing to follow the court's orders. Yet Reed persisted in his conduct. Given Reed's escalating disruptiveness and demonstrated unwillingness to preserve the dignity of the proceedings, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by removing Reed during closing arguments. Moreover, Reed chose to be absent for the remainder of the trial, declining the district court's invitation to return for the jury's verdict.^[1]

The district court did not. err by limiting Reed's proposed testimony in support of his defense theory

Reed claims that the district court violated his right to present a complete defense by barring his proposed testimony that he was on parole for an allegedly false conviction when he was found in the stolen SUV on the day of his arrest. After the district court limited the scope of Reed's proposed testimony, he decided not to testify.

"Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." Crane v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 683. 690 (1986) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We review whether a district court's evidentiary rulings violate the Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense de novo. See Farmer v. State, 133 Nev. 693, 702, 405 P.3d 114, 123 (2017) ("We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion and the ultimate question of whether a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated de novo.").

Reed's proposed testimony that he was wrongfully convicted of a prior crime was properly excluded because it "is marginally relevant and could inject collateral issues which would divert the jury from the real issues in the case....." Hansen v. Universal Health, Servs., Inc., 115 Nev. 24, 27, 974 P.2d 1158, 1160 (1999); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006) ("[W]ell-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury."). Notably, the district court allowed Reed the opportunity, which he rejected, to testify that officers unfairly zeroed in on him as the suspect in this case due to his prior conviction. It simply would not allow "a trial within a trial" regarding whether the prior conviction was wrongful. This was an acceptable application of evidentiary rules that did not violate Reed's right to present a complete defense. See People v. Gibbs, 55 N.E.3d 233, 241 (Ill.App.Ct. 2016) ("Indeed, testimony regarding the particulars of a prior conviction can lead to a 'trial within a trial' and distract from the relevant issues." (quoting People v. Oaks, 576 N.E.2d 299, 302 (Ill.App.Ct. 1991)).

Reed was not entitled to a Sanborn instruction Reed claims that he was entitled to a Sanborn instruction based on the State's grossly negligent mishandling of evidence. He points to three pieces of evidence that the State failed to preserve: body camera footage and gloves and a hat found in the SUV Reed was driving the day of his arrest.

Under Sanborn v. State, a defendant prejudiced by the State's failure to preserve evidence may be entitled to a jury instruction that the lost evidence is irrebuttably presumed to have been favorable to the defense. 107 Nev. 399. 407-08, 812 P.2d 1279, 1285-86 (1991). The State's mere negligence is insufficient to warrant an instruction; there must be a showing of gross negligence or bad faith. See Munoz v. State, No. 66264, 2016 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 54, at *3 (Nev. Jan. 15, 2016) (Order of Affirmance). A district court's decisions settling jury instructions are subject to abuse-of-discretion review. Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005).

As to the body camera footage, it is unclear whether it ever existed in the first place. As to the gloves and hat found in the stolen SUV, the State's destruction of this evidence was certainly negligent. But even if the State were grossly negligent, Reed has not shown prejudice. Reed's bare assertions that others' DNA may have been on the...