Reed v. State
| Decision Date | 01 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 70069,70069 |
| Citation | 560 So.2d 203 |
| Parties | 15 Fla. L. Weekly S115 Grover REED, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and William C. McLain, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and William A. Hatch and Richard E. Doran, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
Grover Reed appeals from a jury verdict of guilt for first-degree murder, sexual battery, and robbery and a sentence of death imposed for the murder conviction. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
The record reflects the following pertinent facts. In December of 1985 Reed, accompanied by his woman friend and two young children, arrived in Jacksonville homeless and destitute. Through Traveler's Aid they were given shelter in the home of the Reverend Ervin Oermann, a Lutheran minister. They stayed with Reverend Oermann and his wife, Betty, for just over a week but were asked to leave when Reverend Oermann discovered that Reed had drug paraphernalia. However, Reed continued to receive aid from the Oermanns in the form of money and transportation. Eventually the Oermanns began to feel they were being used and withdrew all support. Reed resented the discontinuance of aid and vowed to get even.
On February 27, 1986, Reverend Oermann returned home from a night class and found his wife, Betty, dead on the living room floor. An autopsy showed she had been strangled, raped, and stabbed repeatedly in the throat. Found in the house was a distinctive baseball cap. For some time this cap was the only lead police had, so they produced a television recreation of the crime and showed the cap. One viewer recognized the cap as being much like one Reed wore. Further investigation revealed that Reed was last seen wearing his cap on the day Mrs. Oermann was killed. Ultimately, he was arrested.
The most significant evidence of Reed's guilt may be summarized as follows:
(a) Witnesses said they had seen Reed wearing his baseball cap on the day of the murder before the probable time of death but not thereafter. They positively identified the cap as Reed's because of the presence of certain stains and mildew.
(b) Reed's fingerprints were found on checks that had been taken from the Oermann home and had been found in the yard.
(c) An expert witness gave testimony that hairs found on the body and in the baseball cap were consistent with Reed's hair.
(d) Another expert witness gave testimony that the semen found in the body could have been Reed's.
(e) Reed's cellmate, Nigel Hackshaw, gave testimony that Reed had admitted breaking into the Oermann house and killing Mrs. Oermann.
The jury found Reed guilty. Neither side presented additional evidence in the penalty phase. After hearing arguments by counsel, the jury recommended death by an eleven-to-one vote. The judge delayed sentencing in order that a presentence investigation could be completed. After receiving the PSI and after considering additional mitigating evidence presented by Reed, the trial judge sentenced him to death. The judge found six aggravating factors 1 and nothing in mitigation.
Reed raises six issues in this appeal. The first involves jury selection. During the course of voir dire, the prosecutor used eight of his ten peremptory strikes to excuse blacks from the jury. After both sides had expended their peremptories, defense counsel moved for a mistrial pursuant to State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984). At this point, Mr. Bateh, the prosecutor, asked to explain his reasons for striking the black jurors. The court stated:
Anyway, I'm well aware if the court determines that there's a prima facie showing of exclusion of jurors on a racial basis that it requires the State to make some showing to the court as to why they excluded them for other than racial basis, which Mr. Bateh is volunteering to do without me making a finding is what I understand you're saying.
After listening to the prosecutor's explanation for striking the black jurors, the following discussion ensued:
In State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984), and State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S.Ct. 2873, 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988), we established procedures that were intended to abolish the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges. The defense must make a prima facie showing that there has been a strong likelihood that the jurors have been challenged because of their race. If the judge makes that finding, the burden shifts to the prosecution to show valid nonracial reasons why the individual minority jurors were struck. Neil.
In Kibler v. State, 546 So.2d 710, 712 (Fla.1989), this Court recently said:
We hold that under article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution it is unnecessary that the defendant who objects to peremptory challenges directed to members of a cognizable racial group be of the same race as the jurors who are being challenged. This does not mean, however, that the respective races of the challenged jurors and of the person who objects to the challenges may not be relevant in the determination of whether the challenges are being unconstitutionally exercised because of group bias. Under the procedure prescribed by Neil, the objecting party must ordinarily do more than simply show that several members of a cognizable racial group have been challenged in order to meet his initial burden. Thus, a defendant of a different race than the jurors being challenged may have more difficulty convincing the trial court that "there is a strong likelihood that they have been challenged only because of their race." Moreover, in those cases in which the inquiry has been directed to the challenging party, the respective races of the challenged jurors and the defendant may also be relevant in the determination of whether the challenging party has met the burden of showing that the challenges were made for reasons not solely related to race.
(citation omitted).
Within the limitations imposed by State v. Neil, the trial judge necessarily is vested with broad discretion in determining whether peremptory challenges are racially intended. State v. Slappy. Only one who is present at the trial can discern the nuances of the spoken word and the demeanor of those involved. Given the circumstances that both the defendant and the victim were white and that two black jurors were already seated, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in concluding that the defense had failed to make a prima facie showing that there was a strong likelihood that the jurors were challenged because of their race.
Reed was not prejudiced by the prosecutor having given explanations for his challenges. In fact, if it appeared from the prosecutor's explanation that his challenges were racially motivated, the trial judge would...
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