OPINION
SHARPNACK, Judge.
Gerald Reed appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Reed raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether Reed waived his freestanding claim that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing Reed to consecutive sentences; and
II. Whether Reed received the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.
We affirm.
The relevant facts follow. On November 1, 1995, while Indianapolis Police Officers Marlene Neitzel, Michael Roach, and William Beachum were investigating a disturbance, Reed approached the scene in his car. Reed drove between Officer Neitzel and Officer Roach's parked police cars, and Reed's car became wedged between the police cars. When another officer arrived to investigate the accident, Officer Neitzel moved her car and Reed backed his car up. However, Reed suddenly drove forward again and sped away from the scene. Officers Neitzel, Roach, and Beachum pursued Reed. A couple of minutes later, Reed stopped his car, opened his driver's side door, and fired one shot in the direction of Officers Roach and Beachum. Reed drove another block, slowed his car to almost a stop, and fired two shots at Officer Beachum. The chase continued for approximately eight more minutes until the officers stopped Reed's car with stop sticks. The entire chase lasted for approximately ten minutes.
The State charged Reed with one count of attempted murder for shooting at Officer Roach, one count of attempted murder for shooting at Officer Beachum, and one count of carrying a handgun without a license as a class A misdemeanor. The State also enhanced the handgun charge to a class D felony. After a bench trial, the trial court found Reed guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Reed to forty years for each of the two attempted murder convictions to be served consecutively and a concurrent sentence of four years on the handgun conviction. Reed appealed his convictions and argued that he did not waive his right to a jury trial, that the trial court did not adequately explain its reasons for enhancing the sentences and ordering them to be consecutive, and that the sentence was manifestly unreasonable. Reed v. State, No. 49A05-9610-CR-438, 688 N.E.2d 436 (Ind.Ct.App. Dec.22, 1997), trans. denied. We affirmed Reed's convictions and sentences. Id.
Reed filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and after an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions thereon:
Findings of Fact
1. On November 1, 1995, [Reed] attempted to drive between two parked police cars and his car became stuck. [Reed]'s Exhibit 1 at 99, 109, 110-11, 140, 142. An accident police car was called to the scene, and [Reed] was instructed to back his car out of the jam. Id. at 17, 118-19, 154, 236. [Reed] then fled the area. Id. at 119, 154-55. Fully marked police cars followed him on a chase that lasted approximately ten minutes. Id. at 99, 127, 136, 187, 213. At one point, [Reed] completely stopped his vehicle and opened his car door and fired a gunshot at Officer Michael Roach. Id. at 171-74, 176, 203-04. [Reed] then closed the car door and began driving again. Id. at 213. Approximately five seconds later, [Reed] again slowed his car down significantly and fired two shots in the direction of Officer William Beachum. Id. at 207, 208, 210. Stop sticks were ultimately thrown down, and [Reed] was apprehended. Id. at 214.
2. On November 2, 1995, the State charged [Reed] with the attempted murder of Officer Roach and carrying a handgun without a license. Id. at 15-17. At Officer Beachum's request, the State filed an amended charging information on January 16, 1996, adding a charge of attempted murder of Officer Beachum. Id. at 49-51, 222-23.
3. The Court appointed Stephen Laudig to represent [Reed], but Alex Murphy took over the case in January 1996. Id. at 27, 39.
4. Following a bench trial, on March 18, 1996, the Court convicted [Reed] of both counts of attempted murder and the enhanced carrying a handgun without a license. Id. at 335.
5. On April 16, 1996, the Court held [Reed]'s sentencing hearing. In arguing for an enhanced sentence, the State pointed out that the shots occurred at two separate places and two separate points in time and should be consecutive. Id. at 373-74. The Court sentenced [Reed] to an aggregate 80-year term of incarceration. Id. at 377-78. The Court ordered both attempted murder convictions be run consecutively.
6. Patricia McMath filed [Reed]'s direct appeal which raised the following issues: a) whether he waived his right to a jury trial; b) whether the Court's sentencing was adequate; and c) whether the sentences are manifestly unreasonable. Reed v. State, No. 49A05-9610-CR-438, slip opinion, p. 2, 688 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. Ct.App. December 22, 1997). The Court of Appeals affirmed [Reed]'s convictions and sentence in a memorandum decision. Id.
7. On September 14, 2000, [Reed] filed his pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and requested and received representation from the State Public Defender. The State answered the Petition on October 2, 2000.
8. On February 23, 2004, [Reed] by counsel filed an Amended Petition in which he substituted the following issues for those raised in his pro se Petition: a) the Court erred in imposing consecutive sentences; and b) he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The State responded to the amendment on March 1, 2004.
9. On April 27, 2004, the Court held [Reed]'s evidentiary hearing. [Reed] presented the record of proceedings, the briefs of both appellant and appellee, the memorandum decision and an affidavit from Patricia McMath. The Court took judicial notice of its file at the State's request and ordered the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by May 27, 2004.
Conclusions of Law
1. Post-conviction relief is a collateral attack on the validity of a criminal conviction and the petitioner carries the burden of proof. Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind. 2001). This collateral challenge to the conviction is limited to the grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules. Id. (citing Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)). The post-conviction procedure, however, is not a "super-appeal," and not all issues are available. Id. "If an issue was known and available, but not raised on direct appeal, it is waived. If it was raised on appeal, but decided adversely, it is res judicata." Id. (quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind.2001)). Thus, in order to grant relief, the Court must find that the preponderance of the evidence proved that [Reed] is entitled to relief.
2. [Reed] is not entitled to any review on his freestanding claims that the Court committed a sentencing error. Taylor v. State, 780 N.E.2d 430 (Ind. Ct.App.2002) (citing Bunch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1285, 1289 (Ind.2002)), [reh'g denied, trans. denied]. Because "the sentencing issue could have been presented on direct appeal but was not . . . this issue is not available to [Petitioner] upon a petition for post-conviction relief." Taylor, 780 N.E.2d at 435 (citing Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1213 (Ind. 1998) (emphasis in original)). To the extent that this claim is different from his appellate challenge to his sentence, [Reed] procedurally defaulted it by not raising it in his direct appeal.
3. Review of [Reed]'s sentencing claim is barred by res judicata. "[I]ssues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata." Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (Ind.2001). Because the consecutive sentencing order was raised and decided against him during his direct appeal, Reed, slip op. p. 9-10, such claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind.2001). [Reed] cannot avoid the doctrine of res judicata by claiming that his counsel was ineffective. "A petitioner for post-conviction relief cannot escape the effect of claim preclusion merely by using different language to phrase an issue and define an alleged error." Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind.2000). Therefore, [Reed] is entitled to no relief on any claim that was decided against him, even if he now claims that counsel wad ineffective in the presentation of said issue. The Court of Appeals reviewed the consecutive sentence order and found no error. Reed, slip op., p. 9-10. [Reed] is not entitled to another review.
4. The Court finds that [Reed] is also not entitled to relief on his claim that trial and appellate counsel performed ineffectively. The standard for gauging trial and appellate counsels' performance comes from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1166-67 (Ind.2001). Therefore "[t]o prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, [the petitioner] must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice." Id. The two prongs are separate and independent inquiries, and if a court can "dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed." Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind.2001) (citing Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 154 (Ind.1999)) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). "Prejudice exists when a defendant shows `there is a reasonable probability [i.e., probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome] that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
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