Reed v. United States

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
• Citation: Reed v. United States, 224 F. 378 (9th Cir. 1915)
• Decision Date: 12 July 1915
• Parties: REED v. UNITED STATES et al.

224 F. 378

REED v. UNITED STATES et al.

Circuit Court, of Appeals. Ninth Circuit.

July 12, 1915

R. V Whiting, of San Francisco, Cal., and Collier, Shelton &amp Schlegel, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Percy V. Hammon and C. A. Stutsman, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees.

Before GILBERT, ROSS, and MORROW, Circuit Judges.

GILBERT Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the order of the court below discharging a writ of habeas corpus, and remanding the petitioner, the appellant herein, to custody. The petition represented in substance that the petitioner was illegally restrained of his liberty by the chief of police of the city of Los Angeles, and one Phelan, an agent of the Governor of the state of Iowa, under and by virtue of a certain demand for his extradition made by the Governor of Iowa, founded upon an illegal indictment by a grand jury of that state, and a writ of rendition issued thereupon for the petitioner's apprehension by the Governor of the state of California; that the petitioner's imprisonment and detention are illegal for the reasons that the requisition of the Governor of Iowa is wholly insufficient to empower the state of Iowa to ask for the petitioner's extradition; that the indictment which was found against the petitioner in the state of Iowa was insufficient, for the reason that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense, in this: That it does not appear that the person alleged in said indictment to have been defrauded by petitioner was defrauded of anything of value, and that there is no such crime as the crime of false pretenses known to the laws of Iowa; that it cannot be determined from the indictment whether the petitioner is charged with cheating by false pretenses; that it cannot be determined therefrom whether the person alleged to have been defrauded intended to part with the title of the property or thing, or what he was to receive for his property, and it does not appear what representations the petitioner made as to what period of time the real property described in said indictment was free and clear of incumbrances, or at what date the petitioner owned the same. Other similar alleged defects in the pleading to the indictment are pointed out, and it is further alleged that prosecution of the offense with which the petitioner was charged was barred by the statute of limitations of the state of Iowa, and it is also alleged that the petitioner is not a fugitive from justice.

There is no allegation of diversity of citizenship, and no allegation whatever that the petitioner is held in custody in violation of any statute of the United States or of any provision of the federal Constitution. We may assume, however, that the jurisdiction of the court below was invoked upon the allegation in the petition that the facts charged in the indictment are not sufficient to constitute a crime, for it is only upon a charge of crime that extradition may be resorted to under article 4, Sec. 2, par. 2, of the Constitution. Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 28 Sup.Ct. 714, 52 L.Ed. 1113.

The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that, since a question of the construction of the Constitution of the United States is involved, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive. But that jurisdiction is not exclusive in cases where, as here, the appeal presents other questions than that of constitutional rights. In such a case, at the option of the appellant, the appeal may be taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals. American Sugar Refining Co. v. New Orleans, 181 U.S. 277, 21 Sup.Ct. 646, 45 L.Ed. 859; MacFadden v. United States, 213 U.S. 288, 29 Sup.Ct. 490, 53 L.Ed. 801. The motion to dismiss must be denied.

In extradition proceedings a large measure of credence and conclusiveness must be accorded to the proceeding before the Governor upon whom the demand is made, for those proceedings are summary in character, the person demanded has no constitutional right to be heard, and the Governor's warrant for removal is sufficient 'until the presumption of its legality is overthrown by contrary proof in a legal proceeding to review his action. ' Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 25 Sup.Ct. 282, 49 L.Ed. 515.

Upon habeas corpus the sufficiency of the indictment, as a matter of technical pleading, will not be inquired into. Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 642, 5 Sup.Ct. 1148, 29 L.Ed. 250; Pearce v. Texas, 155 U.S. 311, 15 Sup.Ct. 116, 39 L.Ed. 164; Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655, 15 Sup.Ct. 727, 39 L.Ed. 845; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 25 Sup.Ct. 282, 49 L.Ed. 515. Said the court in Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 403, 28 Sup.Ct. 714, 719, 52 L.Ed. 1113:

'The Constitution does not require, as an indispensable

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