Reeder v. Epps

• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MCCULLOCH, C. J.
• Citation: Reeder v. Epps, 166 S.W. 747, 112 Ark. 566 (Ark. 1914)
• Decision Date: 27 April 1914
• Docket Number: 282
• Parties: REEDER v. EPPS

166 S.W. 747

112 Ark. 566

REEDER v. EPPS

No. 282

Supreme Court of Arkansas

April 27, 1914

Appeal from Lee Circuit Court; J. M. Jackson, Judge; reversed.

Judgment reversed and cause dismissed.

Burke & Mann and S. H. Mann and J. W. Morrow, for appellant.

In the absence of an agreement that the title shall meet the approval of a certain attorney, the seller is only required to furnish a merchantable title. Warvelle on Vendors (2 ed.) 363.

A marketable title is one which is unclouded by a reasonable doubt as to its sufficiency to enable the purchaser to hold the property in fee simple. In this case there was an unbroken chain from the United States to the appellant. 63 Ark. 548.

A deed from Mrs. Ford was not necessary, and a failure to procure one from her left no cloud upon the title.

Lands are assets in the hands of an administrator for the payment of debts of the estate, and the heirs take title subject to the rights of creditors to subject the lands to the payment of debts.

H. F Roleson and Thomas & Lee, for appellee.

1. "One who contracts and pays his money for a title to land ought to get not only a title that he can hold against all adverse comers, but one that he can hold without reasonable apprehension of its being assailed, and one that he can readily transfer, if he desires, in the market." 66 Ark. 436; 121 N.Y. 353; 28 P. 1046; 36 N.E. 814; 22 Am. & Eng. Enc. of L. 948, note; 63 Ark. 548.

2. The jury by their verdict found that the purchaser did not cancel the trade without giving the defendant reasonable time in which to comply with the objection to the title and thereby perfect his abstract of title. As to whether the time given in which to perfect this abstract was reasonable or not was a question for the jury, under the evidence, and their finding is supported by the evidence and ought not to be disturbed. 25 Ark. 474; 31 Ark. 163; 23 Ark. 131; 40 Ark. 168; 51 Ark 467; 70 Ark. 385.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

This is an action to recover compensation alleged to have been earned by appellee as commissions in negotiating a sale of land by him for appellant.

The sale was not consummated, but appellee alleges, and attempts to prove, that he produced a purchaser "ready, willing and able" to buy the land upon the prescribed terms, and that the consummation of the sale was prevented by the fault of appellant.

Appellant resided in the State of Illinois and owned a tract of land in Lee County, Arkansas, which he placed upon the market for sale and listed it with appellee, who was in the real estate business at Stuttgart, Arkansas.

Appellee found a purchaser in the person of one Van Arsdale, and he brought the parties together for sale and purchase. Appellee wrote to appellant informing him of the fact that he had found a purchaser and instructed him to execute a deed to Van Arsdale and deposit it in one of the banks at Stuttgart, where said purchaser was to pay the portion of the price agreed upon and deliver a note and mortgage for the deferred payments. Appellant executed the deed in accordance with the request of appellee and deposited same in the bank, and also furnished an abstract of title so that the purchaser's attorneys in Stuttgart could have an opportunity to pass upon the title. Appellant was represented by attorneys in Forrest City, Arkansas, and most of the correspondence was thereafter conducted between the two sets of attorneys. The Stuttgart attorneys who examined the title reported to appellant that they found eight defects in the chain of title, one of which was that in order to perfect the title it was necessary to procure a deed from Mrs. Lela Ford. Some of these defects were subsequently corrected, and thereafter the attorneys for the purchaser agreed to waive the other alleged defects and approve the title if appellant would get a quitclaim deed from Mrs. Ford. Appellant, through his attorneys, replied to this request by offering to comply with all the other terms but declined to procure a deed from Mrs. Ford on the ground that she had no interest in the land nor color of title and that she would not give a quitclaim deed unless she was paid something for it. Thereupon the purchaser instructed the bank to return the deed to appellant and the negotiations between the parties were dropped.

In the chain of appellant's title was a deed from the administrator of the estate of W. H. Pearce, deceased, conveying the lands pursuant to an order of the probate court of the county of said decedent's residence. Mrs. Lela Ford was a daughter of William H. Pearce.

The only explanation in the record of why the deed from Mrs. Ford was demanded is a reference in a letter of the Forrest City attorneys to a partition decree and the statement that the sale by the administrator of the William H. Pearce estate had passed the title and that the heirs of the decedent had no further interest in the property.

There are numerous assignments of error in regard to the rulings of the court in giving and refusing instructions. But we need not discuss them, for we are of the opinion that the disposition of the case here turns primarily upon the question of the sufficiency of the evidence.

The law is well settled that, in the absence of a special contract providing otherwise, an agent employed to sell or find a purchaser for land earns his commission and is entitled to recover the same when he produces a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy upon the terms named and the principal enters into a binding...