Reeder v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Citation: 17 A.2d 879,340 Pa. 503
• Decision Date: 31 January 1941
• Docket Number: 17
• Parties: Reeder, Appellant, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

17 A.2d 879

340 Pa. 503

Reeder, Appellant, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

No. 17

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 31, 1941

Argued January 20, 1941.

Appeal, No. 17, Jan. T., 1941, from judgment of C.P. Lycoming Co., Dec. T., 1938, No. 107, in case of Margaret V. Reeder v Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Judgment affirmed.

Assumpsit.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient reply to new matter made absolute, opinion by LARRABEE, P.J. Plaintiff appealed.

Error assigned, among others, was order making absolute rule for judgment on the record.

Judgment affirmed.

Horace Michener Schell, with him J. Fred Katzmaier and Harry R Matten, for appellant.

Harry R. Gibson, with him John G. Candor, for appellee.

Before SCHAFFER, C.J., MAXEY, DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON and PARKER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. DREW, JUSTICE:

Plaintiff, Margaret V. Reeder, as the named beneficiary, brought this action in assumpsit to recover the amount of a policy of insurance issued by defendant upon the life of her husband, George L. Reeder. In its affidavit of defense, defendant admitted the allegations of the statement of claim as to the execution and delivery of the policy, the payment of the premiums thereon, and the death of the insured, but by way of New Matter resisted the claim on the ground that material statements in the application were untrue, false and fraudulent, and were known to be such by the insured. To plaintiff's reply, a motion for judgment for want of its sufficiency was filed. The learned court below, after argument, directed the entry of judgment for defendant, which we now affirm on this appeal by plaintiff.

The misrepresentations upon which defendant relied in its affidavit of defense are contained in the following questions and answers appearing in the application: "11. Have you ever suffered from any ailment or disease of . . . (b) The Heart or Lungs?" Answer: "No." "12. . . . (g) Have you consulted a physician for any ailment or disease not indicated in your above answers?" Answer: "Yes." "Name of each Ailment, Disease or Injury." Answer: "Indigestion." "No. of attacks." Answer: "One." "Date." Answer: "10-35." "Duration." Answer: "2 days." "Severity." Answer: "Moderate." "Results, and if within five years, name and address of every Physician consulted." Answer: "Good. -- P. L. Ridall, 51 W. 3rd St." "13. What physician or physicians, if any, not named above, have you consulted or been treated by, within the last five years and for what illness or ailment? If none, so state." Answer: "None." The policy was executed and issued June 3, 1936, on an application made May 19, 1936, by the insured, who died April 28, 1938, of coronary thrombosis. In her reply, plaintiff admits that the insured had an x-ray taken of his abdomen by Dr. Lloyd E. Wurster of the Williamsport Hospital on or about October 11, 1935, at the suggestion of Dr. P. L. Ridall, who had examined the insured upon the same day and had diagnosed his ailment as one of nervousness and gastro-intestinal disorder; that insured had also consulted Dr. Marc W. Bodine relative to his general physical condition on or about October 17, 1935, as well as on several other occasions thereafter, and that this physician had advised the insured to have an examination made of his heart; and that on or about October 17, 1935, the insured had been examined by Dr. H. L. Tonkin.

Plaintiff in her endeavor to overcome the detrimental effect upon her claim of the misrepresentations thus contained in the application, averred that these false answers had been given by inadvertence and without any intention of concealment or desire to withhold any facts. While it is generally for the jury to determine the question as to the truth or falsity of the answers in the application, nevertheless where, as here, the admissions contained in the pleadings establish facts warranting the avoidance of the policy, the court may enter judgment without the intervention of a jury: Indovina v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 334 Pa. 167; Evans v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 322 Pa. 547. In the present case plaintiff admits in her reply that the insured had consulted three physicians for his general physical condition, had been advised by one to have his heart examined, and had also had his stomach x-rayed by a prominent roentgenologist. Therefore, how can it...