Reeder v. Ramsey, 1-383A68
Decision Date | 17 January 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 1-383A68,1-383A68 |
Parties | Mary G. REEDER, Defendant-Appellant, v. Guy N. RAMSEY and Laverne T. Ramsey, Plaintiffs-Appellees. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
David V. Miller, James P. Casey, Bowers, Harrison, Kent & Miller, Evansville, for defendant-appellant.
Mark R. Ramsey, Tell City, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Appellant Mary Reeder appeals from the Warrick Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees Guy and Laverne Ramsey. We affirm.
Jack Reeder and Dennis Bays leased certain property from Guy and Laverne Ramsey in order to house a business known as Donut-Chef, Incorporated. Ramseys also required Mary Reeder and Judith Bays, wives of the proprietors, to execute the lease agreement. It is undisputed that the wives had no business connection with the corporation. The Bayses were subsequently released from the agreement and Jack Reeder continued to run the business until his death on April 4, 1979. Thereafter, pursuant to a consent to assignment of lease and the actual assignment thereof, both executed on October 10, 1979, a new tenant was substituted under the lease to take-over the doughnut business. The agreements provided that Mary Reeder should remain liable for the rents due and owing from the time of her husband's death until the assignment of the lease. When such monies were not forthcoming, Ramseys brought an action to collect the rents. Both parties moved for summary judgment, appellant claiming that as a surety she was discharged when the Bayses were released without her knowledge, and appellees contending that Reeder had reaffirmed her obligations under the lease. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Ramseys and it is from that judgment that Reeder now appeals. 1
Reeder presents three issues on appeal. Combined and rephrased, the issue is as follows:
Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment upon its conclusion that Reeder consented to the release of the Bayses and was thereby estopped to assert the defense of discharge?
The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment.
As we have previously noted:
Barnes v. Wilson, (1983) Ind.App., 450 N.E.2d 1030, 1032. Summary judgment may not serve as a substitute for trial where factual disputes remain. Moll; Podgorny v. Great Central Insurance Co., (1974) 160 Ind.App. 244, 255, 311 N.E.2d 640, 648. Even where no factual dispute exists, however, summary judgment is inappropriate where the undisputed facts give rise to conflicting inferences which could alter the outcome, Moll; Clayton v. Penn Central Transportation Co., (1978) 176 Ind.App. 544, 546, 376 N.E.2d 524, 525, or where the facts disclose a good faith dispute as to the inferences to be drawn from those facts. Lenard v. Adams, (1981) Ind.App., 425 N.E.2d 211, 213; Moll. Only where there is no dispute as to the material facts or the inferences to be drawn therefrom, and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, may the court grant such a motion.
In the instant case, Reeder raises a number of loosely-related issues challenging the court's grant of summary judgment. Chief among these, however, is her contention that the release of the Bayses resulted in the discharge of her liability under the lease. Because we conclude that Reeder remained liable on the debt, we decline to reverse the grant of summary judgment.
Appellant correctly notes the general rule that, as a surety, she would be discharged from her obligation by a material alteration or change in or departure from the principal obligation without her knowledge or consent. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Gary v. Arena, (1980) Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 1279, 1284; Orange-Co., Inc. v. Brown, (1979) Ind.App., 393 N.E.2d 192, 197, trans. denied; American States Insurance Co. v. Floyd I. Staub, Inc., (1977) 175 Ind.App. 244, 255, 370 N.E.2d 989, 996, trans. denied (1978). See McKee v. Harwood Automotive Co., (1928) Ind.App., 162 N.E. 62, 63, aff'd, 204 Ind. 233, 183 N.E. 646 (1932) ( ). It is undisputed that Reeder signed the lease merely as a surety. The lower court expressly found "[t]hat Plaintiffs' release of the Bays[es] was a material alteration of the principal obligations under the lease." Record at 37. Reeder argues that, based on the foregoing, the lower court erred in granting summary judgment against her. However, Reeder has overlooked the acknowledged (if not expressly stated) proposition that in order to utilize the defense, the discharge must first be asserted. It is well accepted, therefore, that the surety may consent to the material alteration, First Federal, 406 N.E.2d at 1283, even if the consent follows the alteration, White v. Household Finance Corp., (1973) 158 Ind.App. 394, 401, 302 N.E.2d 828, 833; 74 Am.Jur.2d Suretyship Sec. 48 (1974), or may waive, or be estopped from asserting, the defense of discharge. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Elliott, (1919) 70 Ind.App. 130, 137, 123 N.E. 178, 180. The obligation continues to exist until the surety asserts the discharge. We find support for this conclusion in Matchett v. Winona Assembly & Summer School Association, (1916) 185 Ind. 128, 113 N.E. 1. There our supreme court noted that where the surety acquiesces in the material alteration "he will remain liable therefor." Id. at 138, 113 N.E. at 4 (Emphasis supplied). The release of the Bayses did not conclusively give rise to a discharge, therefore, but rather, merely provided Reeder with the opportunity to assert the defense in response to an action for rent owed. Accordingly, we conclude that Reeder's obligation continued from the time of Bayses' release and would be terminated only by the affirmative assertion of the defense of discharge.
Reeder first affirmatively asserted the discharge on July 8, 1980, in her answer to Ramseys' complaint. Prior to her assertion of discharge, however, Reeder executed a consent to assignment of lease and an actual assignment thereof on October 10, 1979, in order to escape any future liability on the lease. The lower court concluded that Reeder had consented to the release of the Bayses by her prior execution of the documents and was, thereby, precluded from asserting the defense of discharge. Appellant now argues that there exists a material issue of fact as to "whether the language of the assignment ... operated as a consent to the release of the Bays[es] ...." Appellant's Brief at 11.
Whether or not the language of the consent and assignment acted as a consent to the release of the Bayses is a matter to be determined from...
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