Reedy v. Commonwealth
| Docket Number | Record No. 0182-22-3 |
| Decision Date | 21 March 2023 |
| Citation | 77 Va.App. 81,884 S.E.2d 264 |
| Parties | Shonda Danniell Lynn REEDY, s/k/a Shonda Daniell Lynn Reedy v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Ilya I. Berenshteyn (The Senter Law Firm, PC, on briefs), for appellant.
John Beamer, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Beales, Malveaux and Causey
OPINION BY JUDGE MARY BENNETT MALVEAUX
Shonda Danniell Lynn Reedy ("appellant") entered a conditional nolo contendere plea to one count of perjury, in violation of Code § 18.2-434. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss because the delay between the issuance of the indictment and her arrest violated the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Virginia Constitution. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's ruling.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 13, 2020, appellant provided false information regarding her social security number and whether she had been convicted previously of any crimes on an application for a concealed handgun permit. She had a prior misdemeanor conviction for shoplifting in July 2016. A grand jury returned an indictment for perjury on August 3, 2020, and a capias was issued for appellant's arrest on the same day. The City of Bristol Sheriff's Office received the capias on August 4, 2020, but did not execute it until September 1, 2021. Appellant turned herself in on that date and was released on an unsecured bond of $1,000. Her trial was set for November 29, 2021.
Appellant moved to dismiss the case on constitutional speedy trial grounds on November 3, 2021.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion on November 16, 2021. Appellant testified that a friend, who worked at the jail, had notified her of the outstanding capias on August 31, 2021. Appellant stated that she turned herself in the day after receiving that information. She further testified that in the 13-month period after the indictment was issued but preceding her arrest, police had been to her house "[a]t least four times" on matters involving her children and stepchildren. During these visits, police had not informed her that there was an outstanding capias for her arrest. She also testified that "[t]o the best of [her] memory" she thought she had been stopped twice by police while driving during this time period. She did not remember the "exact dates" of the traffic stops but stated that she was stopped once for a speeding violation and once for a possible window tint violation. Police checked her license information but did not arrest her on the capias at those times. During cross-examination, the Commonwealth's Attorney asked appellant for the exact dates of the traffic stops, and appellant replied, She also could not recall the names of the officers who stopped her.
Appellant also testified that she was arraigned and appointed an attorney in mid-September 2021. Counsel for appellant proffered that he first met with appellant near the end of October 2021 and that the delay in meeting with her was "not because of her" but due to his work preparing for other trials.
Counsel also contended that if appellant had been arrested in August or September 2020, "a different plea could have been negotiated because of proximity to the events."
During argument, the Commonwealth offered no specific explanation for the delay in serving the capias on appellant. The Commonwealth's Attorney noted that the COVID-19 pandemic "had affected everything[,] not only what goes on in this [c]ourt but also the way that the [p]olice [o]fficers were able to do their jobs."1 But he further stated,
After hearing argument, the court denied appellant's motion to dismiss. In its ruling, the court noted that The court found that "[t]he reason for the delay in getting her arrested, at least as it relates to those events, is nothing more than oversight, at best, negligence, at worst, of an [o]fficer in not performing their duties by arresting [appellant] with the warrant" during the traffic stops. However, it found that "there's been no evidence of any prejudice shown to" appellant, noting that "[t]here was some general testimony about memory issue ..., but that, in and of itself, is not sufficient for the [c]ourt to find a prejudicial [e]ffect on the trial."
Appellant entered a conditional nolo contendere plea on November 29, 2021. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss because her constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.2
"Constitutional issues present questions of law reviewed de novo on appeal." Ali v. Commonwealth , 75 Va. App. 16, 33, 872 S.E.2d 662 (2022). "To the extent such review involves underlying factual findings, those findings may not be disturbed unless ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘without evidence to support them.’ " Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Commonwealth , 292 Va. 2, 7, 786 S.E.2d 156 (2016) ).
Unlike the statutory right to a speedy trial, "[t]he constitutional right to a speedy trial ... is governed by a balancing test that is not tied inextricably to calendar dates." Brown v. Commonwealth , 75 Va. App. 388, 406-07, 877 S.E.2d 156 (2022). "The determination of whether an accused has been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial requires ‘a difficult and sensitive balancing process’ in which the court examines on an ad hoc basis the conduct of both the state and the accused which led to a delay in prosecution." Kelley v. Commonwealth , 17 Va. App. 540, 544, 439 S.E.2d 616 (1994) (quoting Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-92, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) ). The test for determining whether a speedy trial violation has occurred requires balancing four main factors—the "length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Howard v. Commonwealth , 281 Va. 455, 462, 706 S.E.2d 885 (2011) (citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92 ). An appellant must establish that those factors, when considered together, "weigh in his favor." Ali , 75 Va. App. at 35, 872 S.E.2d 662 (quoting United States v. Thomas , 55 F.3d 144, 148 (4th Cir. 1995) ).
A. Specific Speedy Trial Factors
1. Length of Delay
The first factor we consider when evaluating a constitutional speedy trial issue is the length of delay. "The length of the delay is the ‘triggering mechanism’ for speedy trial analysis." Kelley , 17 Va. App. at 544, 439 S.E.2d 616 (quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92 ). "Unless there is sufficient delay to be ‘presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.’ " Id. (quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92 ).
In the instant case, appellant challenges the time from the filing of the indictment, August 3, 2020, until the date of her arrest, September 1, 2021, a period of approximately 13 months. See Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 648-50, 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2688-90, 2690–91, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (); see also United States v. Alexander , 817 F.3d 1178, 1181 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2016) (). "It is well established that delay ‘approach[ing] one year’ is ‘presumptively prejudicial’ and requires further review." Ali , 75 Va. App. at 35, 872 S.E.2d 662 (alteration in original) (quoting Doggett , 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. at 2690-91 n.1 ); see also Miller v. Commonwealth , 29 Va. App. 625, 633, 513 S.E.2d 896 (1999) (). Here, because the time between appellant's indictment and arrest exceeded a year, the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial3 and triggers consideration of the remaining factors.4
2. Reason for Delay
Turning to the second factor, the reason for delay, "[o]nce shown that there has been a delay that is ‘presumptively prejudicial,’ the burden ‘devolves upon the Commonwealth to show, first, what...
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