Rees v. Layton

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
Citation6 Cal.App.3d 815,86 Cal.Rptr. 268
PartiesThomas M. REES, etc., Petitioners and Respondents, v. Rex E. LAYTON, City Clerk etc., Defendant and Appellant. Maurice D. RUTLEGE, etc., et al., Petitioners and Respondents, v. Rex E. LAYTON, City Clerk etc., Defendant and Appellant. Christina J. NEW, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. Rex E. LAYTON, City Clerk etc., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 34935, 34947, 34997.
Decision Date21 April 1970

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Asst. City Atty., Claude E. Hilker, Asst. City Atty., for defendant and appellant.

David M. Rothman, Barnet M. Cooperman, Los Angeles, and Stanley Rogers, Beverly Hills, for petitioners and respondents Rees, Bell and Bradley.

Christina J. New, in pro. per.

No appearances for other petitioners and respondents.

SCHWEITZER, Associate Justice.

These three cases present the identical question, the validity of section 91 of the Election Code of the City of Los Angeles, 1 and have therefore been consolidated for purposes of appellate review. Section 91 of the city's Election Code provides in part: 'A candidate who is running for the same elective office which he then holds shall have printed on the ballot, immediately underneath his name * * * the words designating such elective office. * * * No candidate except an incumbent shall have any designation other than his name.' (Emphasis added.) As a result an incumbent's occupation is stated on the ballot, whereas the non-incumbent's occupation cannot be designated thereon. Section 91 is inconsistent with state laws. (Elec.Code, §§ 10219 and 22602.)

Questions Presented

(1) Has the state preempted the right of a chartered city to enact a provision in its municipal code in conflict with the state Elections Code?

(2) If not, is section 91 of the Election Code of the City of Los Angeles unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 21, of the California Constitution?

Facts

Petitioners were candidates for the offices of mayor, city council, and board of education of the City of Los Angeles at the 1969 municipal election. After the city clerk refused to designate on the ballot their respective professions, vocations or occupations, they sought and obtained peremptory writs of mandate against the city clerk granting the relief requested. The writs of mandate were issued February 3, 1969. Since it was necessary that the ballots be at the printer not later than February 4, 1969, there was no time for appellate review before the printing deadline. The city clerk complied with the mandate.

Since the election has been held, these cases are now moot. However, since the questions raised thereby will arise at future Los Angeles elections, the basic issues are not moot and an opinion thereon is proper. (See Board of Education v. Watson, 63 Cal.2d 829, 832, 48 Cal.Rptr. 481, 409 P.2d 481.)

It is conceded that the City of Los Angeles is a city chartered under the provisions of article XI, section 8, of the California Constitution.

State Law

Article XI, section 8 1/2 of the California Constitution provides in part:

'It shall be competent, in all charters framed under the authority given by Section 8 of this article, to provide, in addition to those provisions allowable by this Constitution, and by the laws of the State as follows:

'* * *ll

'2. For the manner in which * * * the members of boards of education shall be elected * * *.

'* * *r t

'4. For the manner in which and the times at which any municipal election shall be held * * *.

'It shall be competent in any charter framed in accordance with the provisions of this section, or Section 8 of this article, for any city * * *, and plenary authority is hereby granted, * * * to provide therein or by amendment thereto, the manner in which, the method by which, * * * the * * * municipal officers and employees * * * shall be elected * * *. All provisions of any charter of any such city * * *, heretofore adopted, and amendments thereto, which are in accordance herewith, are hereby confirmed and declared valid.'

In 1961 the Legislature enacted in part 2, division 12 of the state Elections Code, section 22601, which provides:

'The provisions of this part shall apply to all municipal elections except where otherwise provided for in the Constitution of the State or in a charter duly adopted or amended pursuant to the Constitution of this State.'

In 1965 the Legislature added to part 2, division 12 of the state Elections Code, section 22602, which provides:

'The provisions of Section 10219 of this code, relating to ballot designations, shall apply to municipal elections, whether held in a general law or chartered city.'

Section 10219 of the Elections Code, as amended in 1967, provides in part:

'* * * (I)mmediately under the name of each candidate * * * may appear, at the option of the candidate, one of the following designations:

'* * *

'(c) Words designating the (principal) profession, vocation or occupation of the candidate, * * *.'

Findings and Conclusions of Trial Court

The trial court found that the classification under section 91 of the city's Election Code 'would in most cases provide a substantial advantage for the incumbent'; and that it 'is unreasonable and arbitrarily discriminatory as between incumbents who are candidates, on the one hand, and candidates other than incumbents on the other hand.' Its conclusions of law were that section 22602 was enacted subsequent to section 22601; that insofar as there be a conflict in the two sections, section 22602, being the latest declaration of legislative intent, controls; that section 22602 makes section 10219 applicable to chartered cities; that section 10219 is in direct conflict with section 91 of the Election Code of the City of Los Angeles; that '(t)he state law is superior and controlling;' and that section 91 is unconstitutional as constituting a denial of equal protection of laws.

State Preemption

'* * * California courts have already determined that the conduct of municipal elections is a municipal affair and subject to municipal control. (Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 788, 103 P. 181.) More recently (in 1965) the general rule adhered to in Uhl was followed by the appellate court in City of Redwood City v. Moore, 231 Cal.App.2d 563, 42 Cal.Rptr. 72, it there being held that 'election procedures' in a chartered city are municipal affairs (p. 585, 42 Cal.Rptr. 72).' (Mackey v. Thiel, 262 Cal.App.2d 362, 365, 68 Cal.Rptr. 717, 720. Hrg. den.) Other cases involving conflicts between general law and charter provisions relating to election matters in which the courts have held that the charter prevailed are Muehleisen v. Forward, 4 Cal.2d 17, 46 P.2d 969; Scheafer v. Herman, 172 Cal. 338, 155 P. 1084; People ex rel. Martin v. Worswick, 172 Cal. 71, 75 P. 663, and Lawing v. Faull, 227 Cal.App.2d 23, 38 Cal.Rptr. 417. Each of the forementioned cases, except Mackey, was decided prior to the 1965 enactment of section 22602; Mackey did not involve section 22602. We have been unable to find any reported decision discussing the question as to the effect section 22602 has on the statutory exception set forth in section 22601.

'(R)epeals by implication are not favored. To the contrary, even though, in some particular or particulars, the provisions of two or more statutes apparently are in conflict one with the other, nevertheless, if possible and practicable, such seeming inconsistencies should be reconciled to the end that the law as a whole may be given effect.' (Southern Pacific Co. v. Railroad Commission, 13 Cal.2d 89, 100, 87 P.2d 1055, 1061.) '(E)very statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.' (Stafford v. Realty Bond Service Corp., 39 Cal.2d 797, 805, 249 P.2d 241, 245--246.)

City of Redwood City, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 563, 42 Cal.Rptr. 72, was decided in January 1965, shortly before the Legislature enacted section 22602 at its 1965 session. In City of Redwood City the court stated at page 586, 42 Cal.Rptr. at p. 88: 'Thus it is apparent that the provisions of this part (pt. 2, div. 12, Elec. Code) do not apply where a charter undertakes to provide for municipal elections.' In seeking to reconcile the two secions, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature had this pronouncement from the court in mind, that if it intended to override conflicting charter provisions by section 22602, it would have amended section 22601, and that its only intent was to amend part 2, division 12 of the Elections Code so as to make section 10219 specifically applicable to elections in general law cities and in those chartered cities where no conflicting local provisions exist.

Furthermore, this interpretation is reasonable when we realize that the Legislature had knowledge that many chartered cities, pursuant to the plenary power given them by article XI, section 8 1/2 of the Constitution, had enacted ordinances pertaining to the control of municipal elections, that all statutes enacted must be subordinate to the provisions of the state Constitution (11 Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 30), and that the last unnumbered paragraph of article XI, section 8 1/2 of the Constitution specifically limits the Legislature's power with respect to the provisions of the section to the enactment of laws necessary to implement the rights given chartered cities by article XI, section 8 1/2 of the Constitution.

The trial court concluded that: 'As the latest declaration of legislative intent, if any conflict does exist, section 22602 controls section 22601.' This rule of statutory construction, calling for the last enactment to prevail, is applicable only if the two statutes cannot be reconciled. (Coker v. Superior Court, 70 Cal.App.2d 199, 201...

To continue reading

Request your trial
26 cases
  • Coe v. Davidson
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 18 Noviembre 1974
    ...the remainder to stand) will recur in future elections and therefore is a proper subject for appellate review. (See Rees v. Layton (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 815, 86 Cal.Rptr. 268; Zeilenga v. Nelson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 716, 719--720, 94 Cal.Rptr. 602, 484 P.2d The defendant argues on appeal that the ......
  • Gould v. Grubb
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 7 Julio 1975
    ...who wished to support such candidates.' (10 Cal.3d at p. 403, 110 Cal.Rptr. at p. 722, 516 P.2d at p. 10; see Rees v. Layton, Supra, 6 Cal.App.3d 815, 823, 86 Cal.Rptr. 268; cf. West-brook v. Mihaly, Supra, 2 Cal.3d 765, 793, 87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487.) We thus conclude that an electio......
  • Johnson v. Bradley
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 24 Diciembre 1992
    ...710 P.2d 268 et seq. [striking, on equal protection grounds, charter city provision banning write-in voting]; Rees v. Layton (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 815, 822-823, 86 Cal.Rptr. 268 [striking, on equal protection grounds, charter city provision allowing only incumbent to state occupation on ballo......
  • Field v. Bowen
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 19 Septiembre 2011
    ...206, 130 Cal.Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1; Gould v. Grubb (1975) 14 Cal.3d 661, 122 Cal.Rptr. 377, 536 P.2d 1337; and Rees v. Layton (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 815, 86 Cal.Rptr. 268. Any light these cases may shed on the issue before us is eclipsed by Libertarian Party, which is directly on point. The ca......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT