Reese v. First Connecticut Small Business Inv. Co.
| Decision Date | 11 November 1980 |
| Citation | 438 A.2d 99,182 Conn. 326 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Lisa REESE v. FIRST CONNECTICUT SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT COMPANY. |
Monte Radler, Milford, on the brief, for appellant (defendant).
Stewart I. Edelstein, Bridgeport, on the brief, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before COTTER, C. J., and BOGDANSKI, PETERS, PARSKEY and SHEA, JJ.
The plaintiff, a real estate broker, brought this action seeking, inter alia, a commission in connection with a two-year lease agreement entered into by the defendant. In a counterclaim, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff employed unfair business practices and restrained real estate trade. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $900 as damages for an unpaid commission owed to the plaintiff and also rendered judgment for the plaintiff on the counterclaim. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred both in its award to the plaintiff and in its decision on the counterclaim.
The defendant's contention that the award of damages to the plaintiff was erroneous because the listing agreement between the parties was ambiguous is unpersuasive. The agreement plainly provided that "(i)n the event the above-described property is leased, the rental commission shall be 10%." It further provided that "(t)his contract shall remain in effect until April 8, 1975." In November, 1974, the defendant negotiated a two-year lease effective January, 1975. The defendant paid the equivalent of 10 percent of the first year rental but refused to pay a commission for the second year, arguing that a fair reading of the agreement obligated it to pay a commission only on the rent due for the first year. This argument fails when measured against the language of the contract excerpted above. "The question is not what intention existed in the minds of the parties but what intention is expressed in the language used...." White Oak Corporation v. State, 170 Conn. 434, 439, 365 A.2d 1162 (1976). Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms. See Griffith v. Security Ins. Co., 167 Conn. 450, 453-54, 356 A.2d 94 (1975). We find the contract unambiguous. It distinctly called for a 10 percent rental commission. No provision limited the relevant time frame to one year. The lease was entered into before the listing agreement had expired. Consequently, the court correctly rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
On the counterclaim, the defendant claims that it should prevail because the plaintiff, by failing to deny the allegations of the counterclaim, admitted those allegations under the rule expressed in Practice Book, 1978, § 129. The plaintiff never filed a pleading responsive to the counterclaim. A motion for default for failure to plead filed by the defendant was denied on October 20, 1978. The record discloses no further motions for default and no other motions seeking judgment.
At this point the nature of the defendant's claim on appeal ought to be placed in proper perspective. The defendant does not contend that the court erred by rendering judgment for the plaintiff either because the counterclaim was out of the case or because no pleading responsive to the counterclaim was ever filed. It is not the defendant's position that a new trial is required because he never had an opportunity to present his case regarding either liability or...
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...the only effect is that the factual allegations of the special defense are deemed proven. See Reese v. First Connecticut Small Business Investment Co., 182 Conn. 326, 328-29, 438 A.2d 99 (1980). We have examined the record, including the trial transcripts, the briefs filed by all the partie......
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...language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms." Reese v. First Connecticut Small Business Investment Co., 182 Conn. 326, 327, 438 A.2d 99 (1980). The plaintiffs make no claim that, under the licensing agreement with Becton, Dickinson, the defe......
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DePietro v. Dep't of Pub. Safety
...the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the factual allegations admitted. See Reese v. First Connecticut Small Business Investment Co., 182 Conn. 326, 329, 438 A.2d 99 (1980). Such admissions are conclusive upon the defendant in this case. See Webster Bank v. Zak, 259 Conn.......
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