Reese v. Reese

• Decision Date: 05 March 1875
• Citation: 41 Md. 554
• Parties: EDWIN F. REESE v. JACOB REESE, and JOHN E. SMITH, Trustee.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

41 Md. 554

EDWIN F. REESE v. JACOB REESE, and JOHN E. SMITH, Trustee.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 5, 1875

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Carroll County, in Equity.

The facts are stated in the Court's opinion.

The cause was submitted to BARTOL, C.J., STEWART, BRENT, GRASON and ROBINSON, J.

Wm. P. Maulsby, for the appellant,

Contended that the case was a proper one for a specific enforcement and that the answer of the defendant, Jacob Reese, was evidence in the cause.

Jno. E. Smith and William A. McKellip, for the appellee.

There is no proof whatever of the alleged contract in the evidence none of the witnesses ever heard of such a contract. They speak of declarations made by Jacob Reese with reference to a sale of the lands, but on what terms or conditions, at what price, or how paid, if paid at all, none of them know. It is well settled that the specific execution of a contract in equity, is a matter not of absolute right in the party, but of sound discretion in the Court. Smoot vs. Rea & Andrews, 19 Md., 398.

The agreement, whether in writing or by parol, must be fair, just, reasonable, bona fide, certain, mutual and definite in its terms, and the existence of the very contract as laid in the bill, must be shown by clear and satisfactory proof. Smith vs. Crandall, 20 Md., 482; Semmes vs. Worthington, et al., 38 Md., 298; Rider & Trotter vs. Gray, et al., 10 Md., 282; Carr, et al. vs. Hobbs, adm'r., 11 Md., 285; Stoddert, et al. vs. Bowie's Ex'rs., 5 Md., 18; Smoot, et al. vs. Rea & Andrews, 19 Md., 398; Hall vs. Hall, 1 Gill, 383. The agreement must not be vague and indeterminate, or it will not be enforced. Dorsey vs. Wayman, 6 Gill, 66.

There is a specific contract alleged--there is no such contract proved. The answer of Jacob Reese, made after the execution of the deed of trust from him to his co-defendant, John E. Smith, of all his estate, real, personal and mixed, admits the contract set out in the bill. The answer of one defendant is not available against a co-defendant in general. Williams vs. Hodgson, 2 H. & J., 474; Hayward vs. Carroll, 4 H. & J., 518; Stewart vs. Stone, & c., 3 G. & J., 510; Calwell vs. Boyer, 8 G. & J., 136.

And especially in this case, the answer of the defendant, Jacob Reese, after he had conveyed away and specially dedicated these lands, with all the rest of his estate, to his creditors, cannot be evidence, even if it be admissible for any purpose, or competent to be read or used by the complainant against the other defendant and the creditors whom he represents. A grantor is estopped from denying the title of his grantee. Funk vs. Newcomer, et al., 10 Md., 316.

It is well established, that the declaration of a party to an instrument of writing made subsequent to its execution, cannot be given in evidence to invalidate it upon any ground. Stewart vs. Redditt, 3 Md., 67. The only purpose and effect of this answer, if received, is to invalidate the deed of trust pro tanto, and thus permit a secret trust to avail against a record title, doubly assured, on which creditors partly relied for the security and payment of their claims. The right of a person holding by a good title is not to be cut down by the acknowledgment of a former holder that he had no title. 4 B. & C., 325, cited in 1 Greenl. on Ev., sec. 190.

GRASON J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The bill in this case was filed for the specific performance of a contract alleged to have been entered into by the complainant and Jacob Reese, his father.

The bill alleges that the complainant lent his father three thousand dollars, on or about the 26th of December, 1866, and that in February or March, 1867, it was agreed by and between the complainant and his father, that the latter would sell to the former a certain parcel of land, which is described in Exhibit A., filed with the bill, for the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars. The bill further alleges that the sale was consummated by Jacob Reese, accepting that sum, being part of the amount lent him by the complainant, as full payment of the purchase money, and that said Jacob was thereafter, to be indebted to the complainant in the sum of five hundred dollars, the balance of the said loan of three thousand dollars; that said land was delivered into the possession of the complainant, and has since remained in his possession, and that Jacob Reese agreed to execute a deed for the same to complainant, but neglected and failed to do so, and that on the first day of January, 1872, having become embarrassed and involved in his pecuniary affairs he conveyed by deed to John E. Smith, all his property and estate for the benefit of his creditors. The answer of Jacob Reese admits the allegations of the bill. The answer of John E. Smith denies all knowledge of the alleged agreement, and requires full proof of the allegations of the bill.

To this answer there was a general replication, Jacob Reese then died, and, by an agreement filed in the cause, his administrator and heirs at law were made parties. A commission was issued to take testimony, and after its return and a final hearing of the case, a decree was passed dismissing the bill of complaint, and from that decree this appeal was taken. Each party filed exceptions to evidence in the Court below, and we are of opinion that they were correctly disposed of by the learned Judge, before whom the case was tried. Declarations of Jacob Reese, made after the deed of trust was executed, and tending to impeach Smith's title under that deed, were clearly inadmissible. The declarations testified to by James W. Reese, were made not only after the date of that deed but after the bill in this case was filed and when Jacob Reese was about to file his answer to it and at the time the answer was read...