Reese v. State
| Decision Date | 28 May 1929 |
| Docket Number | 13,594 |
| Citation | 165 N.E. 780,89 Ind.App. 378 |
| Parties | REESE v. STATE OF INDIANA |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
From Delaware Circuit Court; Clarence W. Dearth, Judge.
Roy Reese was convicted of operating an automobile on a public highway while intoxicated, and he appealed.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
John T Walterhouse and Thomas V. Miller, for appellant.
Arthur L. Gilliom, Attorney-General, and George J. Muller, Deputy Attorney-General, for the State.
On June 29, 1925, the prosecuting attorney of Delaware county filed in the city court of Muncie an affidavit charging the appellant with being intoxicated in a public place. He also at the same time, filed in said court an affidavit charging the appellant with operating an automobile upon a public highway while he, the appellant, was in a state of intoxication.
Upon arraignment, the appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of public intoxication, was fined on that charge and paid his fine. As to the driving charge, he pleaded not guilty, was tried, found guilty, and from that conviction he appealed to the circuit court, where, upon trial, he was again convicted, from which conviction this appeal is prosecuted. The only alleged errors presented on this appeal relate to the action of the court in overruling his motion for a new trial.
It is the contention of appellant that, as the appellant could not drive an automobile upon the public highway, if at the time intoxicated, without then and there "appearing in a public place in a state of intoxication," and, having paid his fine for the intoxication, he cannot now be prosecuted upon the "driving" charge. This question is raised both by objection as to the sufficiency of the evidence, and by instructions tendered. We cannot concur in appellant's contention. The offense for which he paid his fine was complete when he appeared in a public place in a state of intoxication; the other offense was not complete until, being in such condition, he drove his automobile on the public highway, an act which from its very nature could but endanger the lives of others traveling upon such highway. These offenses, under our statute, are separate and distinct, and a conviction of one is no bar to a conviction for the other.
The court, by its ninth instruction, told the jury that if they found the appellant guilty, they should assess a fine of not to exceed $ 500, to which they...
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