Reese v. State

• Decision Date: 30 January 1891
• Citation: 90 Ala. 624,8 So. 818
• Parties: REESE v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

8 So. 818

90 Ala. 624

REESE v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 30, 1891

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; JOHN B. TALLY, Judge.

The indictment in this case charged that the defendant, Sampson Reese, "unlawfully and with malice aforethought killed a man whose name is to the grand jury unknown, by shooting him with a gun. Said man, so killed, was supposed to be named C Mehan, and was killed at the store of Glover & Ladd, on the south side of the Tennessee river, near Bridgeport, on Sunday, the 29th day of May, 1881, in said county of Jackson." The indictment was found in June, 1881, and the trial was had in August, 1890, resulting in a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and a sentence to the penitentiary for life. When the case was called on the day set for the trial, the defendant objected to proceeding with the trial, because he had not been served with a copy of the indictment, and of the jurors summoned for his trial, as the law required; and thereupon offered the following evidence in support of his objection: G. D. Campbell, the deputy-sheriff testified "that on Monday, the 25th August, 1890, having the papers in his hands to be served, he went to W. F. Kirk a practicing attorney, and partner of J. E. Brown, and asked him if he was with Brown in Reese's case; that Kirk replied that he was; that Brown was then arguing a case before the jury, and Kirk was sitting by the table inside of the bar; that he thereupon handed the papers to Kirk, and never saw them afterwards, and never made any other service." Kirk testified that when said Campbell "came to him in the court-house, and asked if he was interested in Reese's case, he replied that he was assisting Mr. Brown;" that Campbell then handed him the papers, "and he promised to hand them to Brown, and intended to do so, but laid them down on the table, and forgot them;" also "that he was not of counsel in the defendant's case, and had never been, either indvidually or as Brown's partner, and was only helping Brown; that their partnership was formed long after the defendant's case was on the docket, and related only to cases acquired afterwards." Brown testified "that he was the defendant's attorney, and Kirk was not engaged as attorney in the case; that he had not been served with a copy of the indictment and a list of the jury, nor had it ever been called to his attention until yesterday, when he found it lying on his table, and learned on inquiry what it was." The deputy-clerk of the court testified "that the name of W. F. Kirk had appeared on the docket with that of J. E. Brown, as counsel for the defendant, since February, 1889," and the docket was also introduced showing that fact. On this evidence the court overruled the defendant's objection, and required the trial to proceed to which ruling defendant duly excepted. The defendant then demurred to the indictment, and, his demurrer being overruled, he pleaded not guilty. On the trial the state introduced evidence showing that on Sunday, May 29, 1881, while a party of young men were bathing in the river, the deceased passed by, and was invited to join them, though he was a stranger; that he went into the water with them, but soon became angry because some one threw water on him, came out and got his knife, and stabbed one Copeland in the neck; that Copeland died in a few minutes; that the deceased was arrested, and carried to the store of Glover & Ladd, about a half-mile up the river, where an excited crowd gathered; that the defendant, Reese, who was a cousin of Copeland, but was not one of the bathing party, came with his rifle in his hand, and, calling to the crowd to get out of the way, fired and killed the deceased, whose hands were at the time tied behind his back. Two or three witnesses for the defendant testified that the crowd was very much excited; that frequent threats of lynching the deceased were made, guns and pistols displayed, and several shots fired at the time the deceased was killed. The defendant requested the following written charges, and duly excepted to the refusal of each: "(1) Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice; that is, as the unpremeditated result of passion-heated blood. This passion-heated blood may be caused by an assault and battery, or it may be from some other adequate cause sufficient to reduce the killing. (2) Notwithstanding the jury may be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the deceased, and that he did it from a formed design, still he may not be guilty of murder in the first degree,-there may have been some sufficient...