Reese v. State
Decision Date | 11 September 2020 |
Docket Number | CR-18-0687 |
Parties | Antonio Montez REESE v. STATE of Alabama |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Lisa M. Ivey of Stubbs, Sills & Frye, P.C., Anniston, for appellant.
Steve Marshall, atty. gen., and Stephen N. Dodd, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
AFFIRMED BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM.
I concur in the Court's affirmance of Antonio Montez Reese's multiple convictions and sentences that stem from an automobile collision in which two individuals were killed and two others were injured.1 I write separately to address Reese's challenge to a search warrant for the event data recorder ("EDR") from the vehicle he was driving when he caused the collision.
The evidence showed that around 7:00 p.m. on April 22, 2016, Officer Alex Miranda of the Opelika Police Department saw Reese, who was driving his girlfriend's Chevrolet Malibu automobile,2 turn without using a signal. Officer Miranda initiated a traffic stop, but Reese fled at a high rate of speed. After Reese almost caused an accident at one intersection, Officer Miranda slowed down and lost sight of Reese. Reese's flight ended when the Malibu he was driving collided with a Toyota Camry automobile that Rhonda Finley was driving and in which Dennis Finley, Thomas Wallace, and Wendi Wallace were passengers. The Wallaces were injured in the crash, and the Finleys were killed.
Law enforcement found marijuana, alprazolam, and cocaine in Reese's vehicle, and, pursuant to a search warrant, law enforcement got the EDR from the Malibu after the car was stored in a tow yard. Testimony at Reese's trial described the EDR as "a module ... [that] determine[s] whether ... to deploy [the] airbags ... [and] if it senses an impending collision ... [it will] record any data relating to the event." (R. 808-09.) The EDR records "speed, throttle percentage, accelerator percentage, whether ... the brakes ... [were] active ... [and] any kind of diagnostic trouble codes ... that were wrong with the car."3 (R. 815.) Data from the EDR showed that in the 5 seconds before impact, the Malibu was traveling between 63 and 68 miles per hour and that the brakes on the Malibu were never engaged during that time. The speed limit on the road where the crash happened was 25 miles per hour.
In the trial court, Reese moved to suppress the data extracted from the EDR because, he said, the search warrant requested the EDR, not the data on it. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
The trial court held that, under this Court's decision in Sullen v. State, 409 So. 2d 903 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981), Reese lacked standing to challenge the warrant.4 In Sullen, this Court recognized that, to have standing under the Fourth Amendment, "a defendant need no longer ‘establish that he was the owner or possessor of the seized property or that he had a possessory interest in the premises searched.’ " 409 So. 2d at 905 (quoting Waters v. State, 360 So. 2d 347, 353 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) ). But even under that "liberalized" rule of standing, "a defendant must either be charged with a ‘possession’ crime or be ‘legitimately on the premises’ when the search occurs." Sullen, 409 So. 2d at 905 (quoting Waters, 360 So. 2d at 353 ). This Court held that Sullen thus lacked standing because he was not at the place when the items were seized, nor was he charged with possession of the seized items.5
(Reese's brief, p. 40.) Whatever merit there may be in this argument, the danger Reese identifies is not present because law enforcement obtained a warrant before seizing the EDR.
Rather than directly addressing Sullen, Reese focuses his arguments on whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the EDR data. Reese argues, correctly, that "the fact that Reese did not own the car is not dispositive of whether he has an expectation of privacy [in the EDR data]." (Reese's brief, p. 38.) Reese also cites the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 200 L. Ed. 2d 805 (2018).
In Byrd, the United States Supreme Court addressed "whether an unauthorized driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car." 584 U.S. at ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (emphasis added). The defendant in that case, Terrence Byrd, was the driver and sole occupant of a rental car. Law enforcement, as a part of a traffic stop, searched the car without a warrant and found body armor and 49 bricks of heroin. The lower courts held that Byrd lacked standing to challenge the search because, although the individual who had rented the car had given Byrd permission to drive the car, the rental agreement did not list Byrd as an authorized driver.
Byrd, 584 U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. at 1530.
584 U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. at 1526. Turning to the issue before it, the Court continued:
584 U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. at 1527-28.
Applying those principles, the Court stated that "[t]he central inquiry" for the case before it was "the concept of lawful possession" by Byrd of the rental car and his apparent "right to exclude" others--such as a carjacker--from the car while it was in...
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