Reese v. Talbert

• Decision Date: 06 December 1960
• Docket Number: No. 17719,17719
• Citation: 117 S.E.2d 375,237 S.C. 356
• Parties: Jesse T. REESE, Jr., Appellant, v. C. Laney TALBERT, County Supervisor; and Robert W. Eleazer, William C. Mahaffey, Jr., R. M. McGregor, J. L. Moore, T. D. Palmer, J. S. Sites and K. B. Taylor, together constituting the County Board of Commissioners of Richland County, Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 375

117 S.E.2d 375

237 S.C. 356

Jesse T. REESE, Jr., Appellant, v. C. Laney TALBERT, County Supervisor; and Robert W. Eleazer William C. Mahaffey, Jr., R. M. McGregor, J. L. Moore, T. D Palmer, J. S. Sites and K. B. Taylor, together constituting the County Board of Commissioners of Richland County, Respondents.

No. 17719.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 6, 1960.

John G. Martin, Columbia, for appellant.

Frank A. Graham, Jr., Columbia, Huger Sinkler, Charleston, for respondents.

LEGGE, Justice.

The Act of April 1, 1960 (51 Stat. at Large, p. 2799) purports to authorize the issuance of general obligation bonds of Richland County in an amount not exceeding $350,000, the proceeds thereof to be used for the improvement and renovation of existing public hospital facilities in that county. Plaintiff seeks in this action a judgment declaring that Act unconstitutional because it makes no provision for an election, which he contends is required by a special amendment of the Constitution, ratified February 25, 1921, relating to the bonded indebtedness of Richland County. That amendment reads:

'That the limitations imposed in Section 7, of Article VIII, and in Sections 5 and 6 of Article X of the Constitution of the State of South Carolina, shall not apply to the bonded indebtedness incurred by the County of Richland, when the proceeds of any bonds issued by said County are applied exclusively to the purpose of erection, improvement and maintenance of a public hospital and court house or in payment of debts incurred, and when the question of incurring such indebtedness is submitted to the qualified electors of said county, as provided by law.'

The circuit decree, pointing out that at the time of the amendment in question the fifteen per cent overall debt limitation prescribed by Article X, Section 5, was being strictly observed under the literal interpretation that had been given it by this court in Todd v. City of Laurens, 1897, 48 S.C. 395, 26 S.E. 682, concludes that the legislative purpose of the amendment was merely to enable Richland County to issue bonds for court house or hospital purposes if and when that limitation would be thereby exceeded, provided the question of their issuance were voted upon in the affirmative by the qualified electors of the county.

When the language of a constitutional amendment is of doubtful import, the object of judicial inquiry as to its meaning is to ascertain the intent of its framers and of the people who adopted it. Heinitsh v. Floyd, 130 S.C. 434, 126 S.E. 336; Duncan v. Record Publishing Co., 145 S.C. 196, 143 S.E. 31; Ansel v. Means, 171 S.C. 432, 172 S.E. 434. And in attempting to attain that object, the courts may consider the history of the times in which the amendment was framed, the object sought to be accomplished, and legislative interpretation of its provisions. Kirkland v. Allendale County, 128 S.C. 541, 123 S.E. 648; Covington v. McInnis, 144 S.C. 391, 142 S.E. 650; Powers v. State Educational Finance Commission, 222 S.E. 433, 73 S.E.2d 456; Johnson v. Thomason, 236 S.C. 135, 113 S.E.2d 417.

The reason assigned by the circuit court for its conclusion before stated would be more persuasive if when the amendment in question was proposed the amount of Richland County's bonded debt had been such that the issuance of bonds for hospital and court house purposes would likely have resulted in an excess of bonded indebtedness over the eight per cent limitation or the fifteen per cent overall limitation prescribed by Article X, Section 5. But the record here discloses no factual basis for the assumption that such would have been the case. It is true that the defendants in their answer alleged, upon information and belief, 'that on the occasion that the Constitutional amendment was adopted, the debt of Richland County, and certain of the political subdivisions and municipal corporations covering and extending over portions of the territory of Richland County, was such that the original limitations of Section 5 of Article X would be violated by further incurring of bonded debt, and for this reason it was necessary to provide means for the issuance of bonds.' But no proof in support of that allegation appears in the record. Actually, the circuit decree made no direct factual finding as to the quoted allegation; it went no farther than to say that the City of Columbia, 'at that time had a substantial debt', and that 'school districts and townships likewise had bonded debt'; and the record discloses no evidentiary basis for even that finding.

The amendment under consideration provides that the limitations imposed in Section 7 of Article VIII and in Sections 5 and 6 of Article X shall not apply to bonded indebtedness incurred by Richland County when the proceeds of bonds issued by it are applied exclusively to the purpose of erection, improvement and maintenance of a public hospital and court house '* * * and when the question of incurring such indebtedness is submitted to the qualified electors of said municipality, as provided by law.' (Italics ours.) The italicized words plainly indicate that an election is required as a condition precedent to the issuance of bonds for such purposes, and the amendment contains on its face no provision limiting that requirement to a situation in which by the issuance of such bonds the county's bonded debt will exceed the amount limited by the Constitution. Respondents, so conceding, argue: that the amendment contains no language expressly or by reasonable implication curtailing the legislative power, existing prior to its adoption, to authorize the county to issue, without an election, bonds up to the constitutional debt limit; that all amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Article X have been for the purpose of enlarging, not reducing, the original debt limits, Knight v. Allen, 234 S.C. 559, 109 S.E.2d 585; and that therefore the circuit decree correctly held that since the bonds authorized by the Act of April 1, 1960 will be within the constitutional debt limit of Richland County, no election was necessary. The following considerations suggest a contrary conclusion:

1. As we have already indicated, to sustain respondents' position would require writing into the amendment a provision not suggested by its language or by any pertinent circumstances shown by the record to have surrounded its proposal and adoption.

2. Section 5 of Article X contains three distinct limitations upon the power of the General Assembly to permit a county to issue general obligation bonds, viz.:

(a) That its bonded indebtedness shall not exceed eight percent of the assessed value of all taxable property within the county;

(b) That the aggregate debt upon any territory overlapped by several political divisions or municipal corporations shall not exceed fifteen percent of the assessed value of all taxable property within such territory; and

(c) That a county may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes (a power essential to the issuance of general obligation bonds) only for 'corporate purposes.'

Further limitation is found in the provision of Section 6 of Article X that 'the General Assembly shall not have power to authorize any county * * * to levy a tax or issue bonds for any purpose except for educational purposes, to build and repair public roads, buildings and bridges,...