Reeves v. Barbe

• Decision Date: 29 June 1942
• Docket Number: 36551.
• Citation: Reeves v. Barbe, 200 La. 1073, 9 So.2d 426 (La. 1942)
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: REEVES et al. v. BARBE.

9 So.2d 426

200 La. 1073

REEVES et al. v. BARBE.

No. 36551.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

June 29, 1942

Plauche & Plauche, of Lake Charles, for appellants.

Liskow & Lewis, of Lake Charles, for appellee.

PONDER Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment sustaining the defendant's exception of no cause of action to a part of the plaintiff's petition.

From a reading of the petition, it appears that the plaintiffs Ernest J. Reeves and Warren W. Lemoine, are seeking to recover from the defendant, Alfred M. Barbe, certain sums of money and to be decreed the owners of certain royalty interests now standing in the defendant's name. The suit is predicated on a verbal agreement of joint adventure respecting two separate tracts of land. It is alleged that the verbal agreement of joint adventure with respect to one tract of land was acknowledged by the defendant in writing by a certain letter addressed to the plaintiffs. We gather from the petition that while the two tracts of land are involved in the suit, by virtue of the underlying agreement of joint enterprise, that there were various leases and transactions entered into with respect to each of these tracts of land separately. The plaintiffs in their prayer ask for certain relief, and, in event that the court should find that they are not entitled to it, for alternative relief. The defendant interposed an exception of no cause of action to the petition only insofar as one tract of the land was concerned which was sustained by the lower court. It appears from the written reasons handed down by the trial judge that the defendant admitted that the petition set forth a cause of action as to the other tract of land. The plaintiff have appealed from the judgment sustaining the exception of no cause of action as to a part of the plaintiffs' petition.

The appellants have attempted to appeal from a judgment from which no appeal lies. A judgment from which no appeal of no cause of action, only a part of the case is an interlocutory judgment from which no appeal lies unless irreparable injury will result.

'Interlocutory judgments do not decide on the merits; they are pronounced on preliminary matters, in the course of the proceedings.' Code of Practice, Article 538.

'Definitive or final judgment are such as decide all the points in controversy, between the parties. Definitive judgments are such as have the force of res judicata.' Code of Practice, Article 539.

'One may appeal from all final judgments rendered in causes in which an appeal is given by law, whether such judgments have been rendered after hearing the parties, or by default.' Code of Practice, Article 565.

'One may likewise appeal from all interlocutory judgments, when such judgment may cause him an irreparable injury.' Code of Practice, Article 566.

'The law does not favor the interrupting of judicial proceedings by appealing from interlocutory decrees. Hence comes the rule that an appeal is not allowed from such a decree unless it is one which may cause irreparable injury.' In re Byrne, District Att'y, 193 La. 566 191 So. 729, 730.

In the case of Bossier's Heirs v. Hollingsworth & Jackson, 117 La. 221, 41 So. 553, 555, it was stated:

'We therefore usually understand by the term 'final judgment' that judgment which, disposing of all the issues not previously disposed of by interlocutory judgments, is the last judgment which the court renders. If this be not so, there may be, in any given case, as many appeals as there are issues presented, and as the law authorizes the cumulation of separate actions in the same demand (Code Prac. art. 148), a single suit may be infinitely divided, with divisions and subdivisions pending, at the same time, in different courts. The judgment now under consideration does not dispose of all the points in controversy between the parties, nor does it cause the parties against whom it was rendered irreparable injury, and, in neither of these respects, is its character affected by the fact that it bears the judge's signature.

'It can be reviewed, on the appeal from the judgment which may ultimately be rendered in the case (provided the plaintiffs take such appeal or answer it, as the case may be); but we do not think that it would conduce to an orderly administration of justice to review it at this time.'

In the case of Trcka v. Bragmans Bluff Lumber Co., Inc., 168 La. 805, 123 So. 332, an exception of no cause of action was sustained to an alleged verbal contract and overruled as to an alleged written contract. The plaintiff appealed, and the defendant moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the judgment was not signed by the trial judge and that it was an interlocutory judgment. The court held that the signing of the judgment by the trial judge did not make it a final judgment, and that it was interlocutory.

In the case of Feitel v. Feitel, 169 La. 384, 388, 125 So. 280, it was also stated: 'The judgment does not purport to dispose of the entire case, and therefore is not a final judgment. The Code of Practice defines definitive or final judgments as follows: 'Definitive or final judgments are such as decide all the points in controversy between the parties. Definitive judgments are such as have the force of res adjudicata.' Code Prac. art. 539. The judgment in this case is not a final judgment, because it leaves undecided the main demand. Not being decisive of all the points in controversy, it would not support a plea of res adjudicata. This is so because it is an interlocutory judgment. Code Prac. arts. 538 and 539. The fact that the judgment was signed cannot change it from an interlocutory to a final judgment. State ex rel. Pflug v. Judge, 35 La.Ann. 765; Bossier's Heirs v. Hollingsworth & Jackson, 117 La 221, 41 So. 553, 555; Trcka v. Bragmans...