Reeves v. Cincinnati, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 May 1989
• Docket Number: Docket No. 90447
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,139 Hezekiah and Alice REEVES, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CINCINNATI, INC., a foreign corporation, and Addy-Morand Machinery Co., a/k/a Addy-Lubby, a Michigan corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 326

439 N.W.2d 326

176 Mich.App. 181, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,139

Hezekiah and Alice REEVES, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CINCINNATI, INC., a foreign corporation, and Addy-Morand

Machinery Co., a/k/a Addy-Lubby, a Michigan

corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 90447.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 7, 1987.

Decided April 3, 1989.

Released for Publication May 18, 1989.

Meklir, Schreier, Nolish & Friedman, P.C. by Samuel A. Meklir, Southfield, and Jeannette A. Paskin, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Harvey, Kruse, Western & Milan, P.C. by Dennis M. Goebel and Paul J. Widzinski, Bloomfield Hills, for defendants-appellees.

Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and SHEPHERD and SULLIVAN, ^* JJ.

HOLBROOK, Presiding Judge.

In this products liability case, plaintiffs appeal from a directed verdict entered in favor of defendants. Plaintiff Hezekiah Reeves was injured when a power press unexpedctedly cycled, crushing Reeves' right hand so that the fingers had to be medically amputated. Suit for personal injuries was brought against defendants Cincinnati, Inc., the manufacturer of the press, and Addy-Morand Machinery Co., the dealer arranging the sale of the press to Reeves' employer, General Motors Corporation. At trial, plaintiffs introduced evidence to support theories of recovery for negligent design of the press and failure to provide warning of the dangers associated with the press. After plaintiffs rested, the trial court granted a directed verdict, reasoning that the evidence was insufficient to create issues submissible to the jury as to whether the press was unfit for its intended purposes or whether Cincinnati failed to use reasonable care to eliminate foreseeable risks. We reverse and remand for trial.

In determining whether to grant a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a prima facie case is thereby established. Clery v. Sherwood, 151 Mich.App. 55, 63-64, 390 N.W.2d 682 (1986). If the evidence presents material issues of fact upon which reasonable minds can differ, those issues are to be decided by the trier of fact, thereby precluding a directed verdict. Dixon v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 168 Mich.App. 107, 110, 423 N.W.2d 580 (1987). A directed verdict for the defendant is properly granted only when the evidence, viewed in this manner, fails to establish a prima facie case. Goldman v. Phantom Freight, Inc., 162 Mich.App. 472, 477, 413 N.W.2d 433 (1987), lv. den. 429 Mich. 867 (1987).

When, as in this case, theories of negligence and implied warranty are both premised on an allegedly improper design of the product, the legal elements of the two theories converge to the point of identicalness; proofs that suffice for one theory will suffice for the other; proofs that fail to establish a prima facie case on one theory are equally inadequate for the other. See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176 (1984). Under either theory, the crux of liability is "whether the manufacturer took reasonable care in light of any reasonably foreseeable use of the product which might cause harm or injury." Id., at p. 695, 365 N.W.2d 176. A similar rule prevails in the context of a claim that the manufacturer breached a duty to give a warning; viewed as either negligence or breach of an implied warranty, both theories "involve identical facts and require proof of exactly the same elements." Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 90, 273 N.W.2d 476 (1979). The common legal standard dispositive of liability is that of "reasonable care under the circumstances." Id. However, the defective nature of the product must, in fact, exist at the time of the manufacturer's relinquishment of possession, even if the subsequent malfunction and resultant injury occur much later. Pippen v. Denison Division of Abex Corp., 66 Mich.App. 664, 669, 239 N.W.2d 704 (1976), lv. den. 399 Mich. 823 (1977). See also Scott v. Allen Bradley Co., 139 Mich.App. 665, 670-671, 362 N.W.2d 734 (1984). A defect may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Holdsworth v. Nash Mfg. Inc., 161 Mich.App. 139, 148, 409 N.W.2d 764 (1987), lv. den. 429 Mich. 872 (1987).

Specifically, plaintiffs' theory of recovery is that the press unexpectedly and spontaneously cycled for unknown reasons, but that this is a common and foreseeable occurrence of working with presses. Contending that Cincinnati should have designed and implemented more adequate safety devices, plaintiffs primarily relied on Cincinnati's failure to provide an interlocking barrier guard integrated into the clutch mechanism activating the cycling process of the press. Plaintiffs' expert witness opined that an interlocking barrier guard could have been included by Cincinnati as part of the design of the press and that, if it had been installed, an accident of the nature causing Reeves' injuries would have been rendered "virtually impossible."

Plaintiffs' theory, if supported by sufficient evidence, is viable under products liability law. "A product may be rendered unreasonably dangerous by the omission of a safety device. Furthermore, where an injury is reasonably foreseeable, the trier of fact must determine whether a safety device should have been put on the product by the manufacturer." Scott, supra, 139 Mich.App. at p. 670, 362 N.W.2d 734.

Whether an alleged design defect is actionable under theories of negligence and implied warranty is decided with reference to the risk-utility balancing test. Prentis, supra. The precise burden imposed on the plaintiff by this test was delineated by the Supreme Court in Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 414 Mich. 413, 326 N.W.2d 372 (1982), a case affirming the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer of a forklift. The plaintiff's decedent was fatally injured when he was ejected from the forklift, which collided with a post and then rolled over for reasons that were entirely unknown and unexplained at trial. The plaintiff's theory of design defect was the manufacturer's omission of a driver restraint, e.g., a seatbelt, that would have minimized the decedent's injuries. Plaintiff's theory depended almost exclusively upon expert testimony for evidentiary support, and the Court's exhaustive review of that testimony led to its conclusion that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case:

"Our conclusion that the plaintiff did not present a prima facie case is based on the lack of evidence concerning both the magnitude of the risks involved and the reasonableness of the proposed alternative design. Although from the testimony of plaintiff's expert one might infer that a forklift rollover and the injuries resulting from being pinned under the overhead protective guard were foreseeable, neither his testimony nor any other evidence on the record gave any indication how likely such an event might be. In conjunction with this uncertainty, the record also produces no indication how the use of any of the driver restraints would affect a forklift operator's ability to do his or her job or the operator's safety in other circumstances." Id., at pp. 429-430, 326 N.W.2d 372.

Additionally, the Court noted that particularly "where the magnitude of the risks is quite uncertain because it is dependent upon the unknown incidence of forklift rollovers, an examination of the effects of any proposed alternative design must bear a heavy burden in determining whether the chosen design was unreasonably dangerous." Id., at p. 430, 326 N.W.2d 372. In arriving at its holding that the evidence presented by that plaintiff was insufficient, the Court emphasized the lack of evidence as to the effectiveness and feasibility of driver restraints and of the costs of the incorporation of restraints into the design.

Other cases illustrative of the approach taken in Owens have been decided by this Court. See Kinzie v. AMF Lawn & Garden, Division of AMF, Inc., 167 Mich.App. 528, 533-535, 423 N.W.2d 253 (1988), lv. den. 431 Mich. 863 (1988); Petto v. The Raymond Corp., 171 Mich.App. 688, 693-695, 431 N.W.2d 44 (1988), lv. pending. In Scott, supra, a case where the contention of insufficient evidence was made in the context of the press manufacturer's failure to supply a guard as a safety device to protect a switch mechanism from being accidentally bumped, this Court stated:

"Allen Bradley next contends that Scott failed to present sufficient evidence to establish defective design according to Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp, 414 Mich 413; 326 NW2d 372 (1982). Owens established that the plaintiff must present evidence concerning the magnitude of the risks involved and the reasonableness of any proposed alternative design. Owens, supra, [at] p 432 . Allen Bradley's expert testified that the company began producing switch guards sometime after 1955. Two guards were introduced at trial which cost approximately $1 each to produce. It was obvious that the proposed guards would not affect the...