Reeves v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections

• Decision Date: 26 January 2022
• Docket Number: No. 22-10064,22-10064
• Citation: 23 F.4th 1308
• Parties: Matthew REEVES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Warden, Holman Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

23 F.4th 1308

Matthew REEVES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Warden, Holman Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 22-10064

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Filed January 26, 2022

Lucie T. Butner, Allyson Dulac, Spencer Jay Hahn, John Anthony Palombi, Federal Defender Program, Inc., Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Richard Dearman Anderson, Beth Jackson Hughes, Polly Spencer Kenny, Alabama Attorney General's Office, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants-Appellants.

Before Wilson, Jordan, and Branch, Circuit Judges.

Jordan, Circuit Judge:

The Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections (the Commissioner or the ADOC) and the Warden of Holman Correctional Facility (collectively, the defendants) appeal the district court's order granting Matthew Reeves’ motion for a preliminary injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq . They also seek a stay of the district court's order. Following oral argument and a review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of preliminary injunctive relief and deny the motion for a stay.

I

Mr. Reeves, who was sentenced to death in Alabama for murder, see Reeves v. State , 807 So. 2d 18, 23–24 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), is presently incarcerated at Holman Correctional Facility. He is scheduled to be executed by lethal injection on January 27, 2022.¹

A

Alabama Act 2018-353 went into effect on June 1, 2018. As the district court explained, the Act "grants death row inmates a single opportunity to elect that their execution be carried out by ... nitrogen hypoxia

, in lieu of Alabama's default method, lethal injection." D.E. 83 at 5 (internal citations omitted). See Ala. Code § 15-18-82.1(a). Inmates like Mr. Reeves, who were sentenced to death prior to the Act's effective date, had until June 30, 2018, to elect nitrogen hypoxia in writing. See § 15-18-82.1(b)(2). The failure to do so operates as waiver of that method of execution under Alabama law. See id.

At some point between June 26, 2018, and the statutory deadline of June 30, 2018, Cynthia Stewart—who was then the Warden at Holman—obtained an election form created by the Federal Defenders for the Middle District of Alabama and had it distributed by Captain Jeff Emberton to every Holman death row inmate. She did so at the "direction of someone above her at the ADOC." D.E. 83 at 7. Inmates who wanted to elect that their execution be by nitrogen hypoxia

rather than lethal injection were to sign, date, and return the form. See D.E. 70-5. Mr. Reeves made no election.

On January 10, 2020, more than 22 months before his execution date was set, Mr. Reeves filed suit against the Commissioner and the Warden, alleging that the ADOC and Holman were violating his rights under the ADA in their enforcement and implementation of Ala. Code § 15-18-82.1(b)(2). Mr. Reeves alleged that "with IQ scores in the upper 60s and low 70s, his general cognitive limitations and severely limited reading abilities rendered him unable to read and understand the election form without assistance." D.E. 83 at 8. The Commissioner and the Warden, he asserted, failed to provide him—an intellectually disabled inmate—with a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.²

B

On November 4, 2021, before his execution date was set, Mr. Reeves filed a motion for a preliminary injunction requesting that the district court "enjoin the ADOC from executing him by any method other than nitrogen hypoxia

while his ADA claim remain[ed] pending." D.E. 83 at 9–10 (citing D.E. 27 at 2). Following supplemental briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued an order setting out its findings of fact and granting Mr. Reeves’ motion. The district court preliminarily enjoined the ADOC from executing Mr. Reeves by any method other than nitrogen hypoxia. See

id. at 37.

First, the district court determined that Mr. Reeves had Article III standing to assert his ADA claim. The district court cited to our unpublished decision in Smith v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections , No. 21-13298, 2021 WL 4817748, at *2–4 (11th Cir. Oct. 15, 2021) (concluding that an Alabama death row inmate with a similar ADA claim had standing), and "[saw] no reason to depart from that [case]." D.E. 83 at 11. The court concluded that "[Mr.] Reeves, like [Mr.] Smith, ha[d] alleged an injury, established causation, and his alleged injury [was] redressable by an order from th[e c]ourt." Id. at 11–12.

Second, the district court addressed Mr. Reeves’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that Mr. Reeves showed that he was substantially likely to succeed on the merits by proving that "(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he lacked meaningful access to the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities by reason of his disability; and (3) the public entity failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability." Id. at 14 (citations omitted). We set out the district court's analysis in detail below.

With respect to the first element of the ADA claim, the district court found that the record contained evidence that Mr. Reeves is disabled "under the broad construction of the ADA." Id. at 15. Neurological testing found Mr. Reeves’ IQ to be between 68 and 71. Additionally, one expert previously opined that Mr. Reeves was "essentially illiterate" and that it was "quite apparent" that he had never adequately learned to read or write. See D.E. 27-28. And a state expert had concluded that Mr. Reeves’ reading and spelling were at a 5th grade level.

Dr. Kathleen Fahey, a speech pathologist retained by Mr. Reeves, also testified that his "language competency was that of someone between the ages of 4 and 10." D.E. 83 at 16. She determined that Mr. Reeves could read at a 4th grade level but could only comprehend at a 1st grade level. The election form, which she ran through software programs designed to calculate the read-ability of the language utilized, "required an 11th grade reading level to be understood." Id. She testified that, in her professional opinion, Mr. Reeves was unable to comprehend the election form because of this "language disorder." See D.E. 78 at 38–39. The defendants failed to contradict Dr. Fahey's opinions, and the district court found that "[t]he evidence presented at this stage demonstrate[d] that [Mr.] Reeves’[ ] cognitive impairments and low intellectual functioning affect several major life activities, such as reading, writing, and comprehension, placing [Mr.] Reeves under the ambit of the ADA." D.E. 83 at 18.

As to the second element of the ADA claim, the district court found that Mr. Reeves was a qualified individual because Holman implemented a program, service, or activity (as broadly defined under the ADA) from which he was excluded due to the defendants’ failure to provide an accommodation. Captain Emberton, at then-Warden Stewart's direction, distributed over one hundred copies of the election form with over one hundred envelopes, giving one to each death row inmate. Captain Emberton also made an announcement on each tier where death row inmates are housed. "His only criterion [for distribution of the election form], and thus the only apparent eligibility requirement for this service, was whether an inmate was on death row at Holman at the time of the form's distribution." Id. at 21. As a death row inmate in June of 2018, Mr. Reeves was "clearly eligible to receive an election form and participate in the benefits tied to the form and its distribution." Id.

In addition, the district court determined that the form provided benefits, including notice of the new method of execution, the ease and ability of electing this new method, the avoidance of the "substantially painful" lethal injection, and the reservation of an inmate's right to challenge the constitutionality of the new execution protocol. See id. at 23. Mr. Reeves was denied meaningful access to these benefits because of his disability. Despite the ADOC's contentions, Captain Emberton's announcement was insufficient to constitute meaningful access to the form's benefits because there was no evidence that the explanation "was directed at or heard by [Mr.] Reeves." Id. at 25. Indeed, Captain Emberton testified that inmates who were not present or were sleeping would not have received his explanation. The court noted that although § 15-18-82.1 did not require the ADOC to distribute the election form, in voluntarily undertaking to do so the ADOC "imposed upon itself a duty to ensure that all inmates were able to meaningfully access [the] benefits tied to that service." Id. at 24.

On the third element of the ADA claim, the district court found that the defendants failed to provide Mr. Reeves with a reasonable accommodation, and his need for an accommodation was open and obvious. The defendants were aware of Mr. Reeves’ low IQ scores given prior litigation on the matter. And numerous documents in Mr. Reeves’ prison file contained notations by ADOC staff that he had "poor communication" and "trouble processing information." Id. at 30 (citing D.E. 42-1 at 126). ADOC staff also noted that Mr. Reeves was "fragile and easily confused" and "may have limited intel[lectual] abilities." Id. (citing D.E. 42-1 at 126). A prison mental health evaluation, for example, noted that Mr. Reeves "possibly cannot read." Id. (citing D.E. 27-37). Numerous other documents revealed that prison staff at Holman knew of Mr. Reeves’ disability, specifically his low reading level and comprehension abilities. "[M]ost informative," explained the court, was a 2015 inmate request slip from Mr. Reeves asking that some documents be read to him because he did not understand what they were. See id. at 31. In combination, these records "support[ed] [Mr.] Reeves’[ ] contention that the ADOC should have known [he] required a reasonable...