Reeves v. Jersey City

• Decision Date: 30 October 1951
• Docket Number: No. 51333,51333
• Citation: 16 N.J.Super. 231,84 A.2d 42
• Parties: REEVES v. JERSEY CITY et al.
• Court: New Jersey County Court

Page 231

16 N.J.Super. 231

84 A.2d 42

REEVES v. JERSEY CITY et al.

No. 51333.

Hudson County Court Law Division, New Jersey.

Oct. 30, 1951.

Louis G. Morten, Jersey City, attorney for plaintiff.

John B. Graf, Jersey City, attorney for defendants (Louis E. Saunders, Jersey City, of counsel).

DREWEN, J.C.C.

This matter is before the court on a separate trial of the law issues in the case (Rules 3:42--2; 3:30-2 and 5:2--1).

Plaintiff sues as the widow of Edward C. Reeves, deceased. The case pleaded is that Reeves, having served the prescribed time in good standing as a member of the Jersey City Police Department, was in 1936 retired therefrom at half-pay; that at the time of his death in December, 1940 he was still in good standing as a pensioner of the defendant pension fund; that plaintiff has not remarried and that all other facts and circumstances legally necessary to plaintiff's qualification under R.S. 43:16--3, N.J.S.A., as successor to her husband's pension rights at the time of his death were and are in all respects existent; and that notwithstanding the premises defendants have at all times failed and refused to recognize or satisfy plaintiff's right to the pension. Plaintiff demands as damages the accrued arrearage of pension payments, with interest, and also that judgment be entered 'in such form as may be required to establish the right of the plaintiff as the widow of said Edward C. Reeves, deceased, to receive a pension for so long as she remains unmarried equal to one-half of the pay of her deceased husband at the time of his retirement but not exceeding one thousand dollars, payable in such manner as pensions are paid that become come payable under the provisions of R.S. 43:16--3.'

There have been three prior suits by this plaintiff against legal entities and persons charged by her at the time as responsible for the administration of the pension fund respecting which her rights were and are claimed. The issues of law to be decided arise from the defense that in consequence of either or all of these prior litigations the subject-matter of the present suit is Res judicata or is similarly barred by estoppel.

The earliest of these prior suits was instituted in June, 1941, in the Second District Court of Jersey City and was brought to recover the accrued pension arrearages claimed as of that date. One of the defenses interposed declared that plaintiff was not the widow of Reeves, it being alleged that the marriage between them had been dissolved by a decree of divorce entered in the State of Florida at the suit of the husband on May 9, 1940. Whether that defense was finally established on the merits is still an open question and constitutes the core of the instant problem, as will appear.

Of the other two suits mentioned, one was by a bill in equity; the other was an action in the New Jersey Supreme Court. The records in these cases will be reviewed in their order.

The bill in Chancery was filed in October, 1941. In addition to the basic allegations bearing on her claimed right to the pension, plaintiff there pleaded that the Florida divorce by which she had been confronted in the district court action was the product of fraud, having been procured by perjured testimony, and that no process had been served on her in the cause. There was a motion to dismiss the bill on the grounds that (1) it disclosed no cause of action, this for the stated reasons that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, that the deceased husband's second wife was a necessary party to the suit and that plaintiff, as complainant in equity, was guilty of laches; (2) the Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction; (3) the subject-matter of the bill in consequence of the aforementioned action in the district court was Res judicata. The motion to strike was granted and the bill dismissed. The grounds for the dismissal as set forth in the order therefor were that the bill 'discloses no cause of action and that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for.' This determination can mean only that the court adjudged the bill of complaint to be deficient in its failure to show a cause in equity; in other words, that the court was without jurisdiction in the case as made by the bill. Manifestly, there was no disposition on the merits, and this result of plaintiff's attempt to litigate her claim in equity constitutes no bar to her present action nor one that renders its subject-matter Res judicata.

Plaintiff's action in the New Jersey Supreme Court was brought in May, 1945, after the dismissal of the Chancery suit. There was a motion to strike the complaint. It was decided on the ground, Inter alia, that the City of Jersey City, a defendant therein, was neither a proper nor a necessary party. Circuit Judge Thomas Brown, before whom the motion came as Supreme Court Commissioner, filed a memorandum which states in part: 'The motion to strike the complaint against the defendant, City of Jersey City, is granted as that defendant has no adverse interest against the plaintiff in the controversy and is not a necessary party for the complete determination of any question involved in the suit.' In accordance with leave given, an amended complaint was filed. The city again was made a defendant and the former controversy renewed. Again a motion to strike was made and granted, this time for the reason, as stated in a second memorandum: '* * * that the Treasurer of the city of Jersey City * * * is the custodian of the Pension Fund and for the other reasons set forth in the decision of this Court on a motion to strike the original complaint in this cause.' There was an order striking the amended complaint as to the city and final judgment in favor of the city was entered accordingly. As to the remaining defendants the Supreme Court suit ended in a voluntary discontinuance on March 14, 1946. The record of the action thus reviewed does constitute a bar to the present suit as against the City of Jersey City, but can be given no other effect upon the question here in dispute.

In the present case there have been certain motions which, while they do not influence the question for decision, should perhaps be noted for completeness of statement. First, the defendants moved to strike the complaint. That was denied. Later the plaintiff sought, by motions for summary judgment in whole or in part, to overcome the defense of Res judicata now in question. These also were denied. Needless to say, the results of these motions changed nothing.

Returning now to the suit in the district court. The judgment record there is as follows: 'Judgment in the above-entitled cause was entered in the (Second) District Court of Jersey City, Lewis G. Hansen, Esq., Judge, in favor of the said Defendant Firemen's and Policemen's Pension Fund Commission, and against the said Plaintiff Elizabeth M. Reeves, on the 24th day of September, A.D. 1941.' Plaintiff urges three reasons why this judgment is not a bar, viz.: (a) different parties; (b) different causes of action; (c) the judgment record is in truth a record not of a decision on the merits but of a strict ruling on a question of judisdiction. Concerning the first and second of these reasons, it is my opinion that as between the action in the district court and that before us there is substantial identity of parties as well as of causes pleaded, sufficient to constitute that action a complete bar to the present one, did we not have the remaining question with respect to the true import of the judgment record in dispute.

In Hudson Transit Corp. v. Antonucci, 137 N.J.L. 704, 706, 61 A.2d 180, 182, 4 A.L.R.2d 1374 (E. & A.1948) the court said: 'The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction on a question of law or fact, or on a question of mixed law and fact, once litigated and determined, is, so long is it stands unreversed, conclusive upon the parties and their privies, not only as to the subject of the particular action but also as to all future litigation touching the subject matter. This is so even though the prior and subsequent litigations involve different things, if there be substantial identity in the subject matter of the two. Where the right to relief in the one suit shall rest upon the same point or question which, in essence and substance, was litigated and determined in the prior suit, the parties and their privies are concluded, 'not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.' * * * Privity in the sense of this principle connotes such connection in interest with the litigation and the subject matter as in reason and justice precludes a relitigation of the issue. In a word, a litigant is entitled to his day in court but not to relitigate an issue once determined by a valid judgment.' See also Hoffmeier & Son v. Trost, 83 N.J.L. 358, 360, 85 A. 221 (Sup.Ct.1912); Mindolph v. Lippincott, 107 N.J.L. 468, 472, 155 A. 23 (E. & A.1931); City of Paterson v. Baker, 51 N.J.Eq. 49, 26 A. 324 (Ch.1893); In re Walsh's Estate, 80 N.J.Eq. 565, 569, 74 A. 563 (E. & A.1909).

The basic issues in the district court were the same as those here. Plaintiff there contended that she was the lawful widow of Reeves and that as such the legal requirements had been met entitling her to receive the pension. She makes the same contentions here. Plaintiff seeks to distinguish the district court suit from the present one on the further ground that here she has joined as defendants parties different from and additional to those in the district court. The point is not well taken. Assuming a meritorious determination in the district court, the parties defendant in the two suits would seem to be in sufficient privity to preclude relitigation. See Hudson Transit Corp. v. Antonucci, supra. See also Crossley v. Briscoe, 117 N.J.L. 474, 189 A. 381 (E. & A.1937).

There would appear to...