Reeves v. Structural Preservation Systems

• Decision Date: 12 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-C-1795.,98-C-1795.
• Citation: Reeves v. Structural Preservation Systems, 731 So.2d 208 (La. 1999)
• Parties: Joshua Douglas REEVES v. STRUCTURAL PRESERVATION SYSTEMS, et al.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

731 So.2d 208

Joshua Douglas REEVES v. STRUCTURAL PRESERVATION SYSTEMS, et al.

No. 98-C-1795.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 12, 1999.

Gracella G. Simmons, Collin J. LeBlanc, Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Baton Rouge, for Applicant.

Robert W. Thomas, William T. Fontenot, Thomas & Hardy, Lake Charles, for Respondent.

VICTORY, J.¹

We granted this writ to determine whether an employer committed an intentional act under the intentional act exception to the Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act") by directing an employee to move a sandblasting pot manually, a procedure which was prohibited by OSHA and which the employee's supervisor feared would eventually lead to injury. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeal and find that such conduct does not amount to an intentional act; thus, plaintiff's remedy is limited to the Workers' Compensation Act.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 5, 1994, plaintiff, Joshua Reeves ("Reeves"), was injured while moving a sandblasting pot in the course and scope of his employment as a general laborer for Structural Preservation Systems, Inc. ("SPS"), which was providing industrial sandblasting services at the PPG plant in Calcasieu Parish. A sandblasting pot is a large metal pot, approximately four feet high, which when empty weighs between 350 to 400 pounds and which can hold up to 1,000 pounds of sand. Although the pot had wheels at the base and a handle, OSHA required that a sticker be placed on the pot which read "DO NOT MOVE MANUALLY." On previous job sites, the pot was moved by a forklift. Reeves' supervisor testified that when SPS arrived at the PPG plant, SPS did not bring a forklift and although he requested a forklift several times, SPS never supplied one. The supervisor testified that he borrowed PPG's forklift on several occasions in order to move the pot. He also testified that because he feared that someone would eventually get hurt moving the pot manually, he sometimes moved the pot manually himself. The pot was also moved manually on numerous occasions by other SPS workers without incident.

On the day of the accident, the supervisor directed Reeves, one of his strongest workers, to manually move the pot approximately 40-50 feet.² Reeves had previously moved the pot manually by himself several times without complaint and had never had any trouble doing so. After Reeves had moved the pot about halfway with no trouble, the supervisor directed another worker, Darryl Chapman, to help Reeves. The supervisor testified that he felt they could move the pot safely. However, as Chapman positioned himself on one side of the pot and Reeves pulled on the other side, it fell over on Reeves, crushing his knee and injuring his back.

Reeves filed suit against SPS and its insurer and Chapman, alleging that his injuries were caused by the intentional acts of SPS and Chapman. Following a two day jury trial, the jury found that SPS's actions were intentional and awarded him damages for pain and suffering, lost wages and past and future medical expenses. The jury also found that contrary to Reeve's allegations, Chapman did not intentionally push the pot over on Reeves and Chapman was dismissed from the lawsuit. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that SPS committed an intentional act within the meaning of the intentional act exception because "SPS supervisory personnel knew that the sandblasting pot could not be moved safely without a tow motor and [that] moving it manually violated OSHA safety regulations, yet they failed to provide the appropriate equipment." Reeves v. Structural Preservation Systems, et al., 97-1465 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/98), 716 So.2d 58, 61. We granted a writ to consider the correctness of this ruling. Reeves v. Structural Preservation Systems, et al., 98-C-1795 (La.10/30/98), 723 So.2d 966.

DISCUSSION

Since 1914, workers' compensation has traditionally been a quid pro quo remedy in that the employee is entitled to fixed benefits if his injury occurs during the course and scope of his employment, regardless of the employer's lack of fault or the employee's own fault, and in exchange, the employer is relieved of the prospect of large damage judgments. However, until 1976, employees were free to pursue other tort remedies against executive officers and co-employees for their work-related injuries. By Act 147 of 1976, the legislature amended the Workers' Compensation Act in two important respects. It provided that workers' compensation shall be the exclusive remedy against not only the employer, but also against any principal, officer, director, stockholder, partner or employee of the employer or principal who was engaged at the time of the injury in the normal course and scope of his employment. It also provided that the employee is not limited to workers' compensation and may pursue any other remedy where his compensable injury resulted from an intentional act.

As amended in 1976, Section 1032(B) reads:

Nothing in this Chapter shall affect the liability of the employer, or any officer, director, stockholder, partner or employee of such employer or principal to a fine or penalty under any other statute or the liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an intentional act.

La. R.S. 23:1032(B).

The legislative history is very enlightening as to the intent of the legislature in drafting this exception. The amendment was introduced as House Bill No. 354 and contained an exception from the exclusive coverage of the Act for the liability of the employer resulting from "an intentional or deliberate act." The House debated and rejected two amendments offered on the bill. The first amendment would have provided an award of double the normal compensation against an employer when the death, injury or disease "is caused by the employer's violation of a recognized safety rule or regulation, his failure to provide a safety device required by a recognized safety rule or regulation or by a statute, or by gross negligence on the part of a supervisory employee ..." Official Journal of the House of Representatives, June 4, 1976, H.B. 354, p. 20. The second amendment would have provided that the exclusive coverage of the Act did not apply "if such injury or compensable sickness or disease is caused by the gross negligence, as hereinafter defined, of said party or parties. Gross negligence exists when there is such disregard of the interest of others that the tortfeasor's conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonable careful man under like circumstances. Ordinary negligence sufficient to sustain a cause of action under Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code is not sufficient to constitute gross negligence as defined in this section." Official Journal of the House of Representatives, June 4, 1976, H.B. 354, p. 21. The Senate likewise debated and rejected two similar amendments. Official Journal of the Senate, July 12, 1976, p. 42. The Senate also removed the words "or deliberate" from the bill without objection. Official Journal of the Senate, July 12, 1976, p. 41. As commentators have stated, "[t]he only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the legislative process is that both houses of the legislature rejected attempts to make the exception any broader than `intentional' acts of the employer, thereby giving the exception a narrow scope, limited to conduct which is truly intentional." Malone & Johnson, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Volume 14, Workers' Compensation Law & Practice, § 365, p. 206 (3rd ed.1994). "Even if the alleged conduct goes beyond aggravated negligence, and includes such elements as knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, knowingly ordering claimant to perform an extremely dangerous job, or willfully failing to furnish a safe place to work, this still falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of accidental character." Larson, 2A Workmen's Compensation Law, § 68.13 (1989).

In determining the meaning of the phrase "intentional act," this Court took into account the intent of the legislature in Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 480 (La.1981) as follows:

After considering broader penalties that would have provided double benefits for an employer's violation of a safety rule, failure to provide a safety device required by law, or gross negligence on the part of a supervisory employee, which caused injury, death or disease, Official Journal of the House of Representatives, June 4, 1976, H.B. 354, p. 20, our legislature chose to impose a sanction for intentional wrongs by making the exclusive remedy rule inapplicable to such acts. Because of the general practice of severely punishing intentional wrongdoers, which is widely accepted in the field of workers' compensation, because of the received meaning and acceptance of the statutory language, and considering the object of the legislation, we conclude that the words "intentional act" mean the same as "intentional tort" in reference to civil liability.

We held that the meaning of "intent" in this context "is that the person who acts either (1) consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or (2) knows that the result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result." 397 So.2d at 481. In Bazley, where the plaintiff did not allege that his co-employee either desired the consequences of his acts or believed they were substantially certain to follow his acts, we held that the co-employee's acts of operating a garbage truck without a working horn, disregarding mechanical and electrical maintenance standards, failing to keep a lookout, failing to stop in a safe place and failing to warn plaintiff of danger did not amount to an intentional act. Id.

Since the Bazley case, this Court has continued to narrowly construe the...