Rega v. Rega
| Decision Date | 25 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | C/A No. 1:19-259-JMC-PJG |
| Parties | Robert Gene Rega, Plaintiff, v. Lorraine Rega, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Plaintiff Robert Gene Rega filed this state law action to recover damages from his former sister-in-law, Defendant Lorraine Rega, invoking the court's diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Plaintiff files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Both parties are proceeding without counsel. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 83, 90, 145.1) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised the parties of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if they failed to respond adequately to the opposing party's motion. (ECF Nos. 85 & 93.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendant's motion, which Plaintiff supplemented, and to which Defendant replied.2 (ECF No. 100.) Defendant's motion for summary judgment is also her response to Plaintiff's motion.
The court previously recommended that this matter be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (ECF No. 115), but the assigned United States District Judge rejected the Report and Recommendation and found that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. (ECF No. 141.) Accordingly, the parties' motions are now ripe for adjudication on the merits. Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court concludes that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted in part and denied in part.
The parties strongly disagree over the facts in this case. The central issue in this case is whether Defendant broke an agreement she had with Plaintiff to use some of Plaintiff's money to take care of Plaintiff's mother. Plaintiff is incarcerated in Pennsylvania. Defendant lives in South Carolina and was previously married to Plaintiff's brother.
In his verified pleading, Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated between 2015 and 2018, he regularly spoke with Defendant by telephone to arrange for care of his mother, who lives in Pennsylvania and was diagnosed with early stage dementia and Alzheimer's disease in 2017. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11, ECF No. 15 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that in April 2017 he sent Defendant $1,480 in "petty cash" via his attorney so that Defendant could make "online purchases" for Plaintiff's mother. (Id. ¶ 14.) He also alleges that in February 2018 he sent a check for $2,500 to his mother, representing Plaintiff's personal savings, but then had those savings transferred to Defendant by way of money orders for "safe keeping." (Id. ¶ 16, ECF No. 15 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant agreed to not use that money for any reason and to return the money at Plaintiff's request. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff alleges that in March 2018 he requested that Defendant use up to $400 of his "petty cash" to buy a digital surveillance system for his mother's home, whichDefendant agreed to monitor and report any problems to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant purchased the surveillance system with Plaintiff's mother's debit card instead, so Plaintiff reimbursed his mother. (Id. ¶ 18.)
However, Plaintiff alleges he and Defendant disagreed over how to properly sync Defendant's cell phone to the surveillance system. (Id. ¶¶ 20-22., ECF No. 15 at 5-6.) Plaintiff alleges he and Defendant "tentatively discussed" having his mother's assistant mail the system to Defendant so that she could sync her phone to the system. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff further alleges he and Defendant discussed the "possibility" he would have his laptop mailed to Defendant for safekeeping, and he alleges Defendant "agreed to hold and secure" the laptop if it was sent. (Id. ¶ 23, ECF No. 15 at 6.)
Plaintiff alleges he never finally decided whether to have the surveillance system and laptop mailed to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 28, ECF No. 15 at 7.) Instead, Plaintiff alleges, in August 2018, Defendant misled Plaintiff's mother's caretaker into believing that Plaintiff authorized the shipping of the surveillance system and laptop to Defendant, and the caretaker shipped them to Defendant that day. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) Plaintiff alleges he "acquiesced to the preemptive shipping" of the items because Defendant assured him that she would return them at his request. (Id. ¶ 31.)
After that, Plaintiff alleges, Defendant began making excuses for why she would not use his petty cash to make purchases Plaintiff requested she make for his mother. (Id. ¶ 33, ECF No. 15 at 8.) Plaintiff also alleges that he began requesting that Defendant send him $300 of his money every weekend but Defendant gave him excuses why she could not send it. (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff alleges that sometime between September 25 and October 18 of 2018, he repeatedly called Defendant requesting that his entire savings, laptop, and surveillance system be mailed to his mother. (Id. ¶ 36, ECF No. 15 at 8-9.) Plaintiff alleges he has received only $300 from Defendant,that Defendant has refused to take his calls, and that Defendant contacted Plaintiff's prison to ask that Plaintiff be prohibited from calling her. (Id. ¶¶ 36-39, ECF No. 15 at 9.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant has unlawfully retained $2,200 of his personal cash, the digital surveillance system worth approximately $400, and his laptop with propriety software for a car sensor worth $83,700. (Id. ¶ 42, ECF No. 15 at 9-10.) Plaintiff claims Defendant used their personal history and his trust in her to scam him out of his property. (Id. ¶ 41, ECF No. 15 at 9.)
Defendant's verified response in opposition to Plaintiff's motion and motion for summary judgment asserts a very different version of the facts. Defendant alleges Plaintiff sent her $1,480 or $1,500 that Defendant was to use to buy items for Plaintiff's mother. (Def.'s Mot. Summ J., ECF No. 90 at 4; ECF No. 90-1 at 2.) Defendant also alleges Plaintiff sent her another $2,500 that was meant for Plaintiff's needs and Plaintiff's mother's needs. (Id., ECF No. 90 at 4.) Defendant claims the money was spent only on Plaintiff and Plaintiff's mother, including money for Plaintiff's mother's nursing home and Plaintiff's hospital bills. (Id., ECF No. 90-1 at 2, 4.)
Defendant asserts she purchased the digital surveillance system for Plaintiff's mother's house, but Plaintiff's mother refused to allow the system to be installed in the house because Plaintiff's mother did not want "spies on her." (Id., ECF No. 90 at 4.) Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff asked her to buy an outdoor security surveillance system, which she did, but Plaintiff's mother again refused the cameras. (Id., ECF No. 90 at 7.) Defendant claims Plaintiff refused to allow Defendant to return the items for a refund and Plaintiff instead had Plaintiff's mother's caretaker mail the indoor surveillance system to Defendant as a "gift," and the outdoor surveillance system was left in Plaintiff's mother's closet. (Id., ECF No. 90 at 4-5, ECF No. 90-1 at 7.)
As to the laptop, Defendant asserts Plaintiff gifted it to her and that she gave the laptop to charity. (Id., ECF No. 90 at 13.) Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff cannot prove that he everowned the laptop considering the laptop was purchased in 2010 and Plaintiff has been in prison since 1996. (Id., ECF No. 90-1 at 9.) Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff has no proof that the car sensor software ever existed or that Plaintiff's brother was capable of designing such software. (Id., ECF No. 90-1 at 13-14, 16.) Also, Defendant questions the mental competency of Plaintiff's mother, who signed an affidavit swearing to seeing Plaintiff's brother design the software. (Id., ECF No. 90-1 at 16.)
Defendant asserts that the property she retained—a surveillance camera and the laptop—were kept with the clear understanding that it was a gift from Plaintiff to Defendant, and that she made no promises to Defendant regarding the property or entered into any contractual arrangement. (Id., ECF No. 90 at 5, 12, 14.)
Plaintiff filed this action on January 20, 2019. Plaintiff lists various state law causes of action seeking damages on tort, contract, and equitable theories of relief. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts causes of action for conversion, fraud, negligence, trespass, replevin, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff seeks specific damages of $86,300 for his lost property and $100,000 in punitive damages.3
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, ...
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