Regan v. City of Charleston, C.A. No. 2:13–cv–3046–PMD.

• Citation: 131 F.Supp.3d 541
• Decision Date: 14 September 2015
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 2:13–cv–3046–PMD.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: James REGAN, Jesse Faircloth, Michael Pack, Thomas Haffey, Jacob Stafford, and Kyle Watkins, Each on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, Defendant.

131 F.Supp.3d 541

James REGAN, Jesse Faircloth, Michael Pack, Thomas Haffey, Jacob Stafford, and Kyle Watkins, Each on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, Defendant.

C.A. No. 2:13–cv–3046–PMD.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division.

Filed Sept. 14, 2015.

131 F.Supp.3d 543

Ben Leclercq, Leclercq Law Firm, Mt. Pleasant, SC, Carlos V. Leach, Jeffrey Corbett Moore, Morgan and Morgan, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Caroline Wrenn Cleveland, Caroline Wrenn Cleveland Law Office, Charleston, SC, for Defendant.

ORDER

PATRICK MICHAEL DUFFY, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Charleston, South Carolina's ("Defendant" or "the City") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 126) ("Motion"). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court denies the City's Motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs James Regan, Jesse Faircloth, Michael Pack, Thomas Haffey, Jacob Stafford, and Kyle Watkins ("Plaintiffs"), current or former employees of the City's Fire Department ("Department"), commenced this action on November 7, 2013, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, seeking unpaid overtime compensation pursuant to the collective action provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). More specifically, the above-named Plaintiffs, as well as those who have subsequently given notice of their consent to join this action, are current or former firefighters¹ who were paid by the City pursuant to the fluctuating workweek ("FWW") method.

Plaintiffs' Complaint primarily alleges that the City's pay plan—in particular its incentive-pay ("IP") provision—failed to comply with the statutory and regulatory requirements pertaining to the FWW method. Plaintiffs' Complaint also asserts claims related to the method by which the City previously compensated firefighter recruit trainees. Moreover, Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that certain named Plaintiffs, as well as others similarly situated, were not properly compensated for training hours that they contend constituted compensable time under the FLSA. Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the City's alleged violations of the FLSA were willful and knowing. Plaintiffs seek an award of unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid overtime compensation, attorneys' fees, costs, and interest. In response to these allegations, the City admits that it utilized the FWW method but contends that its pay plan was lawful and in compliance with the FLSA and all applicable rules and regulations. Accordingly, the City has denied the asserted claims and any resulting liability.

On February 7, 2014, Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification of a proposed primary class and several subclasses. Following extensive briefing and a status conference, the Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification on July 16, 2014. Although the Court declined to conditionally certify Plaintiffs' proposed subclasses, the Court did conditionally certify the following primary class:

All persons employed in a non-exempt capacity by the City of Charleston, South Carolina at any time from November 7, 2010 to the present who served, or trained to serve, as a uniformed suppression member of the City of Charleston Fire Department, and who were paid pursuant to the City's Fluctuating Workweek pay plan.

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In conditionally certifying this matter as a collective action, the Court authorized Plaintiffs to provide putative class members with notice of the opportunity to opt-in to this lawsuit. To date, over 200 firefighters have joined this action.

On February 23, 2015, prior to the discovery deadline, the City filed the instant Motion, seeking the entry of partial summary judgment in its favor based on certain affirmative defenses.² Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to the City's Motion on March 16, 2015. The City filed a Reply on March 24, 2015, and Plaintiffs filed a Sur–Reply on April 8, 2015. Following additional discovery,³ the City filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law in support of the instant Motion on June 19, 2015, and Plaintiffs responded in like manner on June 30, 2015. Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for consideration.⁴

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To grant a motion for summary judgment, a court must find that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The judge is not to weigh the evidence but rather must determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir.1990). "[I]t is ultimately the nonmovant's burden to persuade [the court] that there is indeed a dispute of material fact. It must provide more than a scintilla of evidence—and not merely conclusory allegations or speculation—upon which a jury could properly find in its favor." CoreTel Va., LLC v. Verizon Va., LLC, 752 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir.2014)(citations omitted) (citing Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir.2002)). "[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate." Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir.1991). Summary judgment is not "a disfavored procedural shortcut," but an important mechanism for weeding out "claims and defenses [that] have no factual basis." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

DISCUSSION

By way of the instant Motion and accompanying Memorandum in Support, the City requests that the Court grant partial summary judgment in its favor "based solely on affirmative defenses ple[aded] pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 259and 260and the applicable limitations period." (Def.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 1.) Although Plaintiffs have not identified any material facts in dispute,⁵ they vehemently oppose

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the present Motion. The Court will address the City's arguments seriatim; however, before doing so, both a thorough explanation of the FWW method and a more detailed examination of the City's pay plan are required.

I. The FLSA and the FWW Method

A. The FLSA

The FLSA "is a remedial statute designed to 'eliminate ... substandard labor conditions' in the United States." Gaxiola v. Williams Seafood of Arapahoe, Inc., 776 F.Supp.2d 117, 124 (E.D.N.C.2011)(quoting Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 510, 70 S.Ct. 755, 94 L.Ed. 1017 (1950)). "The FLSA is best understood as the 'minimum wage/maximum hour law.' " Trejo v. Ryman Hosp. Props., Inc., 795 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir.2015)(quoting Monahan v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 95 F.3d 1263, 1266 (4th Cir.1996)). "In enacting the FLSA, Congress intended 'to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours.' " Id. (quoting Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981)). Consequently, the FLSA's substantive sections "narrowly focus[ ] on minimum wage rates and maximum working hours," id. (quoting Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1267), requiring the payment of a minimum wage and providing specific limits on the maximum hours an employee may work without receiving the requisite overtime compensation, see id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)). Following the Supreme Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985), these requirements also apply to state governments and their municipal subdivisions. See West v. Anne Arundel Cty., 137 F.3d 752, 760 (4th Cir.1998)(citing Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005); Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1267(same).

The FLSA "generally requires employers to compensate employees at the overtime rate for all work performed over 40 hours per week." Roy v. Cty. of Lexington, 141 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir.1998); see also Flood v. New Hanover Cty., 125 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir.1997)("As a general rule, the FLSA provides that an employer may not employ an employee for a workweek longer than forty hours unless it pays its employee one and one-half times the employee's 'regular rate' for all hours in excess of forty."). The general rule is that an employer must pay employees overtime using the "time-and-a-half method" for work performed in excess of forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)( "[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees ... for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.")...