Regan v. Ensley
Decision Date | 04 June 1920 |
Docket Number | No. 20821.,20821. |
Citation | 283 Mo. 297,222 S.W. 773 |
Parties | REGAN et al. v. ENSLEY. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Montgomery County; E. S. Gantt, Judge.
Suit for partition by Mary Alice Regan and another against William Ensley. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
Claude R. Ball, of Montgomery City, for appellants.
W. C. Hughes, of Montgomery City, for respondent.
This is a suit to partition certain town lots in New Florence, Montgomery county. Mary Alice Regan and Sarah Anderson, appellants, and William Ensley, respondent, are the children of Solomon and Rebecca Ensley, through whom appellants claim title by descent as tenants in common to the lots in question. A trial in the circuit court resulted in a finding that appellants had no title to the property and, that the fee in same was in the respondent. From the judgment rendered thereon, appellants have prosecuted this appeal.
Solomon Ensley died testate in April, 1896, seized in fee of the lots, which at the time he occupied with his wife as a homestead. The pertinent portions of his will are as follows:
Rebecca, relict of Solomon, continued after his death to occupy the premises, not only during her widowhood, but after her marriage to one Austin, and until her death in March, 1917. The authority of the testator to devise the lots which constituted his homestead is the matter at issue. The applicable statute is the amendatory act of the homestead laws (Laws 1895, p. 185) in force at the time of the testator's death (Balance v. Gordon, 247 Mo. loc. cit. 131, 152 S. W. 358). Sections 6704 and 6708, R. S. 1909, are in no material features different from the relevant portions of the act of 1895, which in the first section prescribes the limitations upon the right of the disposal of a homestead as follows: "
And in the second section defines the manner in which such homestead shall pass and vest, as follows:
[1] Under these statutes appellants contend that the inhibition therein upon the alienation of a homestead, whether by devise or otherwise, is absolute; and upon the death of the testator a life estate in the property vested in his widow with a vested remainder in the parties hereto, appellants and respondent, which ripened into a fee upon the death of the widow. While homestead laws are purely statutory in their origin, their salutary intent is such as to incline the courts to uniformly construe them with great liberality. Such construction, however, should not extend beyond the plain purpose of their enactment as evidenced by the usual and obvious meaning of the words employed, or dispense with the necessity of parties bringing themselves within the spirit and purpose of the laws unaided by judicial construction. Dalton v. Simpson, 270 Mo. loc. cit. 300, 193 S. W. 546; Keeline v. Sealy, 257 Mo. 498, 165 S. W. 1088; Sperry v. Cook, 247 Mo. 132, 152 S. W. 318; Hines v. Duncan, 79 Ala. 112, 58 Am. Rep. 580; Fred v. Bramen, 97 Minn. 484, 107 N. W. 159, 114 Am. St. Rep. 740; Charless v. Lamberson, 1 Iowa, 435, 63 Am. Dec. 457.
[2, 3] Mindful of these rules, the meaning of the statute as applied to the facts at bar should not be difficult of determination. That the homestead interest upon the death of the husband vests as a conditional life estate in the widow we have repeatedly held. Bushnell v. Loomis, 234 Mo. 371, 137 S. W. 257, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1029; Snodgrass v. Copple, 203 Mo. 480, 101 S. W. 1090; Hufschmidt v. Gross, 112 Mo. 649, 20 S. W. 679; West v. McMullen, 112 Mo. 405, 20 S. W. 628; Rhorer v. Brockhage, 86 Mo. 544. In this far, therefore, no question can arise as to the correctness of appellants' contention. That one of the conditions under the statute on which the widow's estate was terminable, viz. her marriage, need not concern us, as it did not the parties hereto. She continued in the possession and occupancy of the premises thereafter until her death, and if any conclusion is to be drawn as to the character of her tenure after her marriage it is that thenceforth she was holding under the will and not under the statute. In any view of this phase of the facts it cannot affect appellants' title.
A further provision of the statute is that the children of a householder or head of a family shall upon his death use and occupy the homestead jointly with his widow during her tenure and thereafter until each of such children reaches its legal majority. The effect of this statute is to create in said children...
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