Regan v. Grill Concepts-D.C., Inc.

Decision Date05 October 2004
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A.02-884 AK.,CIV.A.02-884 AK.
Citation338 F.Supp.2d 131
PartiesJames P. REGAN, Plaintiff, v. GRILL CONCEPTS-D.C., INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Karen Ann Khan, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

David Patrick Durbin, Deborah M. Whelihan, Jordan, Coyne & Savits, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

KAY, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case is before the Court by consent of the parties to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge, filed on March 25, 2003. The Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") [30] on July 14, 2004. The Plaintiff filed his Memorandum in Opposition ("Opposition") [32] on August 6, 2004, and the Defendant filed its Reply to the Opposition ("Reply") [33] on August 21, 2004.

I. BACKGROUND

James P. Regan, a resident of the Commonwealth of Virginia, was employed as a manager of the Daily Grill at both its Georgetown location and its M Street location between May 14, 2001 and April 26, 2002. On February 25, 2002, two months prior to his being terminated from his employment, Regan was suspended from his position. The Plaintiff claims that the reason that he was suspended, and ultimately terminated from his employment, was because he complained to management about harassment and discrimination that he believed was occurring at the restaurant. (Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts, ¶ 100.) The Defendant contends that Plaintiff's employment was terminated because of complaints made by other Daily Grill employees of sexual harassment, in which the Plaintiff was the alleged perpetrator. (Motion at 2.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment Standard

A party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings and evidence show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, the nonmoving party must present more than a "scintilla of evidence" and must come forward with specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the evidence presented by the nonmoving party is "merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).

In the context of discrimination cases, summary judgment should be approached with special caution because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent and disparate treatment. Morgan v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 172 F.Supp.2d 98, 104 (D.D.C.2001) ("While summary judgment must be approached with special caution in discrimination cases, a plaintiff is not relieved of [his] obligation to support [his] allegations by affidavits or other competent evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.") (quoting Calhoun v. Johnson, Civil No. 95-2397, 1998 WL 164780 at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1998)) (citation omitted); Ross v. Runyon, 859 F.Supp. 15, 21-22 (D.D.C.1994). These standards do not eliminate the use of summary judgment in discrimination cases. See, e.g., Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (finding that District Court's grant of summary judgment was proper and overturning Court of Appeals decision that reversed District Court); Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1132 (D.C.Cir.2002) (upholding grant of summary judgment for defendant in Title VII case alleging racial discrimination and retaliation); Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 448 (D.C.Cir.1999) (upholding grant of summary judgment for defendant in Title VII suit alleging racial and gender discrimination and retaliation). Summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut," but is an integral procedural tool which promotes the speedy and inexpensive resolution of every case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

B. Legal Standard for Claims under DC Human Rights Act

The DCHRA prohibits an "employer" from discriminating against its employees. D.C.Code § 1-2525. In analyzing a claim of employment discrimination under the DCHRA, courts look to Title VII and its jurisprudence. Knight v. Georgetown Univ., 725 A.2d 472, 478 n. 5 (1999); Daka, Inc., v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 92 n. 14 (1998); Goos v. National Ass'n of Realtors, 715 F.Supp. 2, 3 (D.D.C.1989)(applying the analysis in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) to case brought under DCHRA). This Court too, will consider Plaintiff's claims under DCHRA utilizing the case law developed for suits brought under Title VII.

The requirements for a prima facie case of discrimination are flexible and vary depending on the type of case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Here, to establish a claim of gender discrimination, the Plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination. Dickerson v. SecTek, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d. 66, 73 (D.C.Cir.2002)(quoting Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 334 U.S.App.D.C. 92 (D.C.Cir.1999)). To establish a claim of hostile work environment, the Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he has been subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) that the harassment was based on membership in the protected class, and (4) that the harassment is severe and pervasive enough to affect a term, condition or privilege of employment. Lively v. Flexible Packaging Association, et al., 830 A.2d 874 (D.C.2003)(citing Daka v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 92 (D.C.1998)); Howard University v. Best, 484 A.2d 958 (D.C.1984). Finally, to establish a claim of retaliation, the Plaintiff must prove that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he was subjected to adverse employment action; and (3) that a causal connection exists between the two. Brodetski v. Duffey, 199 F.R.D. 14, 19 (D.D.C.2001); Hastie, 121 F.Supp.2d at 79-80; Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C.Cir.1985)(quoting McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d 783, 790 (D.C.Cir.1984)); See also, Carney v. American University, 151 F.3d 1090, 1094 (D.C.Cir.1998); Thomas v. National Football League Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 202 (D.C.Cir.1997).

In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the Supreme Court established a burden-shifting framework that governs the analysis of discrimination and retaliation claims. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The Plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Then the burden shifts to the Defendant "to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for the action. Id. If the Defendant meets this burden, then the presumption of discrimination is rebutted and drops from the case. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The Plaintiff must then show that the articulated reason was a pretext and that the actual reason was discriminatory. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817. At all times, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the Plaintiff to prove that she was subjected to discrimination. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d at 458.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Gender Discrimination

As stated above, the Plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. To that end, the Plaintiff must show (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination. Dickerson v. SecTek, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d. 66, 73 (D.D.C.2002)(quoting Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 334 U.S.App.D.C. 92 (D.C.Cir.1999)). The Court is mindful that the initial burden is not great, and that within the context of a motion for summary judgment it must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The first two prongs are met with relative ease. The Plaintiff is a male and was terminated from his employment. The prong that requires a more detailed analysis is whether the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.

Plaintiff's claim of gender discrimination is based on the allegation that Plaintiff was treated differently from other individuals who were also accused of sexual harassment. (Opposition at 17.) In support of this claim, the Plaintiff argues that he complained to his superiors about sexually inappropriate behavior and comments made by other employees in the restaurant and that his superiors took no corrective action and did not even consider his complaints to be `sexual harassment' complaints. (Motion at 9-11, 14.) To the contrary, according to Plaintiff, when a female employee, Jennifer Bezdicek, complained of sexually inappropriate behavior against Regan, the supervisors of the restaurant took immediate action to investigate and handle the situation. (Motion at 11-14.)

The Defendant makes two principal arguments. First, according to the Defendant, the Plaintiff's claim of gender discrimination was not properly pled to the Court and as such, is not properly at issue in this case. (Reply at 9.) The Court does not agree. Count One of the Plaintiff's complaint is for Discrimination under the DCHRA. (Complaint at 10.) Paragraph 45, contained in Count One, states, "Plaintiff was also subjected to disparate...

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