O'REGAN v. Preferred Enterprises, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-CC-1602.,98-CC-1602.
• Citation: 758 So.2d 124
• Parties: Michelle O'REGAN and Ryan O'Regan v. PREFERRED ENTERPRISES, INC. d/b/a Number One Cleaners, et al.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

758 So.2d 124

Michelle O'REGAN and Ryan O'Regan v. PREFERRED ENTERPRISES, INC. d/b/a Number One Cleaners, et al.

No. 98-CC-1602.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 17, 2000.

Christine S. Tenley, John J. Hainkel, III, Frilot, Partridge, Kohnke & Clements, New Orleans, Counsel for Applicant.

George Brian Recile, Chehardy, Sherman, Ellis, Breslin & Murray, Metairie; Jonathan Beauregard Andry, Andry & Andry, New Orleans; Gary Mark Zwain, Duplass, Zwain & Bourgeois, Metairie; Dominic Joseph Gianna, Marshall Joseph Simien, Jr., Middleberg, Riddle & Gianna, New Orleans; Stephen Nolan Elliott, Bernard, Cassisa & Elliott, Metairie; Robert Edward Barkley, Jr., Nicholas Dale Doucet, Barkley & Thompson, New Orleans; David B. Bartel, Michael L. Zaleski, Quarles & Brady, Counsel for Respondent.

ON REHEARING

KNOLL, Justice.¹

At issue before us is the question of whether an employee who has a disease presumed to be non-occupational under LA. REV. STAT. 23:1031.1(D)² is barred from pursuing a remedy in tort against her former employer by the exclusivity of rights and remedies provision recognized in LA. REV. STAT. 23:1031.1(H).³ Finding that the presumption of non-occupational disease excludes plaintiff from the remedies available under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act, we affirm this State's longstanding jurisprudence that when there is no remedy, there is no immunity in tort for the employer. Boyer v. Crescent Paper Box Factory, 143 La. 368, 78 So. 596 (1917).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Preferred Enterprises, d/b/a Number One Cleaners, (Preferred) employed Michelle O'Regan (O'Regan) from July 1990 through November 1990. O'Regan worked at the counter and plied a chemical (methoxyethanol) with her bare hands into the clothing to remove spots. In 1993, after she left the employ of Preferred, O'Regan was medically treated for sinus problems and was diagnosed with severe anemia. She was diagnosed as suffering from myelodysplasia, a form of aplastic anemia which causes the bone marrow to produce abnormal cells.⁴ The disease can take many years to manifest itself and exposure to toxic chemicals can cause the disease.

In a worker's compensation action against Preferred, O'Regan contended that she was exposed to a chemical during her four-month employment at Preferred and that as a result of her exposure she contracted myelodysplasia. Originally, a hearing officer denied O'Regan workers' compensation benefits, finding that O'Regan did not meet her burden of proving her claim by an "overwhelming preponderance of the evidence," and thus failed to overcome the statutory presumption that the disease was "non-occupational and not to have been contracted in the course of and arising out of [her] employment." The hearing officer properly determined that O'Regan was held to this higher burden of proof because she had to overcome the presumption required by LA. REV. STAT. 23:1031.1(D), because she was employed by Preferred for less than twelve months. The Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, affirmed the hearing officer's determination. O'Regan v. Number One Cleaners, 96-769 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/12/97), 690 So.2d 103.⁵

O'Regan next pursued a timely filed tort suit against Preferred alleging negligence and intentional misconduct.⁶ Preferred answered the petition with a general denial and further urged that O'Regan failed to state a cause of action because her exclusive remedy was in workers' compensation. Thereafter, Preferred filed a motion for summary judgment on the negligence claims, urging that plaintiffs sole remedy was limited to a workers' compensation action.

After the trial court denied Preferred's motion for summary judgment, Preferred perfected a supervisory writ to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit. The appellate court summarily denied the writ, stating that "[o]n the showing made we find no error in the trial court's ruling." After Preferred filed a writ application with this court, we remanded the case to the appellate court for briefing, argument, and an opinion. O'Regan v. Preferred Enters., Inc., 98-0060 (La.3/13/98), 712 So.2d 861.

On remand, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court, finding that Preferred's tort immunity was inapplicable because O'Regan's injury did not fit into the workers' compensation scheme. We granted Preferred's writ application to resolve this issue: Whether an employee who has suffered a disease presumed to be non-occupational under LA. REV. STAT. 23:1031.1(D) is entitled to sue her employer in tort. O'Regan v. Preferred Enters., Inc., 98-1602 (La.10/30/98), 723 So.2d 965. For the following reasons, we affirm.

ANALYSIS

In essence, we are called upon in this suit to construe LA. REV. STAT. 23:1031.1(D), supra n. 1, in the context of the Workers' Compensation Act. Accordingly, it is appropriate for us to review the general rules of statutory interpretation and to recall what we have specifically stated regarding the interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act.

Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will; therefore, interpretation of a law is primarily the search for the Legislature's intent. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2; Cat's Meow v. City of New Orleans, 98-0601 (La.10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1198. The starting point for interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885 (La. 1993). When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law is applied as written, and no further interpretation may be made in search of legislative intent. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9. However, when the language of a law is susceptible to different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law, and the meaning of ambiguous words must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole. LA. CIV. CODE art. 10. In addition, laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other. LA. CIV. CODE art. 13.

Furthermore, as we have cautioned before, when interpreting the Workers' Compensation Act, courts must take into account the basic history and policy of the compensation movement. Roberts v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 92-2048 (La.3/21/94), 634 So.2d 341, 345.

Overview of the Workers' Compensation Act

In interpreting the statute at issue, it is likewise appropriate for us to observe Atchison v. May, 201 La. 1003, 10 So.2d 785, 788 (1942), wherein Justice McCaleb, commenting on the Workers' Compensation Act, stated:

The act, which is social legislation, was passed for the joint benefit of labor and management in order to insure that employees who became disabled as a result of their labors in hazardous industries would have, during the period of their disability, a weekly income for the upkeep of themselves and their families. It was also deemed advisable to provide for compensation, in cases of death, to the persons dependent upon the employee for support so that these persons would not be entirely bereft of funds during the period of time following the employee's death when they, of necessity, were compelled to reconstruct their lives and seek a means of support,—thus avoiding the possibility that these persons would become public charges. In order that this end might be accomplished, the Legislature provided for sacrifices to be made by both the employer and the employee. The employee was required to waive the right granted him under the general law, Article 2315 of the Civil Code, in consideration of receiving a fixed percentage of his wages during the period of his disability. The employer, on the other hand, was deprived of the defenses afforded to him by the general law and he was assured that, in case any of his employees were injured, they would be entitled to no more than the amount stipulated in the statute as compensation during the period of disability.

History of Occupational Diseases under the Workers' Compensation Act

It is noteworthy that although 1914 La. Acts 20 introduced Louisiana to a system which addressed the claims of injured workers free from tort analysis, it was not until 1952 that the Legislature established statutory authority allowing for the coverage of occupational diseases under Louisiana's workers' compensation law. With the passage of 1952 La. Acts 532, every employee who was "disabled because of the contraction of an occupational disease" was entitled to workers' compensation "the same as if said employee received personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment." The statute provided a definition of an "occupational disease," which stated, in pertinent part, that "[a]n occupational disease shall include only those diseases hereinafter listed when contracted by an employee in the course of his employment as a result of the nature of the work performed." LA. REV. STAT. 23:1031.1(A) (1952). This exclusive list included diseases caused by contact with specific substances, namely the diseases of contact poisoning from enumerated sources, asbestosis, silicosis, dermatosis, and pneumoconiosis. LA. REV. STAT. 23:1031.1(A) (1952). Coverage was also provided for diseased conditions caused by exposure to X rays or radioactive substances. Subsequently, in 1958 La. Acts 39 the Legislature added tuberculosis as one of the specified occupational diseases, if it was "contracted during the course of employment by an employee of a hospital or unit thereof specializing in the care and treatment of tuberculosis patients." LA. REV. STAT. 23:1031.1(A) (1958). It was further stated in Paragraph F of 1952 La. Acts 532 and 1958 La. Acts 39 that the rights and remedies granted to an employee for occupational diseases for which "he [was] entitled to [workers'] compensation shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents or relatives."

It was with the enactment...