Regents of The Univ. of Mich. v. Titan Ins. Co.

Decision Date31 July 2010
Docket NumberDocket No. 136905.,Calendar No. 1.
Citation487 Mich. 289,791 N.W.2d 897
PartiesREGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN and University of Michigan Health System, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TITAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
487 Mich. 289
791 N.W.2d 897


REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN and University of Michigan Health System, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
TITAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.


Docket No. 136905.
Calendar No. 1.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 9, 2010.
Decided July 31, 2010.

791 N.W.2d 898

Miller & Tischler, P.C. (by Ronni Tischler), Southfield, for plaintiffs.

Anselmi & Mierzejewski, P.C. (by Mark D. Sowle), Bloomfield Hills, for defendant.

Gross & Nemeth, P.L.C. (by James G. Gross), Detroit, for amicus curiae Auto Club Insurance Association.

Speaker Law Firm, PLLC (by Liisa R. Speaker), and Sinas Dramis Brake Boughton & McIntyre PC (by George T. Sinas), Lansing, for amicus curiae Coalition Protecting Auto No-Fault.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, B. Eric Restuccia, Solicitor General, and Ann M. Sherman and C. Adam Purnell, Assistant Attorneys General, for amicus curiae Michigan Assigned Claims Facility.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, B. Eric Restuccia, Solicitor General, and Robert Ianni, Raymond O. Howd, and James P. Delaney, Assistant Attorneys General, for amicus curiae Department of Community Health.

Plunkett Cooney (by Mary Massaron Ross and Hilary A. Ballentine), Detroit, for amicus curiae Insurance Institute of Michigan.

Steven A. Hicks for amicus curiae Michigan Association for Justice.

Opinion

MARILYN J. KELLY, C.J.

487 Mich. 292

We examine whether MCL 600.5821(4), which preserves state entities' rights to bring certain claims, also preserves the right to seek recovery of all damages incurred notwithstanding the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1). We hold that MCL 600.5821(4) exempts the state entities it lists from the

487 Mich. 293
one-year-back rule. As a consequence, we overrule Liptow v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.,1 which held to the contrary, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We also overrule Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n,2 on which the Liptow decision relied exclusively in reaching its conclusion.
791 N.W.2d 899

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Nicholas Morgan was severely injured in an automobile accident in March 2000. He was treated at the University of Michigan Health System for six days. Less than one year after the accident, Morgan sought personal protection insurance benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility (MACF). Because he was not covered under a no-fault insurance policy, the MACF designated Titan Insurance Company as the servicing insurer for his claims. In January 2006, the University of Michigan Health System and the university's regents filed this lawsuit against Titan, seeking payment from defendant for Morgan's medical treatment. Plaintiffs sought reimbursement of the full cost of Morgan's hospitalization, which they alleged was $69,957.19.

Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1) 3 barred plaintiffs from recovering the claimed damages. Plaintiffs countered that MCL 600.5821(4) 4 allows the state and its political subdivisions to file suit without limitation

487 Mich. 294
and entirely supersedes MCL 500.3145(1). They asserted that MCL 600.5821(4) exempts certain suits brought by public entities from "the statute of limitations" and allows initiation of such actions "at any time without limitation, the provisions of any statute notwithstanding." The trial court agreed with defendant and dismissed the suit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided decision.5 The majority concluded that, under MCR 7.215(J)(1), it was bound to follow the Liptow decision and uphold the trial court. Judge Davis agreed that Liptow was controlling, but opined that it had been wrongly decided and that the Court should convene a conflict panel pursuant to MCR 7.215(J)(2) and (3). Initially, we denied leave to appeal,6 but on reconsideration, we vacated the denial order, granted reconsideration, and granted leave to appeal. 7

MCL 600.5851(1)—THE MINORITY/INSANITY PROVISION

An analysis of this Court's rulings on the issues implicated in this case naturally begins with

487 Mich. 295
Lambert v. Calhoun.8 Lambert held that MCL 600.5851(1) 9 preserves
791 N.W.2d 900
a claim by a minor or incompetent person even though the statute of limitations in the act under which the claim is brought bars the action.

Four years later, the Court of Appeals in Rawlins v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. followed Lambert.10 It held that MCL 600.5851(1) preserves a no-fault claim by a minor even though it would otherwise be barred by the limitations period in the no-fault act.

Shortly after, in Geiger v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch.,11 the Court of Appeals held that MCL 600.5851(1) preserves a claim by a minor or incompetent person for personal protection insurance benefits even though it would otherwise be barred by the one-year-back rule. Geiger remained the prevailing law in this state for the next 24 years.

CAMERON AND LIPTOW

In 2006, in Cameron, this Court overruled Geiger in a 4 to 3 decision. The majority held that the minority/insanity provision in MCL 600.5851(1) did not remove the plaintiff's claim from application of the one-year-back rule. The analysis stated:

487 Mich. 296
By its unambiguous terms, MCL 600.5851(1) concerns when a minor or person suffering from insanity may "make the entry or bring the action." It does not pertain to the damages recoverable once an action has been brought. MCL 600.5851(1) then is irrelevant to the damages-limiting one-year-back provision of MCL 500.3145(1). Thus, to be clear, the minority/insanity tolling provision in MCL 600.5851(1) does not operate to toll the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1).[12]
Accordingly, the majority held that a statute governing when a party may bring an action does not affect the damages recoverable under the one-year-back rule.

In Liptow, the Court of Appeals examined the interplay of the one-year-back rule and MCL 600.5821(4). Relying solely on Cameron, it stated:

Thus, the pertinent question is whether the damages-limiting portion of MCL 500.3145(1), the one-year-back rule, limits the [claimant's] recovery. This Court's ruling in Univ. of Michigan Regents [ v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 250 Mich.App. 719, 733, 650 N.W.2d 129 (2002)] is of no assistance in this determination. The issue appears to be one of first impression.
MCL 600.5821(4) provides that actions brought by the state or its subdivisions to recover the cost of maintenance, care, and treatment of persons in state institutions "are not subject to the statute of limitations and may be brought at any time without limitation, the provisions of any statute notwithstanding." We conclude that, by the plain import of this language, the Legislature intended to exempt the state from statutes of limitations when bringing an action to recover public funds. The language refers to statutes of limitations and provides that an action may be brought at any time. But the statute does not address damage limitation provisions or any other limiting provisions. In other words, like
791 N.W.2d 901
the minority tolling provision, MCL 600.5821(4) concerns the time during which the state
487 Mich. 297
may bring an action; it "does not pertain to the damages recoverable once an action has been brought." Cameron, supra, 476 Mich. at 62 [718 N.W.2d 784]. Accordingly, we conclude that MCL 600.5821(4), like the minority tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1), does not operate to toll the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1). Cameron, supra, 476 Mich. at 61-62 [718 N.W.2d 784]. Therefore, we hold that defendant is liable to the [claimant] only for costs it incurred for [the patient's] care, maintenance, and treatment in state institutions within one year before the filing of the complaint.[13]

ANALYSIS

This case presents questions of statutory interpretation which are reviewed de novo.14

No party disputes that MCL 600.5821(4) preserves plaintiffs' right to bring the instant cause of action. The question before us is whether MCL 500.3145(1) restricts plaintiffs' recovery to damages incurred one year before plaintiffs filed suit. The answer turns on the correct understanding of the interaction between MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5821(4). It is undisputed that all of plaintiffs' costs were incurred between March 18 and March 23, 2000. Thus, if the one-year-back rule applies to their claim, plaintiffs are entitled to no damages.

Defendant relies on Liptow, which held that the one-year-back rule governs actions to which MCL 600.5821(4) applies because the statute does not exempt state entities from its limitation on damages. We disagree.

Defendant's argument and the holding in Liptow rest on a fundamentally incorrect premise. Liptow reasoned

487 Mich. 298
that (1) MCL 600.5821(4) exempts state entities from any statute of limitations, (2) the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1) is not a statute of limitations, but a damages limitation, and therefore (3) MCL 600.5821(4) does not exempt a governmental entity from the one-year-back-rule of MCL 500.3145(1).15 This premise is derived from our decision in Cameron. Therefore, we are required to revisit Cameron's analysis.

The Cameron majority concluded that actions brought pursuant to MCL 600.5851(1) are subject to the one-year-back rule because that statute does not implicate when a plaintiff may "bring an action." We conclude that the statutory language in MCL 600.5851(1) and MCL 500.3145(1) does not command the conclusion that the Cameron majority reached.

To begin with, we conclude that the approach in Cameron was flawed because it read the statutory language in isolation. MCL 600.5851(1) does not create its own independent cause of action. It must be read together with the statute under which the plaintiff seeks to recover. In no-fault cases, for example, MCL 600.5851(1) must be read together with MCL 500.3145(1). Doing so, the statutes grant infants and incompetent persons one year after their disability is removed to "bring the action" "for recovery of personal protection...

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