Regents of University of Mich. v. Labor Mediation Bd.
| Decision Date | 30 July 1969 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. 5559,No. 2,I,AFL-CI,AFL-CIO,5564,2 |
| Parties | , 72 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2855 REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, a constitutional body corporate, Appellant, and Board of Control of Central Michigan University, a constitutional body corporate, Intervenor-Appellant, v. LABOR MEDIATION BOARD, Appellee, and Washtenaw County Building and Construction Trades Council,, and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,ntervenors-Appellees |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
William M. Saxton and Robert J. Battista, Detroit, for U. of M.
Byron P. Gallagher, Mt. Pleasant, for CMU.
Eugene Krasicky, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for Labor Board.
Ronald J. Prebenda, Detroit, for Washtenaw Co. Bldg. and Const.
A. L. Zwerdling, Detroit, for AFL-CIO.
Before McGREGOR, P.J., and BURNS and DANHOF, JJ.
The University of Michigan is an institution of higher education established by the constitution and by law, having authority to grant baccalaureate degrees. Plaintiff, Regents of the University of Michigan, is the constitutionally designated body granted the authority to generally supervise and control the university. Defendant, Labor Mediation Board, is a State administrative agency created by P.A.1939, No. 176, as amended, (M.C.L.A. § 423.3 (Stat.Ann.1968 Rev. § 17.454(3))). Plaintiff employs academic and nonacademic personnel. Defendants, Washtenaw County Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO, and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations who filed a petition with defendant Labor Mediation Board for certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for certain nonacademic employees of the university. Defendant, Labor Mediation Board, held a hearing on the petition and plaintiff objected to defendant Board's assuming jurisdiction of the matter on the basis that plaintiff was a constitutional body corporate, had exclusive control of the university and was, therefore, not subject to P.A.1947, No. 336, P.A.1965, Nos. 379 and 397*. Defendant Board ruled that plaintiff was a public employer under the act and, therefore, subject to its jurisdiction.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that the provisions of P.A.1965, No. 379 contravene the provisions of Const. 1963, art. 8, §§ 5 and 6. The trial court held that it did not, and that the plaintiff was subject to the provisions of the act. Plaintiff appeals. Plaintiff and defendant agree that the issue is whether P.A.1947, No. 336, P.A.1965, No. 379 is unconstitutional if it applies to the plaintiff.
As stated by the trial court this is not a question of whether collective bargaining is good or bad, but rather, only a desire on the part of the plaintiff to proceed in a legal manner.
P.A.1965, No. 379 granted to public employees certain benefits of collective bargaining and organization which they did not have before. In addition, it placed administrative duties upon the defendant Labor Mediation Board.
The act in question was passed pursuant to the provisions of Const.1963, art. 4, § 48 which provides:
'The legislature may enact laws providing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees, except those in the state classified civil service.'
Plaintiff claims, however, that as applied to it the act contravenes a portion of Const.1963, art. 8, § 5 which says:
'Each board shall have general supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds.'
The employees involved in this action are nonacademic employees who have in fact organized under the provisions of P.A.1947, No. 336, P.A.1965, Nos. 379 and 397.
At the outset we must first determine whether the employees in question and 'public employees' so as to the included within the provisions of the applicable statute, and in so doing we must determine whether the plaintiff is a 'public employer.' Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed.) defines 'public' as 'pertaining to a state, nation, or whole community; proceeding from, relating to, or affecting the whole body of people or an entire community.' Also,
In addition, Const.1963, art. 8, § 5 provides:
'The board of each institution (of which the University of Michigan is one) shall consist of eight members who shall hold office for terms of eight years and who shall be elected as provided by law.'
Thus, the plaintiff derives its being from a provision of the basic law of this State, the constitution, which was adopted by the people of this State in 1963. The election laws further provide that the regents shall be elected at the general election which is held in the fall of every even-numbered year. A further indication that the plaintiff is a public institution is found in Const.1963, art. 8, § 4 which provides, 'The legislature shall appropriate moneys to maintain the University of Michigan,' and we recognize that the legislature does each year appropriate moneys to maintain the plaintiff. There moneys are tax moneys derived from general taxation on all of the people of this State, and the legislature is the only body that has the power to appropriate the public funds of this State. Further, the Supreme Court has recognized that the University is a State agency within the executive branch of State government and that the regents thereof are State officers. See People for Use of Regents of University of Michigan v. Brooks (1923), 224 Mich. 45, 194 N.W. 602; Attorney General, ex rel. Cook, v. Burhans (1942), 304 Mich. 108, 7 N.W.2d 370.
We conclude on the basis of the foregoing that the plaintiff is a public body corporate deriving its being from the people, and is supported by the people, and the regents, who are State officers, are elected by the people. Thus, the plaintiff is a public employer. Therefore, the employees in question are public employees within the provisions of Const.1963, art. 4, § 48 and as defined in M.C.L.A. § 423.202 (Stat.Ann.1968 Rev. § 17.455(2)).
While recognizing that the plaintiff is a public employer and the employees in question are public employees, we also recognize that this plaintiff, because of the provisions of Const.1963, art. 8, § 5, is a unique public employer. Its powers, duties and responsibilities are derived from the constitution as distinguished from other public employers whose authority is derivative from enactments of the legislature. Thus, because of the grant of authority contained in Const.1963, art. 8, § 6, giving the plaintiff general supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds, we must further examine the provisions of P.A.1965, No. 379 as they apply to this plaintiff.
Over the years the Supreme Court has jealously guarded the authority granted to the plaintiff as it relates to educational matters and the expenditures of funds of the University of Michigan. See Weinberg v. Regents of University of Michigan (1893), 97 Mich. 246, 56 N.W. 605; Sterling v. Regents of University of Michigan (1896), 110 Mich. 369, 68 N.W. 253, 34 L.R.A. 150; People ex rel. Regents of the University v. Auditor General (1868), 17 Mich. 161. This Court also recognized this independence in Branum v. Board of Regents of the University of Michigan (1966), 5 Mich.App. 134, 145 N.W.2d 860. But it is also clear that the plaintiff is subject to the general laws of the State. In Peters v. Michigan State College (1948), 320 Mich. 243, 30 N.W.2d 854 the Supreme Court held that the defendant, whose powers are not unlike those of the plaintiff here, was subject to the workmen's compensation laws of this State. There Justice Reid, writing for affirmance said on p. 250, 30 N.W.2d on p. 857:
'We find that the workman's compensation act is a valid constitutional exercise of the power of the legislature even when it makes necessary the expenditure of agricultural college funds in the compensation of employees under the terms and within the provisions of...
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