Regents of University of California v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 12 November 1970
• Parties: , 476 P.2d 457 The REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; Kenneth L. KARST et al., Real Parties in Interest. L.A. 29731.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 57

91 Cal.Rptr. 57

3 Cal.3d 529, 476 P.2d 457

The REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent Kenneth L. KARST et al., Real Parties in Interest.

L.A. 29731.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Nov. 12, 1970.

Thomas J. Cunningham, Berkeley, Donald L. Reidhaar, San Francisco, Warren S. Levin and William H. McKenzie, Berkeley, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Charles H. Phillips, Richard H. Borow, Steven L. Sloca, Margolis, McTernan, Smith, Scope & Herring, Margolis & McTernan, John T. McTernan, and Barry Nakell, Los Angeles, for real parties in interest.

TOBRINER, Justice.

Petitioner, the Regents of the University of California, seeks a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 400 ¹ to command the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to transfer an action to the Superior Court of Alameda County and to vacate a summary judgment entered after the denial of petitioner's motion to change venue but before the filing of this petition for a writ of mandate. We shall set forth our reasons for concluding that the venue for the action properly lies in Los Angeles County. We do not reach the merits of the summary judgment since the present action, initiated pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 400, involves only the question of venue.

On October 3, 1969, real parties in interest Karst, Kaplan, Glasgow, Moore, and Deutsch (hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs) filed a taxpayers' action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against the Regents of the University of California. The first cause of action seeks a judgment declaring that certain resolutions adopted by the Regents in the 1940's, in the 1950's, and in September 1969, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and that the expenditure of public tax monies in the furtherance of these resolutions transgresses constitutional protections. The second cause of action seeks a permanent injunction restraining the Board of Regents, and all of its agents, servants, and employees, from expending public funds in the implementation of these resolutions. Prohibiting the hiring by the university of members of the Communist Party, the resolutions direct that steps be taken to terminate the employment of Angela Y. Davis, an assistant professor at the university's Los Angeles campus, by reason of such membership.

On October 7, 1969, plaintiffs filed a notice of a motion for summary judgment to be heard on October 20, 1969. (Code Civ.Proc. § 437c.) On October 9, 1969, pursuant to leave of court, Miss Davis (hereinafter referred to as intervenor) filed a complaint in intervention. Her complaint incorporates most of the factual allegations of the taxpayers' first cause of action. It further alleges that the resolutions adopted by the Regents as well as the proceedings to terminate her employment violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 9, 10, and 13 of the California Constitution. The intervenor asks that the court grant the relief requested by plaintiffs, enjoin the termination of her employment by reason of her membership in the Communist Party, and order the restoration of her status as assistant professor of philosophy at the Los Angeles campus.

On October 10, 1969, the Regents filed a notice of a motion for change of venue, seeking to transfer the cause of the Superior Court of Alameda County on the grounds that the action is transitory and that the Regents of the University of California, a corporation, legally resides in Alameda County. The Regents also filed a general demurrer as to each of the taxpayers' causes of action.

In accordance with the above notices, the court, on October 20, 1969, heard all of such matters. The court denied petitioner's request for a change of venue and overruled its demurrer; the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, but took the intervenor's claims under submission. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 400, petitioner petitioned the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, for a writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal determined that a peremptory writ of mandate should issue, 2 Cal.App.3d 924, 83 Cal.Rptr. 549, instructing the trial court to vacate and set aside its order granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and to transfer the action to Alameda County. Thereafter we granted plaintiffs' petition for a hearing in this court.

Although the Constitution designates petitioner as a corporation, the rules of venue generally applicable to proceedings against state agencies govern actions against the Regents. Charged with almost exclusive responsibility for administering the university, ² the Board of Regents has been variously characterized as an institution of the state, a public corporation, a governmental agency, and a public entity. (Ishimatsu v. Regents of Univ. of California (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 854, 863--864, 72 Cal.Rptr. 756; Gov.Code, §§ 811.2, 7260.) Accordingly, rules of venue governing actions against private corporations (Cal.Const. art. XII, § 16) do not cover the Regents. (See Yedor v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 698, 700--703, 194 P.2d 95; De Campos v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 13, 16--19, 170 P.2d 60.)

Unless otherwise designated by statute, the provisions for venue that pertain to other civil actions apply to actions against state agencies and public entities. (Harris v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Bd. (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 759, 765, 18 Cal.Rptr. 151.) Section 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: 'In all other cases, except as in this section otherwise provided, and subject to the power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, the county in which the defendants, or some of them, reside at the commencement of the action, is the proper county for the trial of the action.'

Several sections of the codes covering actions against state agencies, officers, or public entities, however, operate to override the provision for trial in the county of the defendant's residence. In a few instances these code sections fix by law the venue for actions against some designated agencies. For example, suits against the Board of Medical Examiners must be tried either in Los Angeles, Sacramento, or San Francisco. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2109; McPheeters v. Bd. of Medical Examiners (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 46, 49, 168 P.2d 65.) ³ As in the case of all defendants, an action against the state based on an injury to a person or personal property or for wrongful death may be tried in the county where the alleged injury occurred. (Code Civ.Proc. § 395.) Similarly, an action based on a contract between the state and the plaintiff may be brought in the county where the contract was entered into, or the county where it was to be performed. (Code Civ.Proc. § 395.)

Other important exceptions to the general rule expressed in section 395 are sections 401 and 393 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 401 provides that whenever an action against the state or its agencies can be commenced in, or removed to, Sacramento County, the action may be tried in any city where the Attorney General has an office. ⁴ Section 401 applies, therefore, when a statute requires that the venue be in Sacramento County; ⁵ when the normal rules of venue allow trial there, as when the 'residence' of the agency is in Sacramento; ⁶ or when the case involves an act of a public officer that occurred there (Code Civ.Proc. § 393).

Section 393 is the remaining major exception to the general rules of venue. Subdivision (1)(b) of that section provides in part: 'Subject to the power of the court to transfer actions and proceedings as provided in this title, the county in which the cause, or some part thereof, arose, is the proper county for the trial of the following actions: * * * Against a public officer or person especially appointed to execute his duties, for an act done by him in virtue of his office; or against a person who, by his command or in his aid, does anything touching the duties of such officer.' ⁷

No statute expressly designates the venue for actions against the Board of Regents. Since plaintiffs' action does not rest on contract ⁸ or personal injury, and since it cannot be removed to Sacramento County, neither the tort nor contract provisions of section 395, nor the provisions of section 401, apply. The parties do not question the fact that the residence of petitioner is in Alameda County, the place of its principal administrative office. Accordingly, unless section 393 permits the trial of the cause in Los Angeles County, petitioner may properly demand, pursuant to section 395, the transfer of the action to Alameda County. Only if, for the purposes of venue, petitioner is a 'public officer' within the meaning of section 393 and if all or part of the taxpayers' action arose in that county may the action be tried in Los Angeles County.

1. The corporation known as the Regents of the University of California is a 'public officer' within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 393.

The underlying purpose of statutory provisions as to venue for actions against state agencies is to afford to the citizen a forum that is not no distant and remote that access to it is impractical and expensive. To that end, such provisions should be liberally construed in favor of the private litigant. ⁹ As the court stated in Harris v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Bd., supra, 197 Cal.App.2d 759, 763, 18 Cal.Rptr. 151, 154: 'It is the duty of the courts within the framework of the statutes passed by the Legislature, to interpret the statutes so as to make them workable and reasonable.' ¹⁰ In recommending the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure, section 401, the California State Bar Committee on Administration of Justice noted: ...