Reger v. Ariz. RV Ctrs., LLC
| Citation | 515 F.Supp.3d 915 |
| Decision Date | 26 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-CV-778-MGG |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
| Parties | Kevin REGER, Plaintiff, v. ARIZONA RV CENTERS, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
Phillip A Luetkehans, Pro Hac Vice, Luetkehans Brady Garner & Armstrong LLC, Itasca, IL, for Plaintiff.
T. Michael Pangburn, Trevor Q. Gasper, Thor Industries Inc., Elkhart, IN, for Defendants.
Michael G. Gotsch, Sr., United States Magistrate Judge In August 2015, Plaintiff Kevin Reger ("Reger") purchased a 2015 Tuscany 44MT motorhome ("the RV") from Defendant Arizona RV Centers, LLC ("ARV") in Mesa, Arizona. The chassis of the RV was manufactured by non-party Freightliner and Defendant Thor Motor Coach, Inc. ("Thor") assembled the rest of the RV atop Freightliner's chassis. The RV came with limited warranties from both Thor and Freightliner. Reger also purchased an extended service plan ("ESP") for the RV. Soon after purchasing the RV, Reger discovered defects with the RV including but not limited to rust and corrosion throughout the vehicle and cracks in the roof among several other issues. To address all the issues arising from his purchase of the RV, Reger initiated this lawsuit against Thor and ARV on November 16, 2016, raising seven claims.1
In the operative Third Amended Complaint ("the Complaint"), Reger raises claims of breach of express warranty under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (Count II); violation of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act ("IDCSA"), Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5 et seq. (Count III); and common law fraud (Count VIII) against Thor. As to ARV, Reger asserts claims of breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Count IV); revocation of acceptance (Count V); violation of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act ("ACFA"), A.R.S § 44-1521 et seq. (Count VI); and common law fraud (Count VII). Thor and ARV now seek summary judgment on all claims.
This Court retains subject matter jurisdiction in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B) based upon Reger's claims for breach of warranty under the MMWA with an amount in controversy that exceeds $50,000.2 This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Reger's remaining state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. And with consent of the parties pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the undersigned may enter a ruling in this matter. [DE 28 ]. For the following reasons, Thor's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and ARV's motion for summary judgment is granted in full.
The following facts are primarily not in dispute. Any disputed facts are either not material or will be addressed in the substantive analysis below.
Reger is an Air Force veteran and a long-time businessman. In the Air Force, Reger performed aircraft maintenance. Among his early business endeavors was owning a mobile home park. He then became involved in real estate development and general contracting. Through his company in Illinois, Reger remains active in residential, commercial, and industrial property development. As part of his business, he deals regularly with assorted legal entities and contracts. He also negotiates contracts on his own before seeking advice of legal counsel.
Reger maintains a home in Managua, Nicaragua where he typically lives from October or November through May or June every year. The rest of the year, he lives in the United States residing in his RV. In August 2015, Reger visited ARV—also known as Camping World—to buy parts for an RV he owned. During that visit, another RV—the 2015 Tuscany 44MT—caught Reger's eye. He returned to ARV a few days later for a second look and a test drive. After negotiations with ARV on pricing and some exterior scratches, Reger purchased the RV for $282,999.00. On August 20, 2015, he secured financing for the RV and executed a Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement ("RICSA") with ARV. Reger returned to ARV the next day to pick up the new RV when he also signed the final Purchase Agreement with ARV.
As is common throughout the RV industry, Reger's RV came with several warranties. First, the Purchase Agreement defined the scope of any warranty from ARV, including limitations or exclusions as to such warranties. Second, Thor and Freightliner provided limited warranties consistent with their respective roles in the manufacture of the RV. Having manufactured the powertrain and automotive chassis frame of Reger's RV, Freightliner provided a limited warranty covering aspects of the chassis portion of the RV. Based upon its assembly of the "box" or house portion of the RV on top of the Freightliner chassis, Thor extended a written limited warranty covering defects in workmanship or materials, subject to a number of exclusions.
Shortly after his purchase, Reger noticed a host of problems with his RV, including some rust and corrosion. He returned the RV to ARV to resolve those issues. But as time passed, he discovered more problems and sought further repairs from ARV, Thor, and other RV dealers. He was told that some of the issues were not covered by warranty. Reger was dissatisfied with explanations he was given for the problems leading him to refuse certain repairs that were offered or even undo certain repairs performed. After some repairs he deemed unsuccessful, Reger returned to Thor in the spring of 2016 at which time he was told by a Thor representative that the Freightliner chassis had been left outside at the Thor facility for some time before Thor assembled the RV.
Given the continuing problems with his RV, Reger hired Mr. Phillip J. Grismer, an expert in transportation and marine appraisal, to inspect his RV. In early October 2016, Mr. Grismer inspected the RV and reviewed the purchase and repair documents provided by Reger. Mr. Grismer's resulting appraisal report attributed many of the RV's problems to Thor's allegedly defective extension of the chassis's frame rails when assembling the RV. Mr. Grismer also opined that the RV could not have been "new" at the time of purchase given the quantity and far-reaching scope of defects with the RV that he observed or heard about from Reger.
On October 29, 2016, Reger's attorney sent a letter on his behalf to both ARV and Thor attempting to revoke his acceptance of the RV and cancel his contracts with both entities. [DE 88-3 ]. The letter also notified ARV and Thor of alleged breaches of warranties, violations of consumer protection statutes, and fraudulent conduct. Without a satisfactory response from ARV or Thor, Reger initiated the instant lawsuit on November 16, 2016. With discovery complete, Thor and ARV filed the instant motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the "pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must review the record, construing all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003).
Yet to overcome a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party cannot rest on the mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings. Rather, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Robin v. Espo Eng'g Corp. , 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000). Where a factual record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In other words, "[s]ummary judgment is not a dress rehearsal or practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events." Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory , 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted); see also Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc. , 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010).
Thor contends that Indiana law applies to Reger's Magnuson Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA") breach of express warranty claim. Thor's argument is surprising. In its motion to dismiss earlier in this litigation, Thor advocated for the application of Arizona law to Reger's warranty or contract claims, as well as his deceptive act or tort claims. [Compare DE 13 at 6–8, with DE 80 at 9, DE 95 at 1–2]. This Court then applied Arizona law to Reger's original implied warranty of merchantability claim without making any explicit finding as to the law applicable to Reger's original express warranty claim or even his original claim under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act ("IDCSA"). [DE 16 at 3–9]. Now Thor has challenged the application of Arizona law to the breach of express warranty claim. In response, Reger relies upon the same authority Thor once did to argue for application of Arizona law while Thor cites completely different authority for application of Indiana law without explanation for its shift in legal theory.
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